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Th1$ thesis Investigues senantic priming without conscious awareness 
of prime stim uli. It  also Investigates the hypothesis that anxiety 
responses may be made to emotionally aversive stimuli presented 
sub1Imlnally.
Following a review of literature  on semantic priming without 
awareness I t  I s  concluded that the phenomenon has not been adequately 
Investigated. It  Is  argued that an adequate Investigation requires 
presentation of primes below objective detection threshold and that 
satisfacto ry c riteria  for the definition  of objective threshold are 
lacking. Three criteria  are proposed. Using these an In it ia l 
experiment found semantic priming effects below objective threshold 
when stim uli were presented blnocularly In a backward pattern masking 
paradigm. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated th is finding with different 
samples of stimuli and participants. Experiment 4 replicated the 
finding with dichoptic stimulus presentation and found the magnitude 
of priming effect was Independent of the method of stimulus 
presentation (binocular or dichoptic).
A new variant of the semantic priming effect, an "emotional 
priming* effect Is  proposed. This hypothesises that priming effects 
can be obtained when primes and targets are related so le ly In terms 
of the ir emotional quality. Experiment 5 supported th is  hypothesis 
when primes were presented below objective detection threshold, 
though the effect was not replicated In two further experiments. 
Experiment 9 replicated both the "emotional* and conventional 
semantic priming effects with emotionally aversive targets when 
primes were presented below subjective detection threshold.
Experiment 10 showed that emotionally threatening stimuli


THE AIHS OF THE THESIS
CHAPTER 1
An elderly American psychologist of my acquaintance t e l ls  the story 
of how, when he was a young man, the f ir s t  question asked of a new 
academic colleague was "Are you an experimental or c lin ica l 
psychologist?" The Implication that one could not be both Is  now no 
longer (so) true as evidenced by the attempts of experimental 
psychologists to deal with c lin ica l topics such as emotional states 
(Posner A Snyder 1975; Bower 1981) and dynamic unconscious processes 
(Shevrln & Hickman 1980; Silverman 1985).
This thesis grew out of an Interest In a particu lar clinical 
problem and the conviction that Its  solution might well lie  In the 
application of research findings and techniques In  current 
experimental cognitive psychology. The problem I s  simply this: How 
are free floating anxiety (panic) attacks generated without apparent 
précipitants. The Important word here Is,  of course, ’apparent’ .
The onset of panic attacks might well be understood, in  principle, to 
resu lt from non-apparent, that Is, non-consclously perceived stimuli 
capable of Inducing threat. Such a speculation at once raises the 
old controversy of whether perception without awareness can occur. 
Recent reviews of hard experimental evidence by Shevrln and Dickman 
(1980) and Oixon (1981) c learly suggest that stim uli can Indeed be 
perceived without awareness though no one reading the paper by 
Holender (1986) could think that the pool of sceptics has been 
drained dry.
The thesis Is  divided Into four parts, the f ir s t  of which 
re-examines the perception without awareness Issue  from the 
standpoint of one particular experimental paradigm; semantic priming.
Following i  literature  review In Chapter Z, which discusses the 
nature of semantic priming with and without awareness of primes, the 
f i r s t  aim of the thesis is  announced In  Chapter 3 and explored 
experimentally In Chapters 4 to 6. The f ir s t  aim was to determine 
whether perception without awareness could occur by Investigating 
whether semantic priming effects could be obtained with emotionally 
neutral targets when primes were presented below objective detection 
threshold. Subsidary alms In Part I were to c la rify  certain 
methodological Issues associated with subliminal semantic priming.
The second part of the thesis had two alms. F irst,  to establish 
whether emotionally aversive target stim uli can be primed by 
emotionally neutral prime stimuli presented subllmlnally. Here the 
concept of an ’emotional priming’ effect as a variant of the 
conventional semantic priming effect I s  Introduced. Experimental 
work on thr:e two points I s  reported In  Chapters 7 to 12.
The third part of the thesis explores the hypothesis that 
psychological and psychophyslological components of anxiety can be 
generated by subliminal perception of emotionally threatening stimuli 
(Chapters 13 & 14).
In Part IV an attempt Is  made to draw together the experimental 
find ings of the f ir s t  three parts and a ’model* Is  presented which,
I t  I s  argued, may go some way towards explaining the generation of 
free floating anxiety attacks.
SEHANTIC PRIHIH6 WITH AHD WITHOUT AWAREHESS; A REVIEW OF LITERATURE
CHAPTER 2
The effect of subliminal stimulation can be assessed d irectly  or 
Indirectly. Direct assessment has a number of disadvantages 
associated with it .  F irst ly , while a subliminal stimulus may affect 
behaviour it  may not be processed In such a way that an intentional 
discrim inative response can be made d irectly  to It  and a direct 
assessment of subliminal stimulation cannot take th is  Into account. 
Secondly, participants see l i t t le  point In responding to a stimulus 
which they cannot detect and some have refused to complete the task 
assigned them (see Marcel 1983a, Experiment 1). Assessing the 
effects of subliminal stimulation by Indirect means I s  thu* 
appealing. Over the la st fifteen years an upsurge of Interest In 
non-consclous perception has coincided with the development of three 
experimental paradigms which enable an Indirect assessment of the 
effect of subliminal stimulation. The f ir s t  two, d ichotic listening 
and parafoveal vision, have been discussed by Holender (1986) and 
w ill not be discussed here. The third, subliminal semantic priming, 
w ill be discussed In some detail because I t  I s  the paradigm used In 
the experimental work reported In Chapters 3 to 12.
Studies of subliminal semantic priming can be seen as an 
extension of supraliminal studies in th is  fie ld. For th is  reason, 
before the subliminal research literature  I s  reviewed a brief, 
non-exhaustive review of the findings from supraliminal semantic 
priming experiments will be given.
In a typical semantic priming experiment participants are shown 
two consecutive letter strings. The f ir s t  is  generally referred to 
as the prime and the second as the target. Prime and target letter 
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strings may each spell a real word or a nonword. It  i s  usually the 
participants task to read the prime and then make a lexical decision 
about the target, that is,  to decide whether the target spells a real 
word or a nonword, although in  some experiments participants also 
make a lexical decision to the prime. Using one of these 
experimental paradigms it  has been found that targets are recognised 
as real words s ign ificantly  more quickly when they are preceded by 
semantically related primes (e.g. nurse-doctor, bread-butter) than 
when they are preceded by semantically unrelated primes (e.g. 
nurse-butter, bread-doctor). This finding i s  known as the semantic 
priming effect. (Heyer & Schvaneveldt 1971; Meyer, Schvaneveldt & 
Ruddy 1975; Fisch ler 1977; Neely 1976, 1977; Oannenbring & Briand 
1982; Balota 1983).
Semantic priming and type of prime-target relationship
Whilst there are many different types of semantic relationship 
(Chaffin & Herman 1984) few have been investigated in semantic 
priming experiments. Nevertheless, priming has been found to occur 
when primes are category names and targets are examples of the 
category (e.g. bird-robin; Neely 1977), when primes are antonyms or 
synonyms of the target (e.g. dry-wet; Becker 1980) and when primes 
and targets are semantically sim ila r (e.g. nurse-wife; Fischler 
1977) or strongly associated (e.g. bread-butter; Meyer at al.
1975). Prime-target pairs are considered to be strongly associated 
i f  large numbers of people give the target word in response to the 
prime in a free association test. Normative data from tests of free 
association are published (e.g. Postman & Keppel 1970; Palermo & 
Jenkins 1964; Bousfield, Cohen, Whitmarsh & Kincaid 1961) and the 
semantically related (SR) prime-target word pairs used in many
semantic priming experiments have been taken from these sources (e.g. 
Warren 1977). However, tests o f free association have also been used 
with Individual participants to establish personal associations which 
have subsequently formed SR prime-target pairs In a semantic priming 
experiment. Using th is technique Franklin and Okada (1982) found a 
sign ificant semantic priming effect which did not d iffe r 
sign ificantly  In magnitude from that In which the SR word pairs 
comprised normative associates. Moreover, the fa c ilita tio n  effect 
based on personal associations was evident not only Immediately after 
the prime-target pairings had been established but also 1-2 weeks 
later. Mckoon and Ratc liff (1979) found that semantic priming also 
occurred when primes and targets were neither personal nor normative 
associates but had been studied In their pairings Just prior to the 
experiment. Of particular Interest In Mckoon and R a tc lif f ’s study 
was the finding that the fa c ilita tion  In lexical decision time was 
not sign ificantly  different in magnitude to that which occurred with 
SR stimuli whose association was pre-experlmentally acquired and 
normative. Meyer and Ruddy (1974) found that b ilingual subjects were 
facilitated In their recognition of a target stimulus when i t  was 
preceded by a semantically related prime In another language and that 
the fac ilita tion  for mixed language pairs was comparable to that for 
same language pairs. Thus the semantic priming effect appears to be 
robust In the sense that It  can be replicated when primes and targets 
are related In a variety of ways.
Semantic priming with different experimental paradigms
Although many semantic priming experiments conform to the description 
of a typical experiment given above semantic priming has been 
Investigated In many diverse ways. Carroll and Slowcaczek (1986) for
exanpl«, Investigated the influence of p r iM S  on the speed of target 
processing when both words were embedded within a sentence. Taking 
the ainount of time that the eye fixates the target as a measure of 
processing speed they found that the target was processed 
s ign if ica n tly  more quick ly when it  was preceded by a semantically 
related prime rather than a neutral prime and that the priming effect 
was influenced by the syntactic structure of the sentence.
Semantic priming effects have also been found using non-verbal 
stim uli. For example, in an experiment with children HeCauley, Wei1 
and Sperber (1976) found that the time taken to name a picture was 
fac ilita ted  by the presentation of a picture prime which was 
semantically related to the target. Noreover, responses were made 
s ign if ica n tly  more quick ly when there was a high, rather than low, 
degree of association between the primes and targets.
Bruce and Valentine (1986) asked the ir subjects to decide i f  
target pictures were o f a familiar or unfamiliar face and found that 
seeing an associated face prior to the target sign ificantly 
fac ilita ted  decision time in comparison to seeing an unassociated 
face. Stimuli used in  th is  experiment included the pairings Prince 
Charles and Lady Diana; Eric  Norecambe and Ernie Wise.
Semantic priming has been demonstrated in the auditory modality 
too. Radeau (1983) fo r example, conducted an experiment in the 
French language in which subjects heard prime-target pairs and 
responded by pushing a lever one way to indicate that both stimuli 
were real words and the other way to indicate that the prime or the 
target, or both, were nonwords. ’Real* responses were sign ificantly  
faster when the prime and target were semantically related than when 
they were unrelated and the priming effect did not d iffe r 
s ign if ican tly  between adults and children of 6-7 years. It  seems 
clear from the studies discussed so far that the semantic priming
effect Is  not modality or language specific. It  1$ probably not 
merely a verbal phenomenon either although of course th is  needs to be 
Investigated with stimuli which cannot be encoded verbally.
Semantic and repetition priming effects
Not a ll studies of priming have Involved the use of different primes 
and targets. Priming by repetition of the target has aU o  been 
Investigated and In some studies compared with conventional semantic 
priming. Jackson and Norton (1984) Investigated repetition effects 
In a study In which participants guessed the Identity of words heard 
against a background of auditory noise. Results showed that correct 
responses were made sign ificantly  more often when subjects had 
previously read the words or heard them spoken In either a male or 
female voice. Scarborough, Gerard and Cortese (1984) found that 
lexical decision time was sign ificantly  shorter for words which had 
been included In a previous lexical decision task than for ’novel’ 
words, although th is  finding was not evident when b ilingual subjects 
performed the two different lexical decision tasks In d ifferent 
languages. Dannenbring and Briand (1982) used a lexical decision 
task to compare semantic priming effects with those of repetition.
In their study le tte r strings were presented one after the other and 
the number of le tte r strings between the prime and target were 
systematically varied. Results showed that semantic priming occurred 
only when the target was Imnediately preceded by the prime. However, 
repetition effects were significant not only when the prime and 
target were separated by up to 17 stimuli within one session but also 
when they were presented two days aparti Dannenbring and Briand 
(1982) also found that with a prime-target lag of zero repetition 
effects were s ign if ican tly  greater than those of semantic priming.
Some support for these f1nd1n9s come from a study of event related 
potentials (ERPs) by Rugg (1967). Rugg found that repetition had a 
considerably more profound effect on ERPs In terns of magnitude and 
duration of response than did semantic priming. 8ut It  Is  not dear 
whether semantic and repetition effects are due to different 
processes or whether the repetition effect Is  simply a particularly 
powerful form of semantic priming.
Factors affecting the magnitude o f semantic priming effects
Semantic priming has been found to aid recognition most when the 
target Is  particularly d iff icu lt  to recognise. Heyer et a l. (1975) 
found that fa c ilita tio n  was greater when the targets were degraded, 
by superimposing ’noise’ In the form of a grid of dots, than when 
they were le ft Intact. Becker and K llllon  (1977) found that a 
semantically related prime aided the recognition of the target more 
when the target was shown with reduced luminance than when I t  was 
clearly v is ib le . Bruce and Valentine (1986) found that a prime 
consisting of a fam iliar face aided recognition of the target face to 
a greater extent when the targets were blurred Images than when they 
were sharply focused. This finding I s  supported by Sperber,
McCauley, Ragain and Well (1979) who. In a series of naming tasks, 
also found that semantic priming aided the recognition of pictures 
and words to a greater extent when the Images were blurred.
Some studies Indicate that semantic priming I s  Influenced by the 
level at which the prime Is  processed. Henik. Friedrich and Kellogg 
(1983) found that when the prime was named their results supported 
previous research which found a fac ilita tion  in target lexical 
decision time and an Inhibition In colour naming (Stroop effect).
But. both these effects disappeared when the prime was searched for a
le tter and thus presumably processed non-senaiitlcally. However, Kaye 
and Brown (1965) found that semantic priming did occur when 
participants were asked to search the prime for a letter although not 
when they were asked to decide whether the prime was printed In 
capital or lower case letters. They argue that I t  Is  probably not 
depth of processing (semantic versus non-semantlc) that matters but 
the speed at which the prime I s  processeo. though of course speed and 
depth of processing jre not necessarily unrelated. Certainly time 
available for processir.i appears to be an Important factor. On the 
basis of data gathered after their experiment Fischler and Goodman 
(1976) divided the ir primes Into those which had fast naming 
latencies and those which had slow naming latencies. Ex post facto 
analyses revealed that targets which had been primed with 'fa s t *  
primes showed a large sign ificant semantic priming effect while the 
semantic priming effect associated with 'slow* primes was small and 
non -slp if ican t. Moreover, when targets were divided Into those 
associated with fa st lexical decision times and those associated with 
slow lexical decision times semantic priming was sign ificant for 
's lo w ' targets and non-significant for 'f a s t ' targets. Fischler and 
Goodman believe the ir findings demonstrate that semantic priming Is  
In part dependent upon the time available for processing. They 
Interpret the s ign ifican t fac ilita tion  associated with 's lo w ' targets 
as Indicating that processing of the prime does not necessarily end 
with presentation of the target but that the two stimuli can be 
processed In para lle l. Support for th is  Interpretation comes from 
the work of K1ger and Glass (1983) who found that semantic priming 
occurred even when the prime was presented after the target.
SM antIc  priaing and sw untlc M «ory
Many researchers have attempted to f it  the resu lts of semantic 
priming experiments into a mode! or theory of semantic memory and 
word recognition. Schvaneveldt and Meyer (1973) explained their 
findings in terms of a spreading activation theory. This theory was 
o r ig ina lly  developed by Q uillian (1967, 1969) as a programme for a 
d ig ita l computer simulation of memory search. It  has subsequently 
been extended by Collins and Loftus (1976). According to spreading 
activation theory concepts are stored at nodes in a semantic network. 
The distance between nodes represents the degree of association 
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Figure 1. A Semantic representation of concept relatedness in a 
stereotypical fragment of human memory. (Based on Figure 1 in 
Collin s and Loftus 1975).
When a stimulus activates a node the theory proposes that the node is 
energised and that th is energy spreads out along the paths of the 
network in a decreasing gradient. As a resu lt nodes which are 
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located near to the source of the energy are a lso  p a rt ia lly  energised 
while those more distant reealn unaffected I f  the energy has 
dissipated before reaching them. Thus seaiantlcally related primes 
are thought to partia lly  energize the target while unrelated primes 
are thought to leave I t  unaffected. It  I s  assuaied that It  is easier 
to recognise (and therefore make a lexical decision to) a target 
which has been partia lly  energised and thus re lative  to unrelated 
primes semantically related primes fa c ilita te  recognition.
Whilst spreading activation enables the basic semantic priming 
effect to be conceptualised the theory I s  unable to accoanM>date more 
recent findings. In particular It  Is  unable to account for the 
patterns of fac ilita tion  and Inhibition which occur when the effect 
of semantically related and unrelated primes are compared with a 
neutral ’baseline* condition In which the prime comprises a series of 
X 's .  Facilitation I s  said to occur when In comparison to neutral (X) 
primes semantically related primes decrease the time taken to respond 
to the target. Inhibition Is  said to x c u r  when In  comparison to X 
primes unrelated primes hinder speed of response. Some studies have 
found a facilitation  dominant pattern of resu lts In  which large 
s ign ifican t fac ilita tion  and small non-s1gn1f1cant Inhibition effects 
occur (e.g. Neely 1976; Schuberth I Fimas 1977) while others have 
found their results dominated by Inhibition (e.g. Neely 1977; 
F isch le r & Bloom 1979).
Becker (1980) found that fac ilita tion  dominance occurred when 
prime-target pairs were strongly related (antonyms) and Inhibition 
dominance occurred when the strength of association between 
prime-target pairs was relatively weak but variable. He explained 
these findings with reference to h is ve rification  model of word 
recognition. In Becker’s model words are f ir s t  stored In sensory 
memory and undergo a feature extraction process. Th is process does
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not lead d irectly to Identification but, through the operation of 
word detectors which recognise relational qualities among features 
detected, a set of possible alternative words Is  generated. Each 
alternative Is  In turn compared with the Information In sensory 
memory and when a match occurs the word Is  recognised. Once a word 
1s recognised the semantic features of the word are used to Identify 
a semantically related set of words which In turn become available 
fo r comparison with the sensory memory representation of a subsequent 
word In a verification  process akin to that which occurs with the 
sensory set. Becker's model explains semantic priming as occurring 
when the prime has been recognised through the operation of feature 
and word detectors and has generated a semantically related set of 
words. When the target Is  represented In sensory memory it  is 
compared d irectly with the semantic set generated by the prime. I f  
no match is  found the target is  processed through feature and word 
detectors to the point where i t  I s  recognised. Facilitation is  
dominant when prime-target pairs are strongly related and therefore 
give rise  to the creation of a small semantic set. Targets In the 
semantically related condition w ill be members of th is  small set and 
thus verification can occur very quickly before the sensory set for 
the target has even been created. Targets In the unrelated condition 
w ill not be contained In the semantic set but because the set Is  
small comparison of i t s  members with the sensory memory occurs 
quickly and there 1$ only a short delay before the sensory set can be 
considered. In the X priming condition no semantic set Is  created so 
the verification process has to be performed on the sensory set.
Thus when prime and target are strongly related response time In the 
semantically unrelated condition and X prime condition are comparable 
and quite slow in comparison to the semantically related condition.
In contrast when the relationship between prime and target Is
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weak and varlabla p rim s g iv t r isa  to a larga semantic sat. 
Verification of the target word in the seMnt1ca11y related condition 
w ill eventually occur with a member of the semantic set but th is  1$ 
lik e ly  to be quite a slow process because of the size o f the set.
Thus verification may occur only Just before a match I s  made with a 
member of the sensory set In the X p rim  condition. In the unrelated 
condition however verification  with the sensory set I s  considerably 
delayed because every member of the large semntic set has to be 
considered f ir s t .  Thus when prim -target pairs are weakly related 
and give rise  to the creation of a large semntic set Inh ibition  
effects dominate.
In Becker’s (1980) model fac ilita tion  and inh ib ition  effects are 
entire ly  dependent upon the strength of relationship within 
prim -target word pairs and the model I s  unable to account for the 
finding that these effects are also Influenced by the t im  available 
fo r processing. In som studies of semntic priming the amount of 
t im  between presentation of the p rim  and presentation of the target 
has been systematically varied. This t im  period I s  known as the 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). In one study den Heyer, Br1ai»d ond 
Smith (198$) mnipulated SOA and characteristics of the stimulus l i s t  
which Becker proposed to account for fac lllta tlon/ inh ib it lon  effects. 
Their research replicated Becker's resu lts at a long SOA (1000 msec) 
but when the SOA was short (200 msec) there was a fa c ilita t io n  
dominant pattern of results regardless of stimulus characteristics. 
Other studies too have shown that at short SOAs sem ntic priming Is  
dominated by fa c ilita tio n  effects (large significant fa c ilita tio n ; 
sm l l  non-significant Inhibition) while at long SOA fa c ilita t io n  and 
Inh ibition  are both prominent (e.g. Neely 1977). These findings 
have been explained with reference to the Posner and Snyder (1975) 
two process model o f word recognition. This model combines the fast
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autoMtlc sprtading activation thoory of soaiantlc prining with a 
slowar attantlon drivtn awchanlsn donlnatad by strattgic  affocts. 
Posnar and Snydar's (197S) nodal I s  basad on Norton’s (1970) via« of 
varbal long tarn nanory which I s  sonawhat s ln U a r to that of Collins 
and Loftus (1975) dascribad abova. Norton's vlaw I s  that Infomatlon 
about fan llla r avants Is  storad as loqogans and tha logogens of 
sanantically raU tad words are assunad to ba locatad close together. 
When st inu ll are perceived they are analysed by banks of visual 
and/or auditory feature detectors which feed into long tern nenory.
A logogen is  activated whenever tha number of features feeding Into 
i t  exceeds some c rit ic a l threshold.
Posner and Snyder (197$) propose a two process nodal of word 
recognition. F irst ly ,  they propose that a stimulus automatically 
activates It s  logogen and that th is  activation automatically spreads 
to adjacent sanantically related logogens. This automatic spreading 
activation process Is  assumed to be fast acting, to occur without 
intention or conscious awareness and assumed not to affect the 
retrieval of Information stored In semantically unrelated logogens to 
which activation has not spread. Semantic priming I s  assumed to 
occur, In part, because of a fa c ilita tio n  In target recognition due 
to the targets partial (automatic) activation by a semantically 
related prime. However, Posnar and Snyder (1975) also propose that 
semantic priming I s  based. In part, upon the operation of a second 
mechanism: the limited capacity conscious attention (LCCA) mechanism. 
Th is mechanism is  thought to be slow acting and unable to operate 
without attention and conscious awareness. Unlike spreading 
activation the LCCA mechanism Inh ib its the retrieval of Information 
stored In semantically unrelated logogens upon which I t  I s  not 
focused. This Is  because before the Information stored at the 
unattended logogen can be analysed prior to making a response, the
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conscious ottontlon roadout Mchinlsm  has to bo 'sh iftod * to that 
logogon. Thus a sonantlcaUy rolated print fa c ilita te s lexical 
decisions because It  requires attention to be shifted a shorter 
distance than would an unrelated prime.
The role  of the limited capacity attenttonal mechanism In 
semantic priming was Investigated by Neely (1976) who found that In 
comparison to a neutral prime (se rie s of X 's )  a semantically 
unrelated word prime produced Inh ibition. This finding Implicates 
the role  of attention but other aspects of Neely's re su lts were 
d if f ic u lt  to Interpret. For example, although Posner and Snyder’s
(1975) theory predicts that Inh ib ition  w ill build up as SOA Increases 
Neely found that It  remained constant over three SOA's (360, 600, and 
2000 msec). Moreover, he found that the processing of nonword 
targets was facilitated by the word primes • a finding which argues 
against the role  of limited capacity attention In Inh ibition. Neely
(1976) argued that h is results may have been affected by the highly 
stereotyped association between primes and targets In  the 
semantically related condition (e.g. cat-dog). Specifica lly, he 
postulates that participants may have tried  to guess the target and 
adopted a strategy of trying to match each 'guess' with the target 
when I t  appeared. I f  the participants then responded 'word' when 
there was a match there would be a tendency to respond 'nonword’ when 
the two Items differed. Thus lexical decision time to semantically 
unrelated words would have slowed while lexical decision time to 
nonwords would have speeded up. In a further study Neely (1977) 
Investigated the effect of expectancy by presenting participants with 
a category name as a prime followed by a target which was an example 
from another category (e.g. body-door, body-sparrow). When 
participants were told from which category the target would come 
lexical decisions were facilitated when targets were expected and
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Inhibited when they were unexpected. But both these effects 
diseppeared when the SOA between prime and target was short. In the 
condition where primes were category names and targets were either 
exemplars o f the category (semantically related: SR condition) or not 
(semantically unrelated: UR condition) fa c ilita tio n  and Inhibition 
effects were apparent at an SOA of 2000 msec. However, as the SOA 
decreased fac ilita tion  remained constant and the Inhibition effect 
decreased and disappeared altogether at an SOA of 250 msec. Neely's
(1977) study clearly supports Posner and Snyder's (1975) two process 
theory of word recognition and semantic priming.
Further support fo r a slow limited capacity conscious attention 
mechanism comes from find ing that the magnitude of the semantic 
priming effect Increases as the proportion of related t r ia ls  
Increases. (Tweedy & Lapinski 1981; den Heyer, Briand & Dannenbring 
1983; de Groot 1984). Furthermore, when the SOA between prime and 
target Is  short, thus preventing the operation of a slow conscious 
mechanism, the proportion effect disappears (den Heyer et a1. 1983).
Semantic priming effects and the Id en tif lab lllty  of primes
Whilst many semantic priming experiments have presented both the 
prime and target supra11m1na11y semantic priming has also been 
Investigated In studies In  which the prime could not be Identified 
(NcCauley, Parmelee, Sperber I  Carr 1980; Carr, NcCauley, Sperber & 
Parmelee 1982) or detected (Spence 1981; Fowler, Wolford, Slade & 
Tassinary 1981, Experiments 5 & 6; Marcel 1983a, Experiment 4; Balota 
1983). It  has been thought that the minimal condition for priming 
would be the Identification  of the prime and Fischler and Goodman
(1978) thought they were Investigating th is  In a study In which 
participants tried to reca ll the prime after making a lexical
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decision to the terget. The authors expected to find that only when 
the prime could be recalled would there be a significant semantic 
priming effect, but they found Just the opposite. That I s ,  they 
found that prime recall was associated with a non-significant 
semantic priming effect, and Inab ility  to recall the prime with a 
h igh ly significant priming effecti Fischler and Goodman (1976) 
explained the non-significant result as due to Interference which 
occurred when the prime was kept in mind whilst making a le x ica l 
decision. Priming without prime recall was Interpreted as a 
'subthreshold effect’ . However, In Fischler and Goodman's experiment 
no attempt was made to present the primes below identification  
threshold and It  does not seem reasonable to assume that primes which 
could not be recalled after each t r ia l were not Identified at the 
time o f presentation. A better Investigation of priming below 
Identification  threshold was conducted by McCauley et a1. (1980).
In the McCauley et a1. study picture primes were followed In  
temporal and spatial succession by a pattern mask made up o f  letters 
and le t te r  pieces. Pattern masking can be used to prevent conscious 
detection of the prime (see below) or, as in th is  case, to  prevent 
Identification. In McCauley et a l. ’s study participants attended a 
prelim inary session during which they tried to Identify 10 picture 
primes each succeeded by a pattern mask exposed for 50 msec. Primes 
were In i t ia l l y  displayed for a duration at which they could easily  be 
Identified  but th is duration was gradually reduced using the method 
of descending lim its. Zero Identification threshold (zero IT) was 
defined as the duration at which 6 attempts at Identification  were 
unsuccessful and to ensure that a particularly conservative estimate 
of zero IT was made 5 msec was then deducted. Taking zero IT  as the 
baseline an ascending method of lim its was then used to f in d  1/3 
threshold, 2/3 threshold and fu ll Identification threshold. These
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thresholds were defined as the duration at which the prime was 
successively Identified on 2/6, 4/6 and 6/6 occasions respectively.
In a subsequent session the Influence o f semantically related and 
unrelated pictures on the tine taken to name a picture target was 
Investigated. S ignificant semantic priming was found to occur not 
only when the prime was presented at f u l l  Identification threshold 
(IT) but also when I t  was presented at zero IT, 1/3 and 2/3 IT. 
Koreover, the magnitude of priming did not d iffer sign ifican tly  
between any of these conditions. In a second experiment McCauley et 
a l. (1980) extended the range of prime durations to Include a 
supraliminal condition In which the prime was presented for fu ll IT 
plus 2S0 msec, and a 1/3 and 2/3 zero identification  threshold 
(defined as zero IT multiplied by 0.33 and 0.67 respectively). 
Priming was again sign ificant and comparable across a range of prime 
durations (supraliminal, fu ll IT, zero IT and 2/3 zero IT) and only 
dropped to Insignificance at the shortest duration of 1/3 zero IT. 
Results thus supported McCauley et a l . * s  previous findings and their 
conclusion that semantic priming can occur when primes are presented 
below Identification threshold.
Following Fisch ler and Goodman (1978) McCauley et al. (1980) 
asked participants to recall each prime after responding to the 
target In both Experiments 1 and 2. In  general prime recall was 
poor; even at fu ll Identification threshold It  only reached 13% In 
Experiment 1. McCauley et al. Interpret these findings In the same 
way as Fischler and Goodman (1978), In  that they suggest that 
response to the target and some aspect o f Identifying and remembering 
the prime Interfere with one another.
Carr et al. (1982) extended the research of McCauley et al. 
(1980) In a study of semantic priming with a ll combinations of 
picture and word prime and target. When primes and targets were both
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pictu ris they repllctttd the earlier finding of McCauley et a1.
(1980) In showing that prlulng occurred below Identification 
threshold. However, the effect of cross modal priming (prime-target 
combinations of word-picture, or picture-word), designed to 
Investigate whether words and pictures are encoded In the same amodal 
system, was non-significant at zero Identification threshold. With 
word stimuli as primes and targets Carr et al. (1982) also found a 
non-significant priming effect below Identification threshold. This 
finding I s  of particular Interest and I s  given fu lle r consideration 
below.
Whilst the research of HcCauley et a l. (1980) and Carr et al. 
(1982) appears to show that semantic priming can occur when primes 
are presented below Identification threshold some researchers 
consider the findings of these studies to be spurious. Holender 
(1986), for example, argued that In these experiments there was much 
oore ligh t Involved In the priming phase than In the threshold 
determination phase and therefore participants were probably more 
ligh t adapted during priming than during detection. As a result, he 
believes that primes were more clearly v is ib le  In the second phase of 
the experiment and that I t  was Identification of the primes which led 
to semantic priming. Because Holender (1986) also makes th is  
c ritic ism  of some of the experiments which purport to show semantic 
priming below detection threshold a fu lle r  discussion of h is  views 
w ill follow after the studies of semantic priming below detection 
threshold have been presented.
Semantic priming when primes are presented below detection threshold
Although semantic priming without awareness has been Investigated In 
a number of ways (e.g. Lewis 1972} only 4 studies have required
I t x ic il  d tc islons about v isually  presented targets preceded by 
sub liilna l verbal prliees (I.e . the type of task used In the present 
research). One of the f ir s t  studies was undertaken by Spence (1981). 
Spence conducted a semantic priming experiment In which primes were 
presented for 10. 20 and 40 msec. After the experiment participants 
were shown an additional 30 t r ia ls  at each prime duration and asked 
to discriminate t r ia ls  (N -  IS) In which the prime was a word from 
those In which the prime was replaced by a blank card (N -  IS ).  When 
discrim ination was at. or below, chance level the primes were assumed 
to have been presented subllmlnally and ex post facto analyses of 
priming below and above detection threshold were therefore possible. 
Results showed that when primes were presented subllmlnally lexical 
decisions made to the targets were s ign ificantly  faster In  the 
semantically related condition than In  the unrelated. Surprising ly 
however, th is  effect was non-significant when primes were presented 
above detection threshold. Spence concluded that semantic priming 
without awareness 1$ possible but that when primes are presented Just 
above detection threshold they are partia lly  recognised and th is 
Interferes with processing of the target In such a way that 1t 
cancels out the fac ilita tion  afforded by semantically related primes.
In the studies of semantic priming conducted by Harcel (1983a, 
Experiment 4), Fowler et al. (1981, Experiments 5 I 6) and Balota 
(1983) a dichoptic backward pattern masking technique was used. This 
entailed presentation of the prime to one eye, followed by 
presentation of a pattern mask to the other eye and f in a lly  
presentation of the target blnocularly. This technique was adopted 
to ensure that central rather than peripheral masking occurred 
(Turvey 1973). Peripheral masking occurs In the peripheral nervous 
system at the level of the retina, the lateral geniculate nucleus and 
possib ly the stria te  cortex whilst central masking occurs more
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centrally at the striate  cortex and beyond. Marcel (1983b) claimed 
that whilst both central and peripheral masking prevented conscious 
awareness of the masked stimulus only central masking enabled 
unconscious perception and analysis of the prime to take place. Thus 
semantic priming effects are associated with central, but not 
peripheral, masking. The type of masking which predominates is  
determined by the energy relationship between the prime and the mask 
and also the length of time which elapses between them. I t  has also 
been found that dichoptic presentation cannot resu lt in  peripheral 
masking and that centra! masking can only occur with a pattern mask 
( i.e .  with a mask which comprises a random structure whose 
individual elements are sim ilar to the elements of the prime; Turvey 
1973). Thus besides taking into account energy and time factors 
researchers wanting to ensure central masking use a backward pattern 
masking technique involving dichoptic presentation of prime and mask. 
Using th is technique Balota (1983), Fowler et a1. (1981, Experiments 
5 1 6 )  and Marcel (1983a, Experiment 4) appeared to demonstrate 
semantic priming without awareness. A ll three studies began with the 
assessment of detection threshold (OT) during which participants 
tried  to discriminate blank cards from cards on which a word was 
printed. Each t r ia l consisted of a blank or stimulus card followed 
by a dark interstimulus Interval ( IS I)  and then the pattern mask. In 
a descending method of lim its the IS I was reduced until participants 
were unable to discriminate blanks from stimulus cards at better than 
chance level. Chance level responding was defined as being less than 
60% correct. Balota, Fowler et al. and Marcel found that primes 
presented below detKtion  threshold gave rise  to semantic priming 
effects when the SOA between the prime and target was long (2000 
msec) but not short (200 msec, Fowler et al. 1981; 350 msec, Balota 
1983). Moreover, in two of the three experiments semantic priming
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without awirtnoss at the long SOA was not s ign if ican tly  different In 
magnitude from semantic priming above detection threshold.
As noted above Holender (1986) has c rit ic ise d  the studies of 
semantic priming below Identification  (NcCauley et a1. 1980; Carr et 
a l. 1982) and detection threshold (Fowler et a l. 1981; Narcel 
1983a; Balota 1983) on the grounds of d iffe rentia l light adaptation 
between the threshold determination and priming phases of each 
experiment. Holender (1986) argued that when participants are dark 
adapted and see the pr1me*mask sequence during threshold assessment 
against a dark background the prime Is  re lative ly  d iff icu lt  to 
Identify or detect. However, In  the priming sequence 
(prime-mask-target) more lig h t  I s  available because an extra stimulus 
- the target - I s  presented fo r  a few hundred milliseconds. This, I t  
I s  claimed, may lead to Increased ligh t adaptation during priming and 
therefore an Improvement In detection and Identification  of the 
prime. Holender cites Purcell, Stewart and Stanovich (1983) In 
support of h is argument. Purcell e t a l.  (Experiment 2) assessed 
zero picture Identification threshold In a s im ila r manner to Carr et 
a l. (1982) and HcCauley et a l.  (1980). They then recorded how many 
pictures were correctly recognised In a nock priming procedure In 
which the prime was succeeded by a mask and then a white card exposed 
for 800 msec. Instead of getting 20% correct recognition (as 
expected by chance) Purcell et a l. found that 70% of the pictures 
were correctly Identified. Moreover, when In Experiment 3, they 
equalised levels of ligh t adaptation between the threshold and 
priming phases of the experiment, at zero Identification  threshold 
the semantic priming effect was non-significant.
Holender’s contention that sign ificant semantic priming below 
Identification and detection threshold are spurious finding has been 
challenged. Balota (1986) fo r example, argued that the studies of
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NcCauUy «t a1. (1980) and Carr at a1. (1982) d if f t r  In c rucia l 
ways from thost of Fowlar at a l. (1981) and Balota (1983), and 
because of th is  the sana critic ism  applied to than a ll Is  d if f ic u lt  
to sustain. Balota (1988) racognisas that a different level o f ligh t 
adaptation may be responsible for the findings of HcCauley et a l. 
(1980) and Carr et al. (1982) but he defends h is own study and that 
of Fowler et a l. (1981) on two grounds. F irst ly , he points out that 
whilst a dark f ie ld  was shown during the Inte rtrla l Interval In  the 
experiments of McCauley et al. (1980) and Carr et al. (1982) there 
was a return to the dimly l i t  fixation field between t r ia ls  In  the 
Fowler et al. (1981) and Balota (1963) experiments. As a resu lt 
participants would have been more ligh t adapted throughout the whole 
of Fowler and Balota’s experiments and thus the additional stimulus 
(the target) seen during priming t r ia ls  would be less l ik e ly  to have 
a substantial effect. Secondly, Balota (1986) points out that the 
contrast between stimuli was far le ss In the studies of Balota (1963) 
and Fowler at a l.  (1981) than In those of McCauley et a l. (1980) 
and Carr et a l. (1982). This was partia lly due to stimuli being 
presented at lower levels of luminance 1n the Balota and Fowler et 
al. study and partly because they presented the ir stimuli 
d ichoptically rather than blnocularly as McCauley et al. and Carr et 
a l. chose to do. Thus Balota (1986) claims that although luminance 
levels were not equated across the threshold and priming phases of 
the experiments of Fowler et al. (1981) and Balota (1983) the 
potential for l ig h t  adaptation occurring In the priming t r ia ls  was 
re latively minimal compared to that In the McCauley et a l. study. 
Holender (1986) suggested that one way of assessing whether l ig h t  
adaptation has led to Improved Identification or detection In the 
priming phase o f an experiment i s  to Include such t r ia ls  w ithin the 
priming experiment Itse lf.  In fact Marcel (1983a, Experiment 5) had
already done th is  In 1963 when he randomly mixed detection t r ia ls  
with a lexical decision task. In a procedure where ligh t adaptation 
could not have differed for the two types of t r ia ls  and where 
participants could not detect primes (as assessed by the procedure 
advocated by Holender) there was a sign ifican t priming effect. 
Moreover, when Carr and Dagenbach (1986) equalised the lighting 
conditions between the threshold assessment and priming phases of 
their experiments there was s t i l l  a s ign ifican t semantic priming 
effect when primes were presented below detection threshold.
Whilst Holender’s belief that ligh t adaptation may have Improved 
between the threshold determination and priming phases In some 
Investigations of priming without Identification  or detection, and 
Purcell et a l. *s  (1983) results support th is  point of view, other 
studies (Marcel 1983a; Carr & Dagenbach 1986) suggest that priming 
without Identification or detection is  unlikely to have been due 
entire ly. I f  at a ll,  to an Increase In lig h t  adaptation.
Holender (1986) crit ic ised  the studies of priming without 
awareness not only on the grounds discussed above but also on the 
more substantial point that primes were probably presented above 
detection threshold because detection thresholds were inadequately 
assessed. In expressing this c ritic ism  Holender (1986) was voicing 
h is support for the views of Merlkle (1962). M erlk le 's (1982) 
crit ic ism  of the assessment of detection threshold was directed at 
the studies of Marcel (described In a conference paper and 
unpublished manuscript and reported In 1983a) and Fowler et al.
(1981) but can be applied equally well to the work of Spence (1981) 
and Balota (1983). In a ll these studies detection threshold was 
assumed to have been reached when participants were unable to 
discriminate word stimuli from blank cards at better than chance 
level. To ensure th is  tKhnIque accurately assesses detection
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threshold NerlkU  (1982) stated that two c rite r ia  aust be aet.
F ir st ,  It  aust be deaonstrated that participants used both available 
responses (I.e . ’y e s ' • a stimulus was present and 'n o ' - no 
st iau lu s was present). NerlkU argued, quite correctly In principle, 
that i f  th is  criterion  were not aet I t  would be possible to get 
chance level responding quite spuriously as a resu lt of the same 
response ( ’yes’ or ’no’) being given a11 the time; that Is,  on a ll 
t r ia l s  where the stiau lus was present and on a ll blank card tr ia ls .  
Second, Nerlkle (1982) argued that a reasonable nuaber of t r ia ls  aust 
be given In order to assess whether responses follow chance 
d istribu tions. He condemned the procedures used by Marcel and Fowler 
et al. because response distributions were not considered and Fowler 
et al. (1981) assessed detection thresholds using blocks of only 
f iv e  tr ia ls .  Marcel (1983a, Experiment 4) assessed detection 
thresholds with a reasonable nuaber of t r ia ls  (40); 30 t r ia ls  were 
given by Spence (1981) but only 20 by Balota (1983). Balota (1983) 
clalaed that both ’ye s’ and ’no’ responses were used by h is 
participants though he gave no quantative data to allow one to Judge 
the extent to which th is occurred and Spence (1981) fa iled  to 
consider response d istributions at a ll.
Henley (1984) argued that Merlkle’s (1982) methodological 
c rit ic ism s of the subliminal priming experiments were irrelevant 
because the forced choice procedure used to assess detection 
thresholds was Inappropriate. Henley cited the finding by Rollaan 
and Nachalas (1972) that recognition perforaance had exceeded chance 
level at detection threshold In an experiment where participants were 
presented either with no stiaulus or with weak red or green flashes. 
Henley suggested th is  finding Indicated that Information available 
fo r  discriminative report was s t i l l  available at detection threshold 
and so above chance level responding may be expected I f  participants
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•re not fine ly required to report only wh«t Is  consciously seen (I.e. 
I f  they are allowed to report whether they think a s t lM lu s  was 
present or not).
Henley’s Insistence on threshold determination procedures which 
en^haslse subjective awareness was taken further by Cheesman and 
Herlkle (1984) who proposed the Idea of ’subjective’ and ’objective’ 
detection thresholds. Subjective threshold i s  determined with 
reference to participants’ reports o f fa ilure  to detect the presence 
of a stimulus while objective threshold Is  defined with reference to 
the occurrence of chance level (i.e . non-d1scr1m1nat1ve) responding 
and the la tte r Is  of course lower than the former (Carr & Dagenbach 
1986). Cheesman and Herlkle (1984) claim that semantic priming can 
occur below subjective threshold but not below objective threshold 
and they c ite  findings from their own research to support their 
claim. On the basis of their re su lts Cheesman and Merlkle (1984) 
argue that the priming effects obtained by Fowler et al. (1981) and 
Harcel (1983a) resulted from an Inadvertent measurement of subjective 
rather than objective detection thresholds.
The d istinction  between objective and subjective detection 
thresholds I s  both potentially useful and Important. Acceptance of 
It  lessens the force of Henley’s (1984) objection to the use of 
forced choice threshold assessment techniques because, In principle, 
the Rollman and Nachmias (1972) find ing upon which Henley relies 
could be explained as due to the assessment of subjective rather than 
objective detection thresholds. However, Marcel (1983a), Fowler et 
al. (1981), Spence (1981) and Balota (1983) presumably Intended to 
assess objective thresholds and the ir findings were Intended to 
demonstrate that semantic priming effects could occur at, or below, 
objective detection threshold. But Cheesman and Nerlkle’s (1984) 
resu lts do not necessarily disconfirm th is  hypothesis because
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objective detection threshold wes tssessed In the ir study not using 
the two choice dlscrlwlnetlon procedure but using a four choice 
Identification  procedure In which participants were required to say 
which of four pattern masked colour words had been presented. Thus 
while maintaining that objective detection thresholds were being 
assessed Cheesman and Herlkle (1964) actually assessed objective 
Identification  thresholds. Although It  Is  somewhat of an enigma, a 
number of studies have fa iled  to find sign ificant semantic priming 
effects Just below, or at, Identification threshold and Cheesman and 
Herlk le ’s findings are consistent with this.
Further d iff icu lt ie s  with Cheesman and Mer1kle*s work arise from 
the use of colour names au priming stimuli. It  1$ known that colour 
preferences exist and that these are somewhat different for men and 
women (Choungourlan 1968; NcManus, Jones I  Cottrell 1961). It  is  
also known that strong preferences exist for colour names. For 
example, when asked to state a colour name In a free response 
situation, Simon (1971) found 52% of a large sample of college men 
gave “Blue", 11% gave "Red", 10% "Green", 8.5% "Brown", 5.5% "Purple" 
and 3% "Yellow". These s ix  colour names accounted for 90% of the 
responses. A sim ilar order of preference was found by Trueman 
(1979). Thus there Is  a very strong preference for the colour name 
"blue" and a very weak preference for "Yellow", both of which were 
used by Cheesman and Nerlkle (1984). In the f ir s t  experiment 
reported by Cheesman and Herlkle (1964) the same stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between prime and mask was used for a ll colour names 
(Blue, Green, Orange and Yellow) during threshold detection. Below 
subjective threshold participants were c learly attempting to 
discrim inate colour names under conditions of great uncertainty and 
so response bias resulting from colour preferences seems very like ly  
to have been produced. In attempting to assess objective threshold
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Cheesn«n and Merikle reduced SOA when, In a block of 24 t r ia ls ,  
participants failed to show non-dlscrlmlnatlve responding which was 
defined as occurring when the probability of a correct response, 
taken over the set of four colour names, fe ll below 0.3. As a resu lt 
of response bias due to colour name preferences th is procedure could 
have resulted In the situation where the overall probability o f a 
correct response Indicated discrim inative responding though 
non-d1scr1ffl1nat1ve responding occurred for three of the four colour 
names. In such a case Cheesman and M erlk le 's procedure would fa lse ly  
require SOA to be lowered. Thus In the ir Experiment 1 It  may well 
have been the case that, as a resu lt of response bias, estimates of 
objective threshold were made appreciably below actual objective 
threshold, and th is may explain the fa ilu re  to obtain semantic 
priming effects. Some suggestion that substantial response bias may 
have occurred can be seen In  Cheesman and Herlkle’s d iscussion of the 
procedure In Experiment 2 (p. 393) where they state that 
"occasionally there was a re la t ive ly  large discrepancy in detection 
performance across Individual words". To eliminate th is  disbalance 
thresholds were Ind ividually assessed for each colour word prime In 
Experiment 2. However, th is  cannot be considered to have resolved 
the d iff icu lty  because, although Cheesman and Herlkle Informed 
participants that each colour name would occur with equal 
probability, Trueman (1979) found that Informing participants of 
colour name preferences did not resu lt In chance level responding in 
a free response task. Thus response bias In colour naming appears 
d iff ic u lt  to overcome and I t  seems lik e ly  that to attain chance level 
responding Cheesman and Herlkle may have had to lower SOA below 
'true* objective threshold. That Is ,  lower SOA to a level 
appreciably below that at which an observer without colour 
preferences would have yielded chance level responding. I f  th is
29
happened I t  might well account for the fa ilure to find semantic 
priming effects.
However, there I s  another alternative explanation of Cheesman 
and Herllde’s (1984) findings. Carr and Oagenbach (1986) suggest 
that I t  Is  probably not only the stringency of threshold assessment 
that determines whether semantic activation (and therefore priming 
and Stroop Interference effects) w ill or w ill not occur, but the type 
of task that 1$ used. They consider the threshold-setting task to be 
*an experience that affects the percelvers’ strategies for attempting 
to gain Information from the prime” (p. 26). Carr and Dagenbach 
believe that only particular types of threshold assessment procedures 
lead to the adoption of strategies for acquiring Information which 
subsequently enables the occurrence of priming or Stroop Interference 
effects. Carr and Oagenbach (1986) found that semantic priming 
occurred when detection threshold was assessed using the unrestricted 
presence-absence procedure of Marcel (1983a), Fowler et a l. (1981), 
Balota (1983) and Spence (1981), but disappeared when primes were 
presented at detection thresholds assessed by a forced choice 
recognition procedure. This Is  a particularly Interesting find ing 
because the same participants took part In both experiments and the 
threshold assessed by the forced choice procedure was le ss stringent 
(longer) than that assessed by the two-cho1ce detection task.
The finding that priming effects occur using detection but not 
recognition threshold procedures 1$ d iff ic u lt  to explain as the 
la tter are le ss stringent than the former. However, the find ing may 
be explicable In terms of partial but misleading Information being 
available to awareness with recognition procedures with the resu lt 
that primes are m isidentifled to some extent and therefore activate 
targets other than those later presented.
Conclusions on se u n t lc  p rliin g  without awartntss
Two major points emerge from the literature reviewed in the last 
section. First, in the ligh t of the critic ism s made by Herikle 
(1982), Cheesman and Merikle (1984) and Holender (1986) it  nay be 
argued that detection thresholds were not sa t is fa c to r ily  assessed in 
the studies by Spence (1981), Fowler et a1. (1981), Harcel (1983a) 
and Balota (1983). Second, thresholds assessed by forced choice 
recognition procedures are not equivalent to those assessed by forced 
choice detection procedures and the issue of whether subliminal 
priming effects can occur must be resolved with respect to detection, 
not recognition, thresholds i f  sceptics are to be convinced of the 
phenomenon. The most convincing procedure would obviously involve 
presentation of primes below objective detection threshold because in 
th is  case there would be a clear demonstration that truly 
non-discriminative responding occurred at threshold. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge no study has been carried out in which priming 
effects at, or below, objective detection threshold have been 
Investigated. Thus i t  may be claimed that an adequate test has not 


















SEHAKTIC PRIHIH6 WITHOUT AWARENESS; QUESTIONS FOR IMVESTimiOW
Fro« a review of the sublintinal semantic priming lite ra tu re  in 
Chapter 2 i t  was concluded that semantic priming without awareness 
has not been adequately investigated. It  was also concluded that an 
adequate test of the subliminal priming hypothesis requires primes to 
be presented below objective detection threshold. A major obstacle 
to doing th is  lie s  in the fact that objective detection threshold has 
not been sa tis fac to rily  defined in operational terms. Herikle (1982) 
proposed that the assessment of objective detection threshold should 
meet two criteria . F irst ly , when discriminating between stimuli and 
blank cards participants must use both responses and secondly 
assessment of detection threshold must be carried out using a 
reasonable number of t r ia ls  so that an adequate assessment of 
response d istributions can be made. Neither of these c rite ria  have 
been defined operationally. However, as noted In Chapter 2 I t  seems 
not unreasonable to assume that 40 t r ia ls  (20 blank cards and 20 
stim uli) w ill ensure an adequate measurement of response 
d istribu tion s at detection threshold. This corresponds to the number 
of t r ia ls  used by Marcel (1983a, Experiment 4).
To demonstrate that participants cannot discrim inate blank cards 
from stimuli at better than chance level three c r ite r ia  for 
non*d1scr1m1nat1ve responding are now proposed: f i r s t l y  that the 
p robability of a correct response (P(C)] must l ie  w ithin  the 95X 
confidence lim its of the chance expectancy of 0.5; secondly, that the 
p robability of a h it (correct response when a stimulus I s  presented) 
must l ie  within the 95% confidence lim its of the chance expectancy of 
0.5 and thirdly, that the probability of a false alarm (Incorrect
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response when a blank card Is  presented) must also lie  within the 95% 
confidence lim its of the value 0.5 which is  expected by chance.
These specific c rite r ia  take account of Herik le’s (1982) argument 
that both response categories must be used and that the observed 
response d istribu tions should be compared with those expected on the 
basis of chance. The c rite ria  conform to usual experimental practice 
by assuming that stimulus and blank card t r ia ls  occur with equal 
p robability and that participants are aware of th is.
I t  might be argued that the signal detection theory measure of 
se n s it iv ity  d’ could be used in place of the proposed criteria . In 
t h is  case non*d1scrim1nat1ve responding might be defined as occurring 
when d* > 0 (Hacmillan 1986). This view is  not favoured because d* 
i s  equal to zero when the probability of a h it  i s  equal to the 
p robability of a fa lse  alarm irrespective of the value of the 
probability. As participants are typ ica lly  told (as in Narce! 1983a; 
Fowler et a l. 1981) that stimuli and blank cards w ill be presented 
with equal frequency some account should be taken of participants' 
knowledge of th is fact in defining and assessing chance level 
performance. However, as the proposed c rite r ia  require that d’ 
approximates zero, obtained values of d ’ may be used as assessments 
of detection performance. I f  participants are unable to discriminate 
blank cards from stimuli at detection threshold then an assessment of 
detection performance should not correlate s ign ificantly  with the 
magnitude of priming effect and th is  would be a further check on the 
adequacy of the detection assessment procedure. Some support for 
t h is  view comes from the fin d M js of Cheesman and Herikle (1984). 
Cheesman and Herikle (1984) used the percentage of correctly 
identified  colour names as a measure of Identification  performance 
( IP ), and found that IP  correlated s ign if ica n tly  with the magnitude 
of priming effect at subjective, but not objective, threshold.
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Merlkle has claimed that:
*as long as it  is  assumed that the boundary 
between conscious and unconscious processes 
is  defined by the threshold fo r discriminative 
respondiiM, no evidence for unconscious 
perceptual processes w ill be found when 
precautions are taken to ensure accurate 
measurement of discrim inative responding" 
(Kerikle 1986, p. 42).
The f ir s t  question posed in the present research was concerned with 
whether semantic priming effects occur when primes are presented 
below objective detection threshold assessed in accordance with the 
three c rite ria  proposed above.
Leaving aside the c rit ic ism s o f threshold assessment techniques 
made by Herikle (1982) and Cheesman and Herikle (1964), the va lid ity 
of the conclusions drawn about subliminal semantic priming by Spence 
(1981), Fowler et a1. (1981), Balota (1983) and Marcel (1983a) may 
be questioned on other grounds. C lark (1973) argued that in 
experiments where stimuli are words chosen at random it  is  
inappropriate to use sta tist ic a l models which assume fixed effects. 
According to Clark (1973), sta t is t ic a l analyses making such an 
assumption can only reveal whether the results are l ik e ly  to 
generalise to other samples of participants and cannot determine 
whether generalisation to other samples of words i s  l ik e ly .  Clark 
(1973) advocated the use of a quasi F ratio (F*) in ANOVAs testing 
hypotheses about the gene ra lisab ility  o f findings in experiments 
using verbal stimuli. However, Wike and Church (1976) presented some 
powerful arguments against C la rk 's  view. They contended that Clark’s 
definition of a 'random effect’ i s  d ifferent from that conventionally 
accepted, that there is  a lack of c la r it y  regarding how F’ should be 
computed and that in any event i t  i s  deficient in power. Wike and 
Church suggested that rep lication with different verbal stimuli and 
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different subjects I s  preferable to the use of F* for determining 
whether resu lts are lik e ly  to generalise. However, the subliminal 
priming Investigations by Spence (1981), Marcel (1963a) Fowler et i1. 
(1981) and Balota (1983) used neither F* nor replication. The second 
question posed by the research reported In Chapters 4 and 5 was 
therefore concerned with the value of quasi F (F*) for predicting the 
generallsab lllty of findings from experiments using verbal stim uli:
Is  F ' a useful s ta t ist ic  or Is  replication a preferable procedure?
In the ir d iscussion of the problem of demonstrating 
generallsab lllty  of results Wike and Church (1976) suggested that 
replication, not only with different samples of words and subjects, 
but with different experimental techniques I s  advisable. Marcel 
(1983a, Exnerlment 4), Balota (1983) and Fowler et ai. (1981, 
Experiments 5 & 6) used a dichoptic oackward pattern masking 
technique to ensure central rather than peripheral masking. Spence 
(1981) used binocular presentation of both primes and targets but did 
not use a pattern mask. Theoretically, under certain conditions I t  
should be possib le to achieve central masking by using a pattern mask 
with binocular presentation of both prime and mask. Turvey (1973, 
Experiments 10 and 11) found monoptic presentation produced 
peripheral masking with stimulus and mask durations up to 10 msec, 
but that beyond th is c rit ic a l duration a transition to central 
masking occurred, especially with mask durations of 50 msec or 
longer. Presumably th is  should also hold true for binocular 
presentation. Breltmeyer (1984) Indicated that binocular 
presentation of stimulus and structure mask (especially pattern mask) 
can produce the same type of masking (I.e . central) as dichoptic 
presentation provided the energy ratio  of targetimask I s  greater than 
unity. Thus i t  seems reasonable to suppose that central masking 
should be obtained with binocular presentation I f ;  (a) the stimulus
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The experiments reported in this chapter had three alms:
1. To determine whether subliminal semantic priming effects occur 
when primes are presented below objective detection threshold as 
assessed by the three criteria  proposed In Chapter 3.
2. To Investigate the value of quasi F (F*) for predicting whether 
the resu lts o f subliminal semantic priming studies w ill 
generalise to experiments using new participants and different 
stimuli.
3. To explore binocular presentation o f stimuli and pattern mask as 
an a lternative to dichoptic presentation In research into 
subliminal semantic priming.
Participants
Twelve undergraduate students took part In the experiment. They had 
a mean age of 19.6 years (SO 1.75) and 6 were men. None were aware 
of the nature of the research, or had taken part in sim ilar studies. 
Each was paid £1.50 for participating.
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Apparatus
Tha St lnu li were presented In an Electronic Developments 3-f1e1d 
tachlstoscope fitted with fast r is in g  E03 lamps. Illumination of the 
2
mask fie ld  was set to 1.90 Ig  cd/H while prime and target stimuli
2
were presented at a luminance of 2.35 Ig cd/H . These luminances, 
measured with blank cards In the respective fie ld s, were chosen 
because p ilot t r ia ls  had Indicated they were very like ly  to produce 
detection thresholds In excess of 10 msecs. Such thresholds were 
required because binocular presentation of primes for less than 10 
msecs followed immediately by a mask Is  l ik e ly  to result In 
peripheral masking. Lexical decision times were measured by a Colne 
Instruments Tyer C4 d ig ita l timer Interfaced with the tachlstoscope. 
The experiment was conducted In a sound attenuating room 11t by a 40 
watt bulb In a small desk lamp.
Stimul1
Ten prime-target letter strings In each of 4 conditions were used In 
the experiment (see Appendix A). Two examples from each condition 
appear In Table 4.1. A ll primes were real words. Of the 40 targets 
half were real words and half were nonwords. Nonwords were 
pronounceable and represented high level approximations to English 
words. Half of the real word targets were preceded by semantically 
related primes (SR condition) and these word pairs were f ir s t  
associates from the Minnesota norms for the Kent-Rosanoff word 
association test (Postman and Keppel 1970). The remainder of the 
real word targets were preceded by semantically unrelated primes (UR 
condition). Two prime-target l i s t s  of 10 word-nonword pairs (Wiij;
M  2) were chosen so that the primes matched those in the SR and UR 
conditions for frequency and length, and the targets were of a 
comparable length to those In the SR and UR conditions. Whenever the
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word 'le n g th ' Is  used to describe stimuli In th is  thesis I t  refers to 
number of letters. For presentetlon the stimuli In e ll 4 conditions 
were combined end randomised.
Table 4.1 Examples of prime-target le tte r  strings In 
Experiment 1.
SR UR ut, Ut2
Type of 
le tte r Prime Real Real Real Real
String Target Real Real Nonword Nonword
Example Prime BREAD REPLY TEACH LOAD
I Target BUTTER BIRTH WENTAL MIGLON
Example Prime DOCTOR EMPEROR FIFTY SUPPLY
I I Target NURSE FROZEN LERT ESPET
The frequency with which primes and targets occur In everyday usage 
was determined by reference to the Kucera and Francis (1967) word 
norms. Mean frequency and word length, i s  shown In Table 4.2 for the 
SR, UR and W0 conditions. The primes did not d iffe r between 
conditions In length (F > 0.0152; df 3,36; P > 0.05) or frequency (F 
> 0.0004; df 3,36; P > 0.05). Targets d id not d iffe r s ign ificantly  
between conditions In  length (F • 0.1406; df 3,36; P > 0.05) or 
between the SR and UR conditions In frequency (t • 0.0114; df 18; P > 
0.05). It  was considered Important to ensure that the frequency of 
targets in the SR and UR conditions were matched because frequency 
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has been found to sign ificantly  affect le x ica l decision time 
(Rubenstein, Garfield & HlHlkan 1970; Scarborough, Cortese & 
Scarborough 1977; Gardner, Rothkopt, Lapan & Lafferty 1967). For 
practice 12 additional pairs of le tte r st r in g s  were constructed In 
the same proportions as the experimental stimuli, that 1$ three SR, 
three UR and six  WQ prime-target word p a irs .  The practice stimuli 
are shown In Appendix A.
Table 4.2 Mean length, and frequency, o f prime and target 


































*  Standard deviations are shown In parentheses
For the assessment of detection thresholds ten test words were 
selected (see Appendix A). Each had a frequency of occurrence equal 
to, or greater than, the most frequently occurring prime, and each 
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was equal In length to the longest prime. Thus test stimuli were 
chosen to give conservative estimates of detection thresholds.
A ll stimuli comprised capital le tters printed on se1f*adhes1ve 
transparent tape using wheel size iO of the KROY 60 lettering system. 
This gave a le tte r height of 2.5 mm. Stimuli were centred on white 
cards 101 x 152 mm which were viewed at a distance of approximately 
508 mm. Primes and targets subtended horizontal visual angles of 
1.13 to 3.38 and 1.35 to 2.37 degrees respectively. The pattern mask 
comprised parts of le tte rs which had been printed In an Identical 
manner to the prime and target stimuli but had then been cut up and 
fixed on a blank card at random orientations In an area measuring 20 
X 50 mm. The mask subtended visual angles of 5.63 degrees In width 
and 2.26 degrees in height. It  Is  shown In Appendix A.
Procedure
After the tachlstoscope had been adjusted for height the main 
overhead ligh t was switched o ff so that the room was l i t  by a small 
desk lamp only. Participants were then told that two separate 
experiments were to be carried out, the f ir s t  on visual acuity and 
the second on word recognition.
Each experimental session began with the assessment of detection 
threshold. Participants were told that they would be '>hown either a 
blank card or a card on which a word was printed, followed 
Immediately by another card on which there was a random pattern (the 
mask). The experimenter said that a warning bleep would precede th is  
sequence by one second and that the participant’s task was to look at 
the sequence, from the bleep, and decide whether, prior to the random 
pattern, a word or blank card had been presented. Participants were 
told that the sequence would be shown In sets of 10, and that In each 
set 5 blank cards and 5 stimulus cards would be presented In random
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order. The sequence was Initiated by the experimenter and comprised 
a dark fie ld, prime, mask, dark fie ld. The mask was exposed for 500 
msec. In it ia lly  test words and blank cards were presented 
suprallmlnally for 100 msec to fam iliarise  participants with the task 
and to Indicate the appropriate region to fixate. A marked fixation 
point was not used because In the semantic priming experiment a11 
three available f ie ld s  were required to present the prime, mask and 
target. When participants understood the procedure the duration for 
which the test stimull/blank cards was presented was reduced to 80 
msec and then further reduced by 10, 5 or 1 msec whenever In a block 
of 10 t r ia ls  stimuli were distinguished from blanks at greater than 
60% accuracy. When 60% or fewer responses were correct In  a block of 
10 t r ia ls  another 3 sets of 10 t r ia ls  were shown at the same 
duration. I f  the probability of a correct response fe ll within the 
95% confidence lim its  of the chance expectancy of 0.5 (0.35 to 0.65} 
when assessed over the 4 sets of t r ia ls ,  detection threshold was 
assumed to have been reached. Threshold assessment took between 30 
and 45 minutes.
For the semantic priming experiment participants held a small 
trigger In each hand. Half the men and h a lf the women were 
Instructed to press the trigger In their dominant hand when the 
target stimulus was a real word and to press the other tr igge r when 
the target was a nonword. This procedure was reversed fo r the other 
half of the sample. Participants were Instructed to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible.
The practice stimuli were presented three times before the 
experiment proper began. Each experimental tr ia l was In it ia ted  by 
the experimenter while the participant fixated the centre of a dark 
fie ld. A tr ia l consisted of a warning ’bleep’ followed one second 
later by the prime which was exposed at a duration 10% below the
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partic ipant 's detection threshold. This procedure was adopted to 
ensure that stimuli were truly subliminal. 500 msec of mask followed 
Immediately after the offset of the prime and the target followed 
innedlately after the offset of the mask. Target exposure was 
terminated by a trigger response from the participant and the target 
was followed by a dark fie ld. Thus participants were presented with 
the sequence dark fie ld, prime, mask, target and dark f ie ld .
There was no conversation between the participant and 
experimenter during the semantic priming experiment although 
participants would often comment spontaneously when they had made a 
mistake.
Lexical decision time was recorded by the experimenter who also 
changed the stimulus cards manually between t r ia ls .  At no time did 
the experimenter know which stimuli were being presented as she saw 
only the back of each card while loading It  Into the machine. This 
was also the case In a ll subsequent experiments. The timer 
automatically reset It s e lf  and there was an In te r-tria l interval of 
approximately 12 seconds.
At the end of the experiment participants were questioned about 
the second experiment and In particular about what they might have 
seen prior to the mask on priming t r ia ls .  F irst ly , they were 
reminded that they had been told that the f ir s t  experiment was 
designed to assess visual acuity but that they had not been told why 
the second experiment was conducted. They were then asked to guess 
the purpose of the second experiment and to give a reason for the 
presentation of the patterned stimulus (mask). F ina lly  they were 
asked whether I t  ever seemed as I f  a stimulus had been presented 
prior to the pattern (mask) In the second experiment.
Over the fina l 40 t r ia ls  o f threshold assessment a11 12 participants 
gave a response d istribu tion  in which the probability of making a 
correct response, P(C), fe ll within the upper and lower 95% 
confidence lim its (0.35 and 0.65) about the chance expectation of 
0.5. How«;ver, three participants had response d istributions In which 
the probability of a h it  P(H) and/or a fa lse  alarm P(FA) was outside 
the computed confidence lim its of 0.3 and 0.7. The nine participants 
whose response d istribu tions conformed to a ll three c rite r ia  proposed 
In Chapter 3 for non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responding had the follow ing mean 
response probab ilities: P(C) -  0.527 (SO 0.061), P(H) -  0.540 (SD 
0.100) and P(FA) ■  0.480 (SO 0.060). Their mean detection threshold 
(DT) was 56.7 msec (SD 9.66) and mean d’ at DT was 0.136 (SD 0.342). 
The resu lts reported for the priming experiment are only those for 
the nine participants who showed non-dlscrimlnative responding and 
only lexical decision times In the SR and UR conditions w ill be 
discussed.
The resu lts of the semantic priming experiment show that no 
Incorrect lexical decisions were made In e ither the SR or UR 
conditions. Following the procedure used by Fischler and Goodman 
(1978) 'o u t l ie r s ',  that Is ,  lexical decision times further than two 
standard deviations from a participant’s mean time In each 
experimental condition were set at values equal to 2S0s in the 
appropriate direction. In the SR and UR conditions 'o u t lie r s ' 
represented 6.7% and 8.9% of a ll responses.
The mean decision time for the UR condition was 698 msec (SD 
125.3) while that for the SR condition was 635 msec (SD 114.2). Thus 
on average lexical decisions were faster by 63 msec when targets were 
preceded by semantically related primes. The magnitude of the
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priMing tffec t  due to the semtntlc reUtedness of primes end tergets 
was calculated as 8.86X. A ll nine participants showed quicker mean 
lexical decision times In the SR condition. Three way hierarchical 
analysis o f variance showed that according to the conventional 
ratio  lexical decisions were s ign ifican tly  faster In the SR condition 
than In the UR (F^ « 17.47; df 1,8; P ■  0.003). However, the quasi F 
ratio was not sign ificant (F’ -  2.82; df 1,23; P > 0.05). The 
product moment correlation between detection performance at threshold 
(d*) and the magnitude of p riiln g  effect was -0.170 (P > 0.05).
When questioned at the end of the session most participants said 
they had no Idea of the purpose of the second experiment, although 
some students thought that handedness (dominant versus non-dominant), 
speed of response and type of le tte r string (real versus nonword) 
were the Important variables. Host participants thought that the 
patterned stimulus (mask) was shown as an aid to focussing and/or to 
the location o f  the subsequent le tte r string. No participant thought 
that a stimulus had been presented prior to the mask.
The resu lts o f Experiment 1 Indicate that 9 of the 12 participants 
showed non-dlscrimlnative responding at detection threshold according 
to the c r ite r ia  proposed In Chapter 3. It  therefore seems like ly  
that estimates o f objective threshold were obtained for these 
participants and th is  belief Is  strengthened by the lack of a 
sign ificant correlation between the magnitude of priming effect and 
detection performance as assessed by d*. The sign ificant Fj ratio 
for the priming data shows that a subliminal semantic priming effect 
was obtained when primes were presented lOt below objective

ExptrlMnt 2 was a rep lication  of Experinent 1 In a different sawple 
of subjects and with d ifferent stlwull. Owing to the quasi F 
analysis of Experiment 1 I t  was hypothesised that the significant 
subliminal priming effect found In that experiment would not be 
replicated In Experiment 2.
Participants
Twelve undergraduate students, 7 men and 5 women, took part In the 
experiment. Their mean age was 20 years (SO 1.73). None knew the 
nature or purpose of the research and none had taken part In 
Experiment 1. A ll were paid £1.50.
Stimuli
Using Identical procedures to those described In Experiment 1 a new 
set of experimental stimuli was constructed. The stimuli are shown 
In Appendix B. The mean frequency and length of primes and targets 
In  the semantically related (SR), unrelated (UR), and word-nonword 
(Wfi) conditions are shown In  Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Mean length and frequency of prime and target 

































*  Standard deviations are shown In parentheses.
Primes did not d iffe r s ign ifican tly  between conditions 1n terms of 
length (F • 0.0207; df 3,36; P > 0.05) or frequency (F -  0.00001; df 
3,36; P > 0.05). Targets did not d iffe r  sign ifican tly  between 
conditions in length (F -  0.0217; df 3,36; P > 0.05) nor between the 
$R and UR condition In terms of frequency (t > 0.0298; d f 18; P > 
0.05). Primes and targets subtended horizontal angles of 1.01 to 
3.38 degrees and 1.02 to 2.59 degrees respectively.
The mask used in Experiment 1 was used again in Experiment 2.
The practice stimuli were the same as In Experiment 1 except that the 
words bath, clean, oboe, load, and Ivory replaced the words slow, 
fast, shoe, oboe and apple respectively. New test stimuli fo r  the 
assessment of detection threshold were chosen on the same bas is  as In 
Experiment 1. They are shown in Appendix B.
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Apparatus ind Procedure
These were Identical to those used In Experiment 1.
Ten of the 12 participants gave response d istribu tions In the final 
40 detection t r ia ls  which conformed to a ll three c rite ria  for 
non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responding proposed In Chapter 3. Only the 
resu lts for these 10 participants w ill be presented and only lexical 
decision times for the SR and UR conditions w ill be discussed. For 
the 10 participants who responded non-d1$cr1m1nat1vely the mean 
probabilities of correct response, hit and fa lse  alarm were 0.525 ($D 
0.041), 0.505 ($0 0.079) and 0.455 (SO 0.093) respectively. Mean 
detection threshold was 41 msec (SD 15.42) and mean d’ at threshold 
was 0.128 (SO 0.021).
For the non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responders incorrect lexical 
decisions comprised 1% and 2% of the total responses In the SR and UR 
conditions respectively. In order to compute F’ the participant’s 
mean decision time for the appropriate experimental condition was 
substituted for the actual decision time In the case of Incorrect 
decisions. For the SR and UR conditions respectively 2% and 7% of 
a ll lexical decisions were 'o u t lie rs ’ . Outliers were dealt with as 
In Experiment 1.
The mean lexical decision time for the SR condition was 540 msec 
(SO 28.8) and that for the UR condition was 593 msec (SD 60.9). 
Therefore, on average lexical decisions In the SR condition were 
quicker by S3 msec and the magnitude of the priming effect was 8.61X 
(SD 6.15). Nine of the 10 participants who showed non*d1scr1m1nat1ve 
responding at threshold showed quicker mean lexical decision times in
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the SR condition. Analysis of variance showed that lexical decisions 
In the SR condition were sign ifican tly  quicker than In  the UR 
condition both In terms of the ratio  (Fj -  16.61; df 1,9; P - 
0.0027) and quasi F ratio (F* -  8.40; df 1,2S; P < 0.01). The 
product moment correlation between magnitude of priming effect and d’ 
was 0.599 (P > 0.05). When questioned after the priming experiment 
a ll participants claimed not to have seen anything p rio r to the mask 
on priming t r ia ls .
Ten of the 12 participants showed non*d1scr1m1nat1ve responding In 
terms of the three c riteria  proposed In Chapter 3. I t  therefore 
seems reasonable to conclude that objective thresholds were assessed 
for these participants and th is conclusion Is  supported by the lack 
of a sign ificant correlation between detection performance (d*) and 
the magnitude of priming effect.
The pessim istic hypothesis drawn from the value of F* In 
Experiment 1 was that the subliminal semantic priming effect would be 
unlikely to replicate In research which used new participants and 
different stim uli. But th is effect was replicated In Experiment 2.
However, the correlation between d’ and the magnitude of priming 
effect was rather high, a11«1t non-significant. Cheesman and Herlkle 
(1984) found a sign ificant correlation between performance at 
threshold and the magnitude of priming effect when subjective 
thresholds were assessed though, as one would expect, th is  
correlation was non-significant when objective thresholds were 
assessed, would expect. Because objective detection threshold was 
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*  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Primes did not d iffe r s ig n if ic a n t ly  between conditions in frequency 
(F ■  0.0000; df 3,36; P > 0.05) or length (F -  0.0000; df 3,36; P > 
0.05). Targets did not d if fe r  sign ificantly between conditions in 
length or between the SR and UR condition in frequency of occurrence 
(t ■  0.0057; df 18; P > 0.05). The primes and targets subtended 
horizontal visual angles in the range 1.47 to 2.59 degrees. The mask 
was that used in Experiments 1 and 2. Test stimuli for the 
assessment of detection threshold and practice stimuli were chosen on 
the same basis as for previous experiments and are shown in Appendix 
C.
Appir>tu$ and Procedure
Both were Identicil to those used In Experiments 1 and 2.
Nine of the 12 participants showed non*d1scr1m1nat1ve responding 
according to the three c rite r ia  proposed In Chapter 3. For these 9 
participants the following mean values were obtained; P(C) -  0.517 
(SO 0.035), P(H) -  0.511 (SO 0.124) and P(FA) -  0.477 (SO 0.120). 
These participants' mean detection threshold was 26.67 msec (SO 10.0) 
and at threshold mean d’ was 0.086 (SO 0.170). The proportion of 
Incorrect lexical decisions for non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responders was 
zero In the SR condition and 7.6% In the UR. Outliers occurred 1n 
5.6% of the SR decisions and 4.4% of the UR. Errors and o u t lie rs  
were dealt with as In Experiments 1 and 2. The results presented 
below are only those for the 9 non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responders and only 
lex ica l decision times In the SR and UR conditions are discussed.
The mean lexical decision times for the SR and UR conditions 
were 628 nsec (SO 100.6) and 723 msec (SO 65.8) respectively. On 
average lexical decisions were quicker In the SR condition by 95 msec 
and the mean magnitude of priming effect was 13.44% (SO 6.14). 
Analysis of variance showed lexical decisions were s ign if ica n tly  
quicker In the SR condition both In terms of the conventional F| 
ratio  (Fj -  27.641 df 1.8; P -  0.0008) and In terms of quasi F (F ' • 
6.04; df 1,25; P < 0.05). The product moment correlation between d ' 
and the magnitude of priming effect was 0.266 (P > 0.10). Upon 
questioning none of the participants reported having seen anything 
p rio r to the mask on priming tr ia ls .
Non-dlscrlminatlve responding over the fina l 40 detection t r ia ls  was 
obtained for 9 of the 12 participants and no sign ificant correlation 
was found between detection performance (d ’) and the magnitude of the 
priming effect. Thus for 9 participants objective thresholds 
appeared to have been sa t is fac to r ily  determined. The resu lts of 
Experiment 3 confirmed those of Experiments 1 and 2 In again finding 
a sign ificant subliminal semantic priming effect. Experiments 1, 2 
and 3 used binocular presentation of primes, targets and mask, and It  
seems clear that semantic priming effects can be obtained below 
objective threshold with th is  technique. However before concluding 
that binocular presentation offers an acceptable alternative to the 
dichoptic technique used by Marcel (1983a, Experiment 4), Balota 
(1963) and Fowler et a l. (1981, Experiments S & 6) It  was considered 
necessary to compare the two procedures when applied to the same 
prime and target stim uli. It  was evident from the sign ificant values 
of Fj In a ll three experiments that subliminal priming effects w ill 
replicate over d ifferent samples of participants and therefore It  was 
not considered necessary to apply both dichoptic and binocular 
techniques to the same sample of people, but merely to the same 
sample of stimuli. Accordingly Experiment 4 was carried out to test 
the hypothesis that dichoptic and binocular pattern masking 
procedures would give comparable results when applied to the same 
prime-target stimuli. Experiment 4 Is  reported In the next chapter.
EXPERINEHT 4: A REPLICATION OF EXPERINENT 3 WITH DICHOPTIC
STIHULUS ----------------
The subliminal semantic priming experiments reported In Chapter 4 
appear to show that binocular presentation I s  an acceptable 
alternative to the dichoptic technique used by Fowler et a1. (1981), 
Balota (1983) and Marcel (1983a). I f  th is Is  the case then the 
semantic priming effect found using binocular presentation In 
Experiment 3 should be replicable In a further study using the same 
stimuli presented dichoptically. Furthermore, I f  binocular 
presentation Is  an acceptable alternative to dichoptic, I t  may be 
hypothesised that the two methods of presentation would yie ld  the 
same magnitude of semantic priming effect when used with the same 
stimuli. Experiment 4 set out to Investigate these hypotheses.
Participants
Twelve undergraduate students, with mean age 19.7 years (SO 2.56), 
took part In  the experiment. Five were men. None had previously 
taken part In  sim ilar research and a ll were paid £1.50.
Apparatus
The 3-f1e1d tachlstoscope used In Experiments 1 • 3 was modified by 
f it t in g  polarising f ilte r s  to the mask and prime fie ld s. These two 
f ilt e r s  were fitted at 90® to each other. Two pairs of spectacles 
were constructed with two polarised filte rs ,  one In each eye piece, 
at 90® to each other. The mask was seen by the right eye and the
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p r lM  by the le f t  eye of the wearer of one pair o f spectacles and 
vice-versa by the wearer of the other pair. Thus It  was possible to 
present the Mask to the participant's doailnant eye which ever eye 
th is was. In a l l  other respects the apparatus was the sawe as In 
CxperlMents 1 - 3 .
StiMull and Procedure
The test, practice, and experlPRental stimuli were those used In 
Experiment 3. Eye dominance was assessed by means of the finger 
alignment procedure used by Narcel (1983a). Following Harcel (1983a, 
Experiment 4), Balota (1983), Fowler et a1. (1981, Experiments 5 &
6) and Turvey (1973) the mask was presented to the dominant eye and 
primes were presented to the non-dominant eye. Targets were 
presented to both eyes. To ensure that the mask fu lly  covered the 
prime for participants with right or le ft eye dominance the size of 
the mask was extended to 20 x 70 mn. Except fo r these differences 
the procedure followed was Identical to that used In Experiments 1 - 
3.
In the final 40 detection t r ia ls  9 out of 12 participants showed 
non-dlscrlmlnatlve responding according to the three criteria  
proposed In Chapter 3. The 9 participants had a response 
distribution In which the mean probability of a correct response, a 
h it, and a fa lse  alarm was 0.528 (SO 0.036), 0.510 (SO 0.133) and 
0.458 ($0 0.143) respectively. The mean threshold for the 
non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responders was 18.11 msec (SO 9.60) and the mean 
value of d’ was 0.148 (SO 0.194). The d iscussion of results Includes
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only those for the non-d1scr1n1net1ve responders and only lexical 
decision times In the SR and UR conditions are presented.
In the priming experiment I. IX  of lexical decisions In the SR 
condition were Incorrect while the error rate In the UR condition was 
3.3X. Outliers represented 7.8X of the SR responses and 4.4X of the 
UR. Errors and outliers were treated In the same manner as In the 
three previous experiments.
The mean lexical decision times In SR and UR conditions were 670 
msec (SO 116.4) and 810 msec (SO 167.7} respectively. Thus lexical 
decisions were, on average, 140 msec faster In the SR condition and 
the mean magnitude of priming effect was 16.67X. Analysis of 
variance showed that lexical decisions were s ign if ican tly  quicker In 
the SR condition (F^ • 30.74; df 1,8; P -  0.0005 and F* -  8.11; df 
1,26; P < 0.01). The product moment correlation between detection 
performance (d’) and the magnitude of priming effect was 0.370 (P > 
O.OS). A comparison of the mean magnitude of priming effect In 
Experiments 3 and 4 showed that there was no sign ifican t difference 
between them (t > 1.07, df 16, P > 0.1).
As In the previous three experiments, despite extensive 
questioning, no participant reported seeing any stimulus prior to the 
mask on priming t r ia ls .
At detection threshold (DT) 9 out of 12 participants had response 
d istribu tions which obeyed the three c rite ria  proposed In Chapter 3 
fo r  non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responding. Moreover, the correlation between 
percentage priming effect and d’ at DT was not s ign if ican t and It  
seems reasonable to conclude therefore that primes, presented as they
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were at 90% DT, were presented below objective threshold.
As In Experiments 1 - 3 lexica l decisions In Experiment 4 were 
made sign if ican tly  more quickly, on average, when the target was 
preceded by a semantically related, rather than unrelated, prime.
The sign ificant quasi F (F*) In Experiment 4 suggests that the 
resu lts are l ik e ly  to replicate In  further studies using new 
participants and different word pairs.
The results of Experiment 4 replicate the findings of Experiment 
3 and the hypothesis that the magnitude of priming effect would not 
d iffe r  sign ifican tly  as between binocular (Experiment 3) and 
dichoptic (Experiment 4) presentation of primes was supported. This 
suggests that the binocular method of presentation adopted for 
Experiment 3 Is  an acceptable alternative to the dichoptic 
presentation used In Experiment 4. A further d iscussion of this 
experiment, and Experiments 1 - 3, follows In the next chapter.
THE SUILIMINAL SEMANTIC PRIKIW OF NEUTRAL TAR6ETS: AN OVERALL
pmussiw OP gxwihaffs i - i ----------------
In Experiments 1 - 4 i11 participants gave a response d istribution  at 
threshold In which the probability of a correct response did not 
deviate sign ifican tly  from the chance expectancy of 0.5. Thus a ll 
participants sa tisfied  the criterion for non-discriminative 
responding used by Marcel (1983a), Fowler et a1. (1961), Balota 
(1963) and Spence (1961). However, in each of the experiments some 
participants fa iled  to meet the additional c riteria  proposed In 
Chapter 3. This suggests that it  Is  unwise to specify objective 
detection thresholds In terms of the probability of correct response 
alone, and that M erlk le 's (1982) insistence upon the need to examine 
response distributions was well founded. But, In Experiments 1 • 4 
i t  seems reasonable to conclude that adequate assessments of 
objective threshold were made for those participants who showed 
non-dlscrimlnative responding In terms of a11 three of the c rite ria  
proposed in Chapter 3. This conclusion Is  strengthened by the 
finding In each experiment that the magnitude of priming effect was 
not sign ificantly related to detection performance at threshold. As 
objective thresholds appear to have been sa tisfacto rily  assessed, and 
as primes were presented 10% below threshold. It  seems not 
unreasonable to assume that Experiments 1 - 4 provided a satisfactory 
test of the hypothesis that semantic priming effects can be obtained 
below objective threshold. However, to be as certain as possible of 
th is  conclusion several additional analyses were carried out by 
pooling data across the four experiments for those participants
(N • 37) who showed non-dlscrlninetive responding i t  detection 
threshold. This wes considered eppropriate because some of these 
participants showed quite substantial values for d’ at estimated 
detection threshold. In fact 8 o f the 37^participants had values for 
d* between 0.28 and 0.53. A sceptic might argue that participants 
Included In the data analyses of Experiments 1 * 4 who had values of 
d’ In excess of zero might, despite the stringent c rite r ia  employed 
In assessing detection threshold and the non-significant correlation 
between d’ and the magnitude of priming effect In each experiment, 
have been showing discriminative responding. This, I t  could be 
argued, was responsible for the priming effects obtained. To examine 
th is point participants were divided Into two groups. The f ir s t  
group (N • 14) contained participants for whom d’ was le ss than, or 
equal to, zero (mean d’ ■  -0.102, SD ■  0.15; mean percentage priming 
effect -  10.73, SD -  6.51). The second group (N ■  23) contained 
participants for whom d* was greater than zero (mean d’ > 0.261, SD - 
0.143; mean percentage priming effect -  12.45, SO • 6.88). The 
correlation between d’ and percentage priming effect for the group 
for which d* was < 0 was found to be 0.164 (P > 0.05) and the 
correlation for the group for which d* was > 0 was 0.132 (P > 0.05). 
Thus no sign ificant relationship between detection performance (d*) 
and magnitude of priming effect was found for either group and the 
sizes of the correlations are very comparable. A second analysis 
showed that the magnitude of priming effect did not d iffe r  
sign ificantly  between the d* 4: 0 and d* > 0 groups (t  -  0.753; df 35; 
P > 0.1).
I t  Is  c learly very d iff ic u lt  to believe that where d’ was < 0 
priming effects were due to conscious awareness of the primes or 
discriminative performance at threshold. As the d* > 0 group showed 
priming effects of the same magnitude as the d* < 0 group, and showed
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the same (nu ll) relationship between d* and percentage prlulng effect 
as the d’ < 0, It  cannot be maintained that high values of d’ 
produced the results found. Thus the additional analyses strongly 
support the conclusion that Experiments 1 - 4 demonstrated that 
semantic priming effects can occur below objective detection 
threshold. Thus the f i r s t  aim of the research was fu lf i l le d  and It  
may be concluded that semantic priming can occur without awareness of 
the primes.
As regards the second aim of the Investigation use of the quasi 
F ratio  advocated by Clark (1973) suggested that the priming effect 
obtained In Experiment 1 would be unlikely to be replicated with 
different samples of prime and target words. However, the effect was 
replicated In Experiments 2 and 3 which used different word samples 
with the same stimulus presentation technique. The priming effect 
was again replicated In Experiment 4 using a d ifferent (dichoptic) 
presentation technique but the same primes and targets as Experiment 
3. These findings offer substantial support to Wike and Church’s 
(1976) argument that rep lication  of experimental resu lts with 
different verbal stimuli and different experimental techniques Is  
preferable to the use of quasi F ratios. In fairness to C lark’s 
(1973) position 1t should be pointed out that 1n Experiments 2, 3 and 
4 the quasi F ratio suggested that the obtained priming effect would 
generalise to other samples of prime-target stimuli even though th is 
was not the case In Experiment 1. But I t  should also be noted that 
had a conclusion been drawn from the value of F’ In a single 
experiment (I.e . Experiment 1) It  would have been that the 
sign ificant subliminal semantic priming effect was a chance finding. 
Thus there I s  l i t t le  doubt that replication Is  preferable to the use 
of F’ applied to a single  Investigation.
The resu lts of Experiment 4 are Interesting on two grounds.
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First, as already mentioned, they replicated the re su lts of the f ir s t  
three experiments. Second, the magnitude of the priming effect In 
Experiment 4 was not s ign ifican tly  different from that found In 
Experiment 3 which used the same stimuli but a different method of 
presentation. This relates to the third aim of the Investigation and 
Indicates that the binocular presentation technique used In the f ir s t  
three experiments was a satisfactory alternative to the dichoptic 
technique used In  the fourth.
One of the critic ism s made of previous subliminal semantic 
priming experiments was that differences In lighting conditions 
between the priming and detection phases of the experiments may have 
rendered the primes more v is ib le  during priming than during detection 
(Holender 1986). This point was discussed in some detail In Chapter 
2 where I t  was also noted that when Carr and Dagenbach (1986) 
equalised ligh tin g  conditions between the two phases of their 
experiment s ign if ican t subliminal semantic priming effects were s t i l l  
evident below detection threshold. The present experiments were 
carried out before th is c ritic ism  had been made and so Carr and 
Dagenbach’s (1986) procedure was not followed. They presented a 
bright f ie ld  after the mask on detection t r ia ls  to compensate for the 
bright target f ie ld  during priming t r ia ls .  However, in the 
experiments reported here participants were not dark adapted as the 
room was moderately well lighted. It  therefore seems extremely 
unlikely that changes In dark adaptation could account for the 
results. A further point which adds some support to th is  conclusion 
comes from the finding that In Experiment 4 where polarising  f ilte rs  
reduced luminance levels, and thus reduced the contrast between 
stimulus f ie ld s and the dark in te r-tria l field, the magnitude of 
priming effect was not sign ifican tly  different from that In 
Experiment 3 where the same stimuli were used but where luminance
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leve ls viere appreclebly higher reU tIve  to the dark Inte r-tria l 
fie ld . I f  dark adaptation changes were responsible for the results 
I t  would be expected that participants would benefit more In 
Experiment 3 than In Experiment 4 and therefore the priming effect In 
Experiment 3 should have been sign ificantly  larger than that In 
Experiment 4 (which It  wasn’t).
In considering the discrepancy between the re su lts of 
Experiments I - 4 and those of Cheesman and Herlkle (1984) a return 
w ill be made to the point made In Chapter 2 that the Identity 
discrimination procedures, as used by Cheesman and Herlkle, do not 
assess detection thresholds. As noted In Chapter 2 evidence 
supporting th is point comes from Carr and Dagenbach (1986). Using a 
pattern masking procedure Carr and Oagenbach assessed conventional 
detection thresholds, forced choice recognition thresholds and 
thresholds for making semantic sim ilarity Judgements. Forced choice 
recognition threshold required participants to answer such questions 
as "Was ’doctor’ or a blank fie ld  presented before the mask?" While 
semantic sim ilarity Judgements were assessed by asking participants 
to respond to questions of the sort: "Was the word before the mask 
more sim ilar In meaning to ’nurse’ or to ’bread’ ? "  Detection 
thresholds were found to be more stringent (I.e. lower) than the 
other types of threshold and sign ificant semantic priming effects 
were found only at detection threshold. These find ings Indicate that 
Identity discrimination procedures do not yield satisfactory 
estimates of detection thresholds and the fa ilure  by Cheesman and 
Herlkle (1984) to find semantic priming effects may therefore be 
considered as possibly resulting from Inappropriate threshold 
assessment. It  I s  particularly interesting to note that both 
Cheesman and Nerlkle, and Carr and Dagenbach, fa iled  to find priming 




THE CONCEPT OF EHOTIOML PRINÏIW
Studies o f semantic priming have been designed primarily to enhance 
understanding of word and picture recognition and the features of 
semantic memory. To this end many factors have been manipulated, for 
example; type of stimulus, mode of presentation, stimulus onset 
asynchrony, prime-target relationship and target quality. One factor 
whose Investigation has not been reported In published studies of 
semantic priming I s  the emotional quality of the target stimulus, 
although emotional quality has been Investigated In research on 
unprlmed word recognition where I t  was found that emotional words 
(positive  and negative) do not d iffe r sign ificantly  from neutral 
words In  terms of lexical decision time (Clark, Teasdale, Broadbent & 
Hartin 1983). One reason fo r conducting priming experiments with 
emotional target stimuli I s  that they might lead to a better 
understanding of the way In which the emotional connotations of 
stimuli are perceived and stored and may also have explanatory value 
In abnormal/cllnlca! psychology.
One c lin ica l problem which might be explained by a semantic 
priming effect Is  the onset o f anxiety attacks which occur without 
the conscious perception of threat. It  has been thought that such 
attacks arise  because of the activation of non-consclous emotional 
stimuli (Tyrer 1985) but the mechanism by which these stimuli are 
activated Is  not well understood, though evidence has been found that 
non-consclous concepts associated with conflict can be activated 
(Silverman 1965). Priming effects are thought to occur because the 
prime activates a representation of the target In semantic memory and
various models of semantic memory and word recognition assume th is 
(e.g. Horton 1970; Collins & loftus 197S; Becker 1980). In 
principle  non*consc1ous emotional stimuli present in memory could be 
activated by this mechanism but of course the explanation re lie s on 
two assumptions. F ir st  that the emotional Information associated 
with a stimulus Is  activated when the representation of the stimulus 
Is  activated In semantic memory. Second that th is  emotional 
Information, once activated, Is  capable of g iv in g  rise  to an 
emotional response. The f ir s t  of these assumptions Is  supported by 
the work of Posner and Snyder (1975). They carried out two 
experiments the f ir s t  of which Involved participants In making a 
decision about the presence/absence of emotional probe words In a 
sentence. The second Involved decisions about whether the emotional 
quality of a probe was congruent with the emotional quality of the 
sentence. From the results o f the two experiments Posner and Snyder 
(197S) concluded that emotional Information I s  stored as a high level 
and habitual associate to a given word and that the presentation of 
the word automatically activates related emotional responses. On the 
basis o f Posner and Snyder’s work I t  may be hypothesised that i f  a 
neutral prime can activate an emotional target through a semantic 
priming effect it  should also activate the emotional Information 
associated with the target. This may In turn may give rise  to the 
emotional response which patients with free floating anxiety report 
comes 'ou t of the blue’ .
The f ir s t  aim of the work reported In Chapters 8 • 12 was to 
investigate whether emotional targets, that Is ,  targets with 
(aversive) emotional connotations can be primed by emotionally 
neutral primes to which they are semantically related, when the 
primes are presented below objective detection threshold.
A second aim of the work was to determine whether a priming
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effect cen be obtained with emotional targets when the primes have a 
sim ilar emotional qua lity  to the targets but are not In other ways 
semantically related. The p o ssib ility  that an 'emotional priming 
effect’ exists is  not as unlikely as I t  seems at f ir s t  sight and has 
been demonstrated suprallm lnally by H ill and Kemp-Wheeler (1987).
Host semantic priming experiments have used primes and targets 
related through common semantic p rinciples, for example, primes and 
targets as antonyms (dry-wet, Becker 1980) or strong normative 
associates (bread-butter, Heyer et al. 1975). However, Franklin and 
Okada (1982) showed that personal Idiosyncratic associations can give 
rise  to priming e ffe cts and Nckoon and R a tc lif f  (1979) demonstrated 
priming with unrelated word pairs which had been studied In their 
pairings prior to the semantic priming experiment. Thus a variety of 
d ifferent kinds of semantic relationship appear capable of yield ing 
priming effects and I t  seems clear that the priming effect depends 
upon primes and targets sharing at least one of quite a large set of 
possible semantic attributes.
In their ana ly sis of 'meaning* Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum 
(1955) found that the meaning of a concept could be specified In 
terms of three dimensions; activity, potency and evaluation. It  Is  
the la s t  of these which Is  relevant to the present argument. I f  two 
verbal stimuli (words) are evaluated In the same way they must, 
according to Osgood et a1. 's analysis, share a semantic attribute or 
set of attributes and must therefore be semantically related. 
Consequently I f  two wot'ds are evaluated as both having unpleasant 
emotional connotations they should be capable of acting as prime and 
target to produce an 'emotional* priming effect. This argument Is  
supported, and Indeed derivable from, Bower's (1981) network theory 
which postulates that emotions no less than concepts are represented 
In a semantic memory network.
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Bower's (1981) theory ilso  predicts that words which have 
emotional connotations congruent with a persons mood state should be 
recognised more readily and with greater accuracy. But the findings 
from research designed to investigate these predictions have been 
somewhat inconsistent. For example, Teasdale and Russe ll (1983) and 
Clark and Teasdale (1985) found sign ificantly  better recall for 
mood-congruent than mood-incongruent words. This i s  what would be 
expected i f  mood congruent words are more easily recognised because 
such words would presumably be subject to strong early-processing 
effects in terms of receiving selective attention and preferentially 
deeper encoding. But Gerrig and Bower (1982) found that briefly 
presented mood-congruent words were not more accurately identified 
than neutral or incongruent words in a two-choice forced recognition 
task. Moreover, Clark, Teasdale, Broadbent and Martin (1983) found 
not only that lexical decision time for mood-congruent words was not 
s ign if ica n tly  faster than for word-incongruent words but in a 
subsequent surprise recall task mood-incongruent words were those 
best recalled. Whilst previous research findings are rather 
contradictory i t  remains a p ossib ility  that in tasks requiring 
participants to process words with emotional connotations personality 
t ra it s  and mood states may influence performance. To investigate the 
p o s s ib il it y  that the semantic and emotional priming o f emotionally 
aversive targets may be Influenced by emotional state the f ir s t  
emotional priming experiment (Experiment 5) was conducted with 
participants who scored at the two extremes of the neuroticism 
dimension of the Eysenck Personality Inventory.
CHAPTER 8
PRIH1H6 EFFECTS WITH EHOTIOMAL TAR6ETS; EXPERIHEHT 5
The experiment reported in th is chapter was designed to Investigate 
priming effects with emotionally aversive targets. There were three 
hypotheses:
1. Lexical decisions w ill be made sign ifican tly  more quickly when 
emotional targets are preceded by a semantically related neutral 
prime than by a semantically unrelated neutral prime presented 
below objective detection threshold. That is, there w ill be a 
sign ificant semantic priming effect with emotional targets.
2. Lexical decisions w ill be made sign if ican tly  more quickly when 
emotional targets are preceded by emotional (but otherwise 
unrelated) primes than by semantically unrelated neutral primes 
presented below objective detection threshold. That is ,  there 
w ill be a sign ificant ’emotional priming effect’ with emotional 
targets.
3. Lexical decision times for primed emotionally aversive targets 
w ill d iffe r sign ificantly between groups of high and low scorers 
on the Neuroticism scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory.
No prediction Is  made regarding d irection of the difference.
P«rt1cipant$
Following administration of the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI; 
Eysenck & Eysenck 1964) to large groups of f ir s t  year undergraduates 
In the University of Keele, two groups of students were chosen to 
participate in the experiment. One group comprised 7 women and 3 men 
who scored 18 or more on the Neuroticism (N) scale of the EPI (High N 
group). A second group (Low N group) comprised 6 women and 4 men who 
scored 8 or le ss on the EPI N scale. Mean Neuroticism scores for the 
High and Low N groups were 18.20 (SO 1.077) and S.20 ($D 2.135) 
respectively. The two groups did not d iffe r sign ifican tly  in 
extraversión [High N mean 10.60 (SD 4.758), Low N mean 10.60 (SD 
3.412); t -  0, df 18, P > 0.05J or age [High N mean 20.1 years (SD 
2.548), Low N mean 23.4 years (SD 6.726); t -  1.376, df 18, P >
0.05]. None of the students was aware of the nature of the research 
and a ll were paid £2.00 for participating.
Apparatus
The apparatus was Identical to that used In Experiments 1 - 3 .  As 
before luminance levels were set at 2.35 Ig  cd/m  ^ for the 
presentation of prime and target stimuli and at 1.90 Ig  cd/m  ^ for the 
presentation of the mask. The experiment was conducted In a sound 
deadened room which was l i t  by a 40 watt bulb in a small desk lamp.
Stimuli
20 prime-target letter strings in each of 6 conditions were used In 
the experiment. Two examples from each condition appear in Table 8.1 
and the fu ll l i s t  Is  shown In Appendix D.

Of the 120 tergets ha lf were real words and half were nonwords. 
The real word targets were chosen to be associated with unpleasant 
eMotlons. One third of these targets were preceded by seaiantlcally 
related neutral words (seaiantlcalTy related; SR condition). Another 
third were preceded by unpleasant enotlonal words to which they were 
not semantically related (emotionally related; ER condition). The 
remainder were preceded by semantically unrelated neutral words 
(unrelated; UR condition). The nonword targets were preceded by real 
word primes (word-nonword; WO conditions). In one condition the 
primes were emotional words but in the other two conditions they were 
neutral. This matched the 2:1 ratio of neutral to emotional primes 
in the three conditions which had real word targets. The emotional 
tone of the words was decided by the Experimenter and her Supervisor. 
Tables of norms could not be used because many words were required 
and frequency of occurrence had to be matched across conditions thus 
restricting choice. In la te r experiments (e.g. Experiment 6) 
stimuli were chosen after the completion of an ’emotionality* rating 
exercise. A ll nonword stimuli were pronounceable and represented 
high level approximations to English words. The prime-target 
stimulus pairs in a ll 6 experimental conditions were combined and 
randomised. They were then divided into 4 packs of 30 for 
presentation. This made the large set of stimuli (240 cards 
altogether) easier to handle and gave participants a brief rest when 
the packs of cards were changed. For practice 12 further 
prime-target letter strings were constructed; 2 of each type o f 
prime-target pair used In the experiment (see Appendix 0).
The average length of prime stimuli was matched across a ll  
conditions, as was the average length of target stimuli. The average 
frequency of occurrence was calculated for each set of primes using 
the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms and matched across conditions.
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The average frequency o f occurrence of target stimuli was matched 
across the SR, ER, and UR conditions. Mean length and frequency of 
primes and targets In the SR. ER, UR and WO conditions are shown In 
Table 0.2. One way ANOVA for Independent groups showed that the 
primes did not d iffe r sign if ican tly  between conditions In length (F • 
0.0012; df S.114; P > 0.05) or frequency (F > 0.0043; df 5,114; p > 
0.05). The length of target stimuli did not d iffer sign ifican tly  
between conditions e ither (F • 0.0089; df 5,114; P > 0.05) and there 
was no significant d ifference In the frequency of targets in the SR, 
ER and UR conditions (F -  0.0089; df 2,57; p > 0.1).
For the assessment o f  detection threshold 6 test words were 
selected (see Appendix 0 ). These had the same number of le tters as 
the longest prime and a frequency which was equal to, or greater 
than, the most frequently occurring prime. Thus, test stimuli were 
chosen to give conservative estimates of detection threshold. As In 
Experiments 1 • 4 a ll st im uli were printed on self-adhesive 
transparent tape using wheel size 10 of the KROY 80 lettering system. 
This gave a letter height of 2.5 m .  Stimuli were centred on white 
cards 101 x 152 mm which were viewed at a distance of approximately 
508 mm. Primes and targets subtended horizontal visual angles In the 
range 0.90 to 3.72 degrees and 1.24 to 3.33 degrees respectively.
The pattern mask from Experiments 1 • 3 was also used In Experiment 
5. It  measured 20 x 50 mm and subtended visual angles of 5.63 




After the tachistoscope had been adjusted for height the M in  
overhead ligh t  was switched off so that the room was l i t  by a $m 11 
desk lamp only. Participants were then told that two entirely 
separate experlMnts were to be carried out, the f ir s t  on detection 
threshold (DT) and the second on word recognition. To give a 
plausible  rational for the assessment of DT participants were told 
that the f i r s t  experiment was one of a series designed to investigate 
how detection varied with type of stimuli • numbers, shapes and words 
• and the Influence of d istractors. The Experimenter said that In 
th is  research the distractor looked sim ilar to the t i le s  which lined 
the room and from then on the d istractor (M sk) was referred to as 
'the wallpaper card’ (WPC). This was because I t  was thought that 
participants would be less lik e ly  to think that I t s  function was to 
mask stim uli I f  I t  was never referred to as a d istractor or M sk.
Participants were told that In the f ir s t  experiment they would 
be shown either a blank card or a card on which a which a word was 
printed followed by the WPC exposed for half a second. The 
experimenter said that a warning bleep would precede the 
s t1mu1us/blank card sequence by one second, and that the 
partic ipants ' task was to look at the whole sequence, from the bleep, 
and then decide whether a blank card or a stimulus card had preceded 
the WPC. I t  was stressed that the task was not d if f ic u lt  at f ir s t  as 
the participant would probably be able to read the stimulus when It  
was present. However, participants were also told that after each 
set of t r ia ls  the amount of time for which the f ir s t  card of the 
sequence was shown would be reduced and gradually the letters would 
Just look lik e  a black smudge. Then as exposure time was further 
reduced even the smudge It s e lf  would become very d if f ic u lt  to 
d istingu ish  from a blank card. Participants were told that the
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sequence would be shown In sets of 10, end that in each set 5 blank 
cards and S stimulus cards would be presented In  random order. They 
were asked to say 'y e s ' I f  they thought a stimulus card had been 
shown and 'n o ' I f  they thought a blank card had been presented. 
Participants were encouraged to remember how many 'ye s’ and *no’ 
responses they made in each set of t r ia ls  and as far as possible to 
say S of each. In trying to prevent response bias in th is way I t  was 
hoped that cases would not have to be dropped from the final analyses 
as In Experiments 1 * 4 .
Stimuli and blank cards were f ir s t  shown at a duration which 
enabled participants to distinguish between them with perfect 
accuracy In one block of tr ia ls .  For most people th is was 100 msec. 
Presentation time was then reduced by 20, 15, 10 or 5 msec until 
participants were responding at approximately chance level (I.e .
6/10 or less correct). At th is point four sets of 10 t r ia ls  were 
begun. I f  performance exceeded 60% accuracy during any of these sets 
presentation time was further reduced. Detection threshold (DT) was 
assumed to have been reached when four sets of t r ia ls  had been 
completed with an overall accuracy within the 95% confidence lim its 
of the chance expectancy of 0.5 (0.35 • 0.65). Threshold assessment 
took 30 to 45 minutes.
The Experimenter then rewired the tachlstoscope, set the time 
for presentation o f primes to 90% of DT, and gave an explanation of 
the 'next experiment'. Participants were told they would see a 
sequence In which the WPG (mask) appeared one second after the 
warning bleep with a letter string appearing Immediately after the 
WPC. They were asked to decide whether the le tte r string spelt an 
English word or a nonword. Participants terminated the display of 
letters by pressing a small handheld trigger In  their dominant 
(writing) hand when they thought the letters spelt a real word and by
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pressing « $m 11 handheld trigger In their non-dominant hand when 
they thought the letters spelt a nonword. They were told to respond 
as quickly and accurately as pussible.
Prior to the onset of the prime, which Immediately preceded the 
mask, and following the offset of the target a dark fie ld  was 
exposed. Thus, the sequence presented was dark fie ld , prime, mask, 
target, dark fie ld . The mask was displayed for 500 msec as In 
threshold assessment. There was an Inte rtrla l Interval o f about 12 
seconds during which the Experimenter recorded lexical decision time 
and correctness of response. The stimulus cards were then changed 
manually whilst the timer automatically reset Itse lf .  There was no 
conversation between the experimenter and participant during the four 
parts of the experiment, In each of which 30 prime-target pairs were 
presented, although participants would often comment spontaneously 
when they had made a mistake. Between the presentation of stimulus 
sets 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4 participants rested for 
approximately two minutes.
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to describe 
what they thought the second experiment was designed to Investigate 
and In particular about the role of the UPC (mask). They were also 
asked I f  they thought the two experiments were related and whether It  
seemed as I f  a stimulus word had ever been presented prior to the UPC 
In the second study.
Over the final 40 t r ia ls  of threshold assessment a ll participants 
gave a response distribution In which the probability of making a 
correct response [P(C)], a h it [P(H)] and a false alarm [P(FA)] fe ll
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«Ith in  th« upper and lower 95X confidence H i l t s  about the chance 
expectation of 0.5. These p robab ilities are shown for the high and 
low ii groups In Table 8.3, together with mean detection threshold (in 
isec) and d*. As can be seen f r o i  Table 6.3 Independent sample 't *  
tests revealed that the high and low N groups did not d iffe r 
sign ificantly on any of these measures.
Table 8.3 Mean detKtIon  threshold (OT), d*. P(C). P(H) and P(FA) 
at OT for high and low N groups In Experiment 8.




























0.000 P > 0.05
*  Standard deviations are shown In parentheses.
Ltx ic il d tc is lo n s aide about real word targets only are 
presented below. The percentage of Incorrect responses aade by the 
high and low N groups In the SR, ER and UR conditions are shown In 
Table 8.4. As In  Experlnents 1 - 4 ’o u t lie rs ',  that Is,  le x ica l 
decision tiaes further than 2 standard deviations froa a 
participant's aean tiae In each condition, were set at values equal 
to 2S0s In the appropriate direction. The percentage of o u t lie rs  
aade by the two groups In the SR, ER and UR conditions Is  a lso  shown 
In Table 6.4.
Table 8.4 Percentage of Incorrect responses and outliers 
aade by t N  high and low N groups In the SR, ER 





High N 1.5 0.5 0.5
Low N 3.0 4.0 2.0
High N 6.0 5.0 6.0
Low N 5.5 6.0 4.0
Mean lexical decision t lM  In the SR, ER and UR conditions for the 
high and low N groups is  shown in Table 8.5. Lexical decision times 
were analysed using a two way (3 x 2: condition x group) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on one factor (condition) and a summary of the 
results appears In Table 8.6.
Table 8.S Mean lexical decision time for high and low N groups 
In  the SR, ER and UR conditions of Experiment 5.
Group
Condition 
ER UR SR, ER and UR 
combined

























Standard deviations are shown In parentheses.
T a b u  8.C Sumary tabU  froM two way ANOVA (condition x group) 
of U x ica l decision t iM S  In  Exporlnant 5.
Source of 
Variation df M S F s t g .
Group (G) 1 38.38 0 . 0 0 2 P > 0.05
Error: G x S 18 23412.53
Condition (C) 2 4922.60 6.056 P -  0.054
Group X condition 2 564.20 0.694 P > 0.05
Error: G x C x S 36 812.81
From Table 8.6 I t  can be seen that the difference between 
conditions (SR/ER/UR) was on the margin of significance at the 5% 
level, although the high and low N groups did not d iffe r 
sign ifican tly  and there was no significant Interaction effect. The 
Tukey test showed that for high and low N groups combined mean 
lexical decision tine was s ign if ican tly  faster In the ER condition 
than In the UR (P < 0.01). The difference between the SR and UR 
condition just failed to reach significance at the 5% level, while a 
correlated *t* test revealed that the difference was Just not 
sign ificant at P ■  0.07. Hean lexical decision times In the SR and 
ER conditions did not d iffe r  sign ifican tly  (P > 0.05).
Overall, the magnitude of the priming effect due to emotional 
and semantic relatedness o f prime and target stimuli was 4.4SX (SO 
7.00), and 2.82* (SO 6.71) respectively. The product moment 
correlation between detection performance at threshold (d’ ) and 
magnitude of semantic and emotional priming effect was 0.276 (P > 
O.OS) and 0.432 (P > 0.05) respectively.
When participants were questioned at the end of the session It  
became clear that none of them had any suspicion that letters had 
been presented prior to the mask In the priming experiment.
P«rt1c1p«nts said that they thought that the WPC (mask) had been 
presented In the ’second’ experiment as a fixation point; an aid to 
focusing or to d ea r their mind of the previous letter string. None 
of the participants thought that ’experiments 1 and 2’ were 
connected.
In Experiment S a ll participants showed non-d1scrim1native responding 
at objective detection threshold (DT), which was assessed In 
accordance with the criteria  proposed In Chapter 3. Detection 
performance at threshold (d*) and percentage semantic priming effect 
did not correlate sign ifican tly  and thus I t  seems reasonable to 
believe that primes, presented at 90X of DT, were indeed presented 
below objective threshold.
The f ir s t  experimental hypothesis, which predicted a sign ifican t 
priming effect when emotional targets were paired with emotionally 
neutral semantically related primes, was weakly supported by the 
findings. Although lexical decisions were made more quickly in  the 
semantically related condition than in the unrelated condition the 
difference Just failed to reach sta tist ica l significance at the 
conventionally accepted level. However, lexical decisions were made 
sign ifican tly  faster when emotional targets were preceded by 
semantically unrelated emotional primes than by semantically 
unrelated neutral primes and thus the second experimental hypothesis 
which predicted a s ta t ist ic a lly  sign ificant emotional priming effect 
was supported. The third experimental hypothesis predicted that 
overall lexical decision times and the magnitude of semantic and 
emotional priming effects would d iffe r sign ifican tly  between the high
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and low N groups. Tables 8.5 and 6.6 show that neither of these 
predictions were supported. Although the Influence of personality 
t r a i t s  and emotional states on recognition and response to mood 
congruent stimuli has been the focus of much research It  w111 not be 
discussed In detail here. Note should be taken however that the 
non-significant effect of neuroticism In th is experiment appears to 
add to the growing body of research which has failed to support 
Bower’s (1981) semantic network model of emotion (e.g. Gerrig & 
Bower 1962; Clark et a1. 1983; Bower & Heyer 1985; Garcia & Beck 
1985).
The results o f th is  study suggest that emotional stimuli can be 
activated by primes which are presented below objective detection 
threshold when the prime and target are both evaluated In the same 
way ( I.e .  both evaluated as having emotionally unpleasant 
connotations) even though the two stimuli are semantically unrelated 
In  terms of conventional meaning. However, I t  Is  le ss certain 
whether emotional stimuli can be activated by semantically related 
neutral primes presented below objective detection threshold (the 
conventional semantic priming effect). To Investigate how reliable 
these effects are I t  was decided that a second experiment should be 
undertaken particularly because In the analysis of variance the 
effect of condition was only marginally sign ificant which would 
suggest that the semantic and emotional priming effects should be 
Interpreted with caution. Replication was chosen In preference to 
the Quasi F analysis because of the conservative nature of the latter 
(see Chapter 4).
One critic ism  which can be made of Experiment 5 Is  that the 
stim uli were not rated for emotionality but were chosen because they 
were thought to be either emotionally unpleasant or emotionally 
neutral by the Experimenter and her Supervisor. Clearly It  would
havft been preferable to have chosen words which had been rated as 
having these qualities by Miibers of the population fro« which the 
sample of participants were drawn. I t  was therefore decided that a 
rating exercise should be undertaken before stimuli were chosen for 
the replication attempt.
Although word length and number of sy llab les has been found not 
to Influence lexical decision time s ign if ica n tly  (Frederlksen t  KroU 
1976)» frequency of occurrence does have a significant effect 
(Rubenstein, Garfield & N lH lkan 1970; Scarborough, Cortese & 
Scarborough 1977; Gardner, Rothkopt, Lapan & Lafferty 1987) and I t  Is  
therefore very Important that frequency I s  matched across conditions 
In a priming experiment. Using the Kucera and Francis (1967) word 
norms target stimuli were matched for frequency of occurrence In the 
SR, ER and UR conditions of Experiment S and they did not d iffe r 
sign ificantly  In th is  respect. However, the accuracy with which 
words can be rated for frequency of occurrence from norms which are 
based on American English nearly twenty years out of date must be 
questioned. An alternative way to ensure that target stimuli do not 
d iffe r In frequency of occurrence I s  to repeat the targets, that is,  
use the same set of targets In each experimental condition. Using 
th is design a further subliminal semantic, and emotional, priming 
experiment was undertaken. It  I s  reported, together with a 
supraliminal study, In Chapter 9.
A FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF SEMANTIC AND EMOTIONAL PRIMING:i AMP~7- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In Experiment S I t  was found that lexical decisions were made more 
quickly when emotional target words were preceded by primes which 
were semantically, or emotionally, related to them. The emotional 
priming effect was s ign ifican t at the 1% level but the semantic 
priming effect only at the 7% level. Experiment 6 was designed to 
Investigate whether sign ificant semantic and emotional priming 
effects would occur In a replication with new words and different 
participants.
The Importance of matching target stimuli across conditions for 
frequency of occurrence was stressed In Experiment 5 and I t  was 
argued that a ’perfect’ match could be achieved by repeating targets 
In each experimental condition. This was done In Experiment 6 In 
which one set of targets were chosen and repeated with different 
primes In the semantically related, emotionally related and unrelated 
conditions.
Participants
The participants were 18 undergraduate students with mean age 20.9 
years (SO 2.S8). Twelve were men. None of the students had 
previously taken part In  subliminal research or In semantic priming
experiments. A11 were paid £2.00 for participating In  th is  study. 
Apparatus
The apparatus was Identical to that used In Experiment 5.
Stimuli
To estab lish  a word pool of neutral and emotional words a rating 
exercise was undertaken by 50 undergraduate students [15 men, 35 
women; mean age 20.5 years (SD 3.57)]. Each student rated the 
quality and strength of emotion they associated with a series of 
words on a seven point scale. Each scale point was described 
verbally although numbers were subsequently assigned fo r  the purpose 
of scoring. The scale points were ’A very strong unpleasant emotion’ 
(score - 1 ) ;  *A fa ir ly  strong unpleasant emotion’ (score > 2 ) ;  ’A 
mild unpleasant emotion’ (score > 3); ’No emotion’ (score -  4); ’A 
mild pleasant emotion’ (score -  5); ’A fa ir ly  strong pleasant 
emotion’ (score ■  6) and ’A very strong pleasant emotion (score • 7). 
The Instructions were printed at the top of a questionnaire and are 
shown In Appendix E.
Hedían ratings of emotionality were computed fo r each word and 
words which scored less than 3.49 were considered ’emotional’ (I.e. 
emotionally unpleasant). Words which had a median rating  of 3.50 to 
4.49 were considered ’neutral’ but In order to Increase the choice of 
non-emotlonal primes (In  particular for the semantically related 
condition fo r which prime-target word pairs were d if f ic u lt  to find)
13 words which had median ratings greater than 4.49 were also 
considered neutral. Thus a ll ’emotional’ words had median ratings 
which fe ll Into the emotionally unpleasant categories but some 
’neutral’ words had median ratings which fe ll Into the emotionally 
pleasant categories.
from the pool of rated words 18 emotional words were chosen as 
targets and each target was paired with one of three primes. One 
prime was a neutral word semantically related to the target (SR 
condition), one prime was an emotional word not semantically related 
to the target (ER condition) and one prime was a neutral word not 
semantically related to the target (UR condition). Some of the 
prime-target pairs In the SR condition of Experiment S were used 
again In the SR condition of Experiment 6. However, In Experiment 6 
mean lexical decision time for the SR condition was compared with 
mean lexical decision time for prime-target word pairs In the UR and 
ER conditions which were unique to Experiment 6 .
Eighteen nonword targets were chosen from the Wfi stimuli used In 
Experiment S. Each Wfi target was paired with 3 primes; two neutral 
and one emotional. Thus primes paired with the Wfl targets matched 
the 2:1 ratio  of neutral to emotional primes paired with the real 
word targets. Two prime-target letter strings In each of the 
experimental conditions are shown In Table 9.1 and a fu ll l i s t  
appears In Appendix F.
Nean length, frequency of occurrence and emotionality rating for 
the primes and targets used In Experiment 6 are shown In Table 9.2. 
The primes did not d iffe r sign ificantly between conditions In length 
(F ■  0.1S46; df S,102; P > 0.05) or frequency (F ■  0.0246; df 5,102;
P > 0.05).
The word pairs were presented In three blocks of 36, each 
containing one complete set of real and nonword targets. In every 
block one third of the real word targets were paired with primes In 
the SR condition; one third with primes In the ER condition and one 
third with primes In the UR condition. S im ilarly, In every block, 
one third of the Wfi targets were paired with emotional primes and two 
thirds with neutral primes. After 3 blocks of t r ia ls  prime-target
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ptirs In «11 6 experimental conditions had been presented and the two 
sets of target stimuli (real and nonword) had been seen three times. 
To control for order effects a fu lly  crossed design with 6 different 
orders of presentation was used. Within blocks presentation order 
was randomised.
For practice 12 prime-target le tte r strings were constructed; 
two from each type of experimental condition. They are shown In 
Appendix F. For threshold assessment 6 test stimuli were chosen 
equal In length to the longest experimental prime and occurring with 
greater frequency than the most frequently occurring prime. This was 
to ensure that conservative estimates of detection threshold were 
assessed. These test stimuli were the same as those used In 
Experiment 5.
As In Experiments 1 - $ a ll stim uli were printed on the KROY SO 
lettering system, wheel size 10, and fixed to the centre o f white 
cards measuring 101 x 152 mm. The cards were viewed at a distance of 
approximately 508 mm. The visual angle subtended horizonta lly for 
prime and target stimuli ranged from 0.90 to 3.60 degrees and 1.24 to 
3.55 degrees respectively. The mask used In Experiments 1 - 3, and 
5, was used again for th is experiment.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as In Experiment 5 except that three 
blocks of 36 t r ia ls  were given In the priming experiment Instead of 
four blocks of 30. Participants were not told that targets would be 
repeated.
Ov«r the finel 40 t r ia ls  of threshold assessment a ll 18 participants 
gave a response d istribu tion  In which the probability of making a 
correct response P(C), a h it P(H) and a false alarm P(FA) fe ll within 
the upper and lower 95% confidence lim its about the chance 
expectation of 0.5. Averaged across participants the mean value uf 
P(C), P(H) and P(FA) was 0.464 (SD 0.037), 0.442 (SD 0.069) and 0.514 
(SO 0.078) respectively. Mean detection threshold (DT) was 37.22 
msec ($0 12.38) and mean d* at DT was - 0.186 ($0 0.198).
The percentage of Incorrect responses In the SR, ER and UR 
conditions was 1.5%, 2.5% and 1.2% respectively. Outliers were dealt 
with as In previous experiments and comprised 5.9%, 4.9% and 4.0% of 
the total responses in the SR, ER and UR conditions respectively.
Mean lexical decision time for the SR, ER and UR conditions In 
blocks I,  I I  and I I I  are shown In Table 9.3. They were analysed 
using a two way repeated measures analysis of variance and a sumary 
of the results appears In Table 9.4.
Tabi« 9.3 N«an lex ica l decision tine for the SR, ER and UR 
rendition In  block I, I I  and I I I  of Experlaent 6.
I.  I I  










































Standard deviations are shown 1n parentheses.
Heans for the combined groups do not ta l ly  exactly with means 
for the groups combined because of errors In  rounding up.
T ib li 9.4 SuMMiry tab1t fron two way ANOVA (condition x block) 
of Itx ica l dacislon t lsas In  Exparliaant 6.
Source of 
variation df MS F S19.
Condition (C) 2 1227.39 0.91 P > 0.05
Block (B) 2 56457.85 19.56 P < 0.01
Subjects (S) 17 53232.74
C X  B 4 199.54 0.13 P > 0.05
Error: C x S 34 1349.28
Error: B x S 34 2886.30
Error: C x B x $ 66 1535.30
As can b« saan frow Table 9.4, although axperliaental condition 
(SR/ER/UR) did not have a sign ificant affect on lexical decision 
tine, block ( I/ I I / I I I )  was sign ificant at the 1% level. There was no 
sign ificant Interaction effect (condition x block). A Tukey test 
carried out on the block naans In Table 9.3 revealed that the 
sign ificant effect of block was due to lexical decisions being Made 
sign ificantly  faster In block I I I  than In block I  (R < 0.01).
Lexical decisions were also nade considerably faster In block I I  than 
In block I but the difference just failed to reach sta tist ica l 
significance (c ritica l nean difference at P -  0.05 was 44; calculated 
mean difference was 42).
The percentage semantic, and enotlonal, p rlilng  effect was 
-1.35X (SD 4.73) and -0.96X (SO 4.73) respectively. The product 
Moment correlation between d* and the percentage priming effect for 
the semantically and emotionally related conditions was - 0.0145 (P > 
0.05) and • 0.013 (P > 0.05) respectively.
Once egein eech partic ipent 's detection performance at threshold 
obeyed the criteria  for non-dlscrlmlnatlve responding proposed In 
Chapter 3. Horeover, the correlation between detection performance 
and percentage semantic and emotional priming effect was 
non-significant and one may therefore be reasonably confident that 
primes were presented not only sub11m1na11y but below objective 
detection threshold. Also, none of the participants guessed 
correctly why the UPC (mask) was used In the priming experiment and 
no one thought there was a connection between the assessment of DT 
and the subsequent lexical decision task.
Contrary to expectations mean lexical decision time was not 
s ign if ican tly  faster In the SR and ER conditions than In the UR. 
Indeed the percentage semantic, and emotional, fac ilita tion  effect 
was negative because on average lexical decisions were made very 
s l ig h t ly  faster In the UR condition. The absence of significant 
priming effects may be due to the repetition of target stimuli for, 
even though a fu11y crossed experimental design was used to control 
for the presentation order of the primes, the effect of target 
repetition (block) was h igh ly significant. Relevant to th is argument 
are the findings from supraliminal studies In which participants made 
lex ica l decisions about a series of le tte r strings presented one 
after the other. Using th is  experimental paradigm Dannenbring and 
Briand (1982) found that lexica l decisions were facilitated more when 
the target word was Immediately preceded by It s e lf  than when It  was 
Immediately preceded by a semantically related word. Furthermore, 
while semantic priming effects lasted for only a few seconds 
(Dannenbring & Briand 1982; Heyer et al. 1975) the effect of target 
repetition was long la sting  (Forbach, Stanners li Hochaus 1974;
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Dannenbring & Briand 1982; Ratcliff, Hockity 8 HcKoon 1965). Indeed 
Scarborough et ai. (1977) found that repetition effects were evident 
even when the Interval between repetitions of the target was as long 
as two days! Such studies suggest that target repetition has a long 
la sting  fa cu lta t ive  effect on lexica! decision t iM  while the 
effects o f conventional seeiantic priaing are considerably weaker and 
more transient. This conclusion Is  supported by Rugg's (1987) study 
of Event Related Potentials (ERP’s) which showed that while both 
semantic priming and word repetition modulated ERP’s, repetition had 
a considerably more profound effect In terms of magnitude and 
duration. In Experiment 8 lexical decisions were made more quickly 
with each subsequent presentation of the target stimuli and I t  may be 
that t h is  repetition effect was so strong that It  prevented the 
occurrence of priming effects due to semantic and emotional 
relatedness.
Although there Is  not a great deal o f evidence In support of 
subliminal semantic priming effects, the literature review of Chapter 
2 Indicated that activation of target stim uli by suprallm lnally 
presented semantically related primes I s  well established. However, 
I f  target repetition effects are stronger then semantic priming 
effects, with the consequence that when the two are Investigated 
together the effect of semantic priming I s  masked or overriden, the 
re su lts o f  Experiment 6 should occur In a supraliminal study using 
the same experimental design. Experiment 7 was undertaken to 
investigate th is possib ility.
Experiment 7 was a supraliminal rep lication  of Experiment 6. It  was 
hypothesised that:
1. There would be no significant difference between average lexical 
decision time In the SR, ER and UR conditions.
2. Lexical decision time would decrease sign ifican tly  with each 
repetition of the target stimuli.
Participants
Twenty four undergraduate students took part In the experiment. They 
had a mean age of 22.5 years (SD 3.84) and fourteen were men. As 1n 
previous experiments none of the students had participated In sim ilar 
research and a11 had English as their f i r s t  or only language. The 
students were not paid for participating In  th is experiment because 
I t  was not considered an arduous task and took less than th irty  
minutes to complete.
Apparatus and Details o f Stimulus Presentation 
The stimuli were presented on the screen monitor of an Apple I I  
compatible micro con^uter. The computer was progranmed to ensure 
that primes always appeared In the centre of the screen between two 
figure I ’s placed approximately 5 cms apart. Targets appeared Just 
below the prime between two figure 2 's .  The numbers acted as 
fixation points and remained on the screen throughout the experiment.
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The prime wis displayed for approximately S90 msec and there was a 
delay o f approximately SO msec between the offset of the prime and 
the onset of the target. The target display was terminated by a 
trigge r response from the participant. Approximately 3 seconds 
elapsed between the offset of the target and the onset of the next 
prime. To warn participants of the beginning of a new prime-target 
sequence a bleep sounded one second before the onset of the prime.
The computer automatically recorded lexical decision time and the 
correctness of each response. The experiment was conducted with each 
participant ind iv idua lly in  a sound deadened room, l i t  by natural 
ligh tin g. It  took approximately 30 minutes.
Stimuli
The stim uli were exactly the same as in Experiment 6.
Procedure
Participants were told to read the f ir s t  letter string which appeared 
on the screen, and then to read the second letter string and to 
decide whether th is  second letter string spelt a real English word or 
a nonword. Half of them were instructed to press a small hand held 
trigger in  their dominant hand to give the response ’real word’ and 
to press the trigge r in the ir non-dominant hand to give the response 
’nonword’ . For the remaining participants th is order was reversed.
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately 
as possible. As In Experiment 6 they were not told that the targets 
were to be repeated, although they were told that there were three 
parts to the experiment and that a break of two to three minutes 
would be taken between each one. Before the experiment proper began 
the practice stimuli were presented twice.
The percentage of incorrect responses in the SR, ER and UR conditions 
was 2.3%, 2.1% and 2.8% respectively. Outliers were dealt with as in 
previous experiments and comprised 5.1%, 4.9% and 4.9% of the total 
responses in the SR, ER and UR conditions respectively.
Mean lexical decision times for the SR, ER and UR conditions in 
blocks I,  I I  and I I I  are shown in Table 9.5.
Table 9.5 Mean lexical decision time for the $R, ER and UR 
conditions In block 1, I I  and I I I  of Experiment 7.
I I I I I I I.  I I  
and I I I  
combined'*
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Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Mean for the combined groups do not ta lly  exactly with means 
for the groups combined because of errors in rounding up.
SuNury tab l* froa two way ANOVA (condition x block) 
on Itx ica l dtcislon t la ts In Exporlnont 7.
Source of 
variation df MS F Sig.
Condition (C) 2 6945.00 0.6653 P > 0.05
Block (B) 2 86152.70 2.7925 P -  0.07
Subjects (S) 23 410617.39
C x B 4 12514.59 1.7061 P > 0.05
Error; C x S 46 31567.29
Error; B x S 46 8025.31
Error: C x B x S 92 7334.78
Lexical decision tines were analysed using a two way repeated 
measures ANOVA and the results appear In Table 9.6. As can be seen 
from Table 9.6 the main effect for condition (SR/ER/1^R) not 
sign ificant, while block ( I/ I I / I I I )  had a sign ificant effect at P -  
0.07. There was no sign ificant Interaction effect (condition x 
block). Although not sign ificant at the conventionally accepted 5% 
level of significance, the effect of block was In the hypothesised 
direction as can be seen from Table 9.5 which shows that lexical 
decisions were made more quickly with each subsequent presentation of 
the target stimuli.
The fac ilita tion  effect due to the semantic, and emotional, 
relatedness of primes and targets was • 0.62% (SD 7.54) and • 0.12% 
(SD 6.90) respectively.
As predicted In the f ir s t  hypothesis, the priming effect due to 
emotlonel reUtedness, end Indeed the semantic priming effect which 
hes been demonstrated so often In supraliminal research, fa iled  to 
occur In Experiment 7. In fact, on average lexical decisions were 
made s lig h t ly  faster In  the unrelated (UR) condition than In the 
semantically related (SR) condition. The findings from Experiment 7 
also support hypothesis Z In that lexical decisions were made more 
quickly with each subsequent repetition of the target stimuli, 
although the effect o f repetition (block) was sign ificant at only the 
7% level.
The results o f Experiment 7 are sim ilar to those of Experiment 6 
and they offer some support for the hypothesis expressed In the 
discussion section of Experiment 6 that priming effects due to target 
repetition can prevent the occurrence of semantic and emotional 
priming. To replicate the findings of Experiment 5, and so confirm 
the existence of subliminal semantic and emotional priming effects 
with emotional targets, a return to the design used In Experiment S 
was therefore considered necessary.
SUBLIMINAL SEMANTIC AND EMOTIONAL PRIMIN6: A FURTHER AHEMPT AT
miitkim------------------
Semantic and emotional priming effects failed to occur sub11m1naI1y 
In Experiment 6 and supra11m1na11y In Experiment 7 where an 
experimental design Involving target repetition was used. Some 
support was found In these experiments for the hypothesis that 
repetition o f targets creates a strong priming effect In  It s  own 
right and I t  I s  plausible to argue that this repetition effect 
overrides conventional priming effects due to semantic and emotional 
relatedness o f  primes and targets. The experiment reported In this 
chapter (Experiment 8) was undertaken to Investigate whether 
sign ificant semantic and emotional priming effects would occur when a 
return was made to the experimental design of Experiment 5 which 
avoided repetition effects. Experiment 8 was a replication of 
Experiment 5 using new stimuli and different participants.
Participants
Fifteen undergraduate students with mean age 22.7 years (SD 4.64) 
took part In the experiment. Ten were men. None of the students 
knew of the nature of the experiment or had previously taken part In 
sim ilar research. A11 were paid £2.00 for participating.
Apparatus
The apparatus was Identical to that used in Experiments 5 and 6.
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Words which had been rated 'emotlonar (median rating less than 3.SO) 
or ’neutral’ (median rating 3.SO to 4.49) In the rating exercise 
completed for Experiment 6 formed part of the word pool from which 
prime-target word pairs were chosen for Experiment 6. To Increase 
the size of th is  word pool another 100 words were rated. Thirty five 
students, with mean age 20.5 years (SO 4.14), completed the 
additional rating exercise. There were 12 men and 23 women and a11 
were native English speakers. The same questionnaire was used as 1n 
the previous rating exercise (see Appendix E) but, of course, new 
words were substituted for those previously rated. As before, words 
with a median rating which fe ll Into the categories ’A 
very/fa1r1y/m11d1y strong unpleasant emotion’ were considered 
’emotional’ , while ’neutral’ words were defined as having a median 
rating which fe ll into the category ’no emotion’ . In Experiment 6 
some words were considered neutral because they had been rated not 
emotionally unpleasant (I.e . they were considered neutral even 
though they had been rated emotionally pleasant). In Experiment 8 It  
was decided that a ll neutral words must have a neutral median rating 
and only words which conformed to th is s t r ic t  definition of neutral 
were taken from Experiment 6 for use In Experiment 6. Into th is  word 
pool of emotional and neutral words the nonword stimuli from 
Experiment 6 were added. Seventeen prime-target word pairs were then 
chosen for 6 experimental conditions. These conditions, the same as 
In Experiments 5, 6 and 7, were semantically related (SR), 
emotionally related (ER), unrelated (UR), neutral prime • nonword 
target (Wflj), emotional prime - nonword target (WQ2) and neutral 
prime - nonword target (Wfi^).
To ensure that prime-target word pairs In  the SR condition were 
semantically related, and those In the ER and UR conditions were not
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semantically related a further rating exercise was undertaken.
Thirty five undergraduate students with mean age 20.3 years (SO 3 .H ) 
took part. Some of these students had also taken part In the 
previous rating exercise described In Chapter 9. Semantic 
relatedness was assessed by giv ing students a 11st of prime-target 
word pairs and asking them to decide how lik e ly  I t  was that the 
target word would be given In response to the prime In a test of free 
association In which five  responses to each prime were required. 
Students Indicated the ir response by ticking one of five categories 
each of which was verba lly labelled and assigned a number for the 
purpose of scoring. The categories were ’extremely l ik e ly ’ (score ■  
1), ’very l ik e ly ’ (score ■  2), ’fa ir ly  lik e ly ’ (score ■  3), ’fa ir ly  
unlikely’ (score ■  4), ’very unlikely’ (score -  5), and ’extremely 
unlikely’ (score -  6). The Instructions, which were printed at the 
top of the questionnaire, are shown In Appendix G. Semantically 
related prime-target word pairs were defined as having a median 
rating of 3.49 or below. Semantically unrelated word pairs had a 
median rating of 3.50 and above.
The primes In a ll 6 conditions were matched for average word 
length and for average frequency of occurrence using the Kucera and 
Francis (1967) word count. The 6 sets of targets were also matched 
for average length. Targets In the SR, ER and UR conditions were 
matched for average frequency of occurrence and they did not d iffe r 
sign ifican tly  In th is  respect (F • 0.0049; df 2,48; P > 0.05). The 
mean length, frequency of occurrence, emotionality rating and degree 
of semantic relatedness between primes and targets are shown In Table 
10.1. A ll stimuli appear In  Appendix H, together with their 
Individual ratings o f emotionality and relatedness. For presentation 
prime-target pairs from a ll 6 conditions were combined, randomised 




Twelve additional prime-target word pairs were chosen for 
practice; two from each type of experimental condition. The practice 
stimuli are shown In Appendix H. For threshold assessment, 8 stimuli 
were chosen. Each was equal In length to the longest prime and had a 
frequency of occurrence greater than the most frequently occurring 
prime. Thus, as In previous experiments, conservative estimates of 
detection threshold (OT) were attempted. The stimuli used for the 
assessment of DT are shown 1n Appendix H.
A ll stimuli were constructed as In  previous experiments. Prime 
and target stimuli subtended visual angles of 0.9023 to 3.1000 
degrees and 1.2400 to 3.9500 degrees respectively. The mask used In 
Experiment 6 was used again In Experiment 6.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as In Experiment 5.
At detKtIon  threshold (OT) a ll participants showed 
non-dlscrimlnative responding as defined by the objective c rite r ia  
proposed In Chapter 3. At DT the mean probability of making a 
correct response, a h it and a fa lse  alarm was 0.505 (SO 0.036), 0.503 
($0 0.059) and 0.493 ($0 0.048) respectively. Nean d* at OT was 
0.025 ($0 0.183) and mean DT was 36.67 msec (SO 17.480).
Errors comprised 1.16X, 1.96% and 2.35% of the total number of 
responses In the Sft, ER and UR conditions respectively. Outliers 
were dealt with as In previous experiments and comprised 4.70%, 3.14% 
and 5.88% of the total responses In  the SR, ER and UR conditions.
Mean lexical decision tine  In the SR. ER and UR conditions was 
S46.33 nsec (SO 39.43), 567.80 nsec (SD 60.25) and 578.73 nsec ($0 
46.14) respectively. Thus lexica l decisions were nade on average 32 
nsec faster In  the SR condition than In the UR condition and on 
average 11 nsec faster In the ER condition than In  the UR. Lexical 
decision tines were analysed using a one way repeated neasures ANOVA 
and a sunnary of the resu lts appears In Table 10.2.
Table 10.2 SuNiary table fron one way ANOVA of lexical decision 
tines In Experinent 8.
Source of 
Variance df MS F SIg.
Condition (SR/ER/UR) 2 4075.29 10.75 P < 0.001
Subjects 14 7077.71
Residual 28 379.17
As can be seen fron Table 10.2 the effect of experinental condition 
was sign ifican t at P < 0.001. Subsequent Tukey tests revealed that 
lexical decisions were nade sign ifican tly  faster In the SR condition 
than In the UR (P < 0.01) or the ER (P < 0.05) while lexical decision 
tines In the ER and UR condition did not d iffe r  sign ificantly  fron 
each other (P > 0.05).
The fa c ilita tio n  effect due to senantic relatedness was 5.45%
(SO 4.35) and a ll but one participant showed a fac ilita tion  effect. 
Although 13 of the 15 participants also nade lexical decisions faster 
In the ER condition than In the UR the average emotional fac ilita tion  
effect was only 2.04% (SD 3.42). The product nonent correlation 
between d* at threshold and percentage senantic and enotlonal priming
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effect was 0.116 (P > O.OS) and 0.472 (P > O.OS) respectively.
After careful questioning It  became clear that none of the 
participants had any suspicion that words were presented prior to the 
mask In the priming experiment and neither had any participant 
thought that the two experiments (threshold detection and priming) 
were part of a single study.
Once again detection threshold (OT) was assessed in accordance with 
the objective c rite ria  proposed In Chapter 3 and a ll participants 
showed non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responding at threshold. Further support 
fo r  the belief that primes were presented below objective, rather 
than subjective threshold comes from the non*s1gn1f 1cant correlation 
between percentage semantic priming effect and d ' at DT. Moreover, 
primes were presented not at DT but at the more conservative duration 
o f  90X DT. It  was therefore hardly surprising that no participant 
had any conscious awareness that stimuli were presented prior to the 
mask In the priming experiment.
The semantic priming effect, sign ificant at the 7% level of 
confidence In Experiment S, was highly sign ificant In Experiment 8. 
Unfortunately though the emotional priming effect, highly sign ificant 
In  Experiment 5, fa iled  to reach sta tist ic a l significance In the 
current experiment. Nevertheless emotionally related primes 
fac ilita ted  responses (lexical decision time) to semantically 
unrelated emotional targets and, although not sign ificant, the 
re su lt s  were In the expected direction.
The contradictory findings of Experiment 5 and 8 suggest that 
while semantic and emotional priming of emotional targets may occur
no
below objective detection threshold» they ere not effects which can 
be relied upon. Whether they occur at a11 probably depends, at least 
In part, upon properties of the stim uli such as degree of relatedness 
between prlne-target word pairs. For example, Fischler and Goodman 
(1978) found that highly associated prime-target words pairs showed 
sign ifican tly  more fa c ilita tion  than words pairs which were less 
strongly related and th is  difference was particularly pronounced when 
the stimulus onset asynchrony was short. McCauley et a1. (1976) 
also found a sim ilar effect In an experiment In which target pictures 
were preceded by picture primes sharing either high or low category 
relatedness. McCauley et al. found that the time taken to name the 
target was sign ifican tly  shorter when the prime-target stimuli were 
highly related than when the re lationsh ip  was weak, although this 
effect did not emerge s ign if ica n tly  when the participants were 
kindergarteners of about 6 years o ld . While It  may appear that 
prime-target word pairs In the semantically related (SR) condition of 
Experiment 8 were less related In  meaning than those In the SR 
condition of Experiment S th is was not borne out by student ratings. 
Thirty one undergraduate students [mean age 20.6 years (SO 3.51)] 
rated the stimuli In the SR condition of Experiment 5 using the same 
rating scale as that used to assess degree of relatedness between 
primes and targets In Experiment 8 (see Appendix G). A coiiq>ar1son 
was then made between ratings fo r the two sets of SR stimuli and the 
difference was found to be non-significant (t > 0.7306; df 35; P >
0.05). Presumably though. I t  I s  not Just the degree of relatedness, 
whether semantic or emotional, w ithin one set of prime-target stimuli 
that matters, but th is degree o f relatedness In comparison to the 
degree of unrelatedness In the set o f stimuli used for comparison 
purposes (UR condition).
A possible explanation of the apparent unre liab ility  of the
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priming of emotional targets by semantically unrelated emotional 
primes may lie  In the stringent conditions for subllm lnallty enforced 
In Experiments 5 and 6. In both these Investigations primes were 
presented below objective detection threshold. I f  It  I s  assumed that 
the emotional priming effect 1$ merely a variant of the conventional 
semantic priming effect, that Is,  that emotional relatedness Is  
merely one form of semantic relatedness, then It  may be that It  I s  a 
re lative ly  weak form of relatedness and for that reason the emotional 
priming effect may not be reliable below the rather stringent 
objective detection threshold. However, It  I s  also possible that 
both semantic and emotional priming effects occur more re liab ly  below 
the le ss stringent subjective detection threshold. Priming effects 
have been found to occur less strongly below detection threshold than 
suprallm lnally (Balota 1983) though In some studies th is trend did 
not reach sta tist ica l significance (Marcel 1983a, Experiment 4;
Fowler et al. 1981, Experiment S). Cheesman and Herlkle (1984) 
found that priming effects were sign ifican tly  weaker below objective 
threshold than below subjective threshold In  a colour naming Stroop 
task. However, In the Cheesman and Merlkle study Identification 
rather than detection thresholds were assessed. There appears to be 
no report In the literature  of a comparison between priming effects 
below subjective and objective detection threshold In a priming 
experiment using a lexical decision task. Yet the results of the 
experiments discussed above (I.e . Balota 1983; Fowler et a1. 1981; 
Karce! 1983a; Cheesman & Herlkle 1984) suggest that I f  a less 
stringent level of detection threshold had been assessed In the 
current experiments (Experiments 5 & 6) the semantic and emotional 
priming effects may have occurred more strongly and reliably. To 
Investigate th is p o ss ib il ity  Experiment S was replicated with the 
prime stimuli presented below subjective, rather than objective.
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EHOTIONAL PRIMIM BELOW SUBJECTIVE DHECTION THRESHOLD:
------------------------- EXKHIHaff ft
Experiment 9 was designed to Investigate the priming of emotional 
target stimuli by primes presented below subjective detection 
threshold. Cheesnan and Herlkle (1984) defined subjective threshold 
as the level at which participants claim not to be able to 
discriminate the stimuli and objective threshold as the level at 
which non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responding can be demonstrated. In their 
own research Cheesman and Herlkle assessed subjective threshold by 
asking participants to guess the accuracy of their responses at the 
end of each block of discrimination tr ia ls .  In one experiment 
(Cheesman & Herlkle 1984, Experiment 2) In which four-choice 
Identification thresholds were assessed participants estimated that 
they were responding at chance level (I.e . 2S% correct) when 
objective assessment revealed that on average 66% of the ir responses 
were correct. Facilitation and Inhibition In a subsequent Stroop 
task was s ign ifican t when the primes were presented at the level at 
which participants estimated that they were responding at chance 
level but not when primes were presented at the level at which 
discrimination was actually at chance. Holender (1986) c rit ic ised  
Cheesman and Herlk le 's (1984) procedure for assessing subjective 
threshold. He argued that the discrepancy between estimated and 
actual performance may have occurred because of the Inaccuracy 
associated with asking participants to rate the ir global performance 
retrospectively after a large number of t r ia ls  (48 In Cheesman & 
Herlkle 1984, Experiment 2). Holender (1986) advocates a procedure 
In which a response Is  given after every t r ia l.  But what response
114
should be required of the subject end how should the responses be 
combined across t r ia ls ?  Harcel (1983a, Experlinent 4), Balota (1963) 
and Fowler et a1. (1981, Experiments S & 6) assessed detection
threshold by ensuring that in a two-choice detection procedure the 
probability of making a correct response did not deviate 
sign ificantly  from that expected by chance. Merlkle (1982) claimed 
that subjective rather than objective detection thresholds may have 
been assessed In these experiments because even when the overall 
probability of making a correct response was at chance level 
participants may have been able to respond discrim lnatively. 
Experiments 1 - 4 (Chapters 4 & 5) show that sometimes th is  I s  the 
case. In each of these experiments some participants were dropped 
from the final ana lysis because their response d istribu tions at 
detection threshold showed discriminative responding even though 
their overall p robability of making a correct response was at chance 
level. One might therefore define subjective threshold as the level 
at which participants show discriminative responding while at the 
same time having a probability of making a correct response within 
the boundaries of chance expectation. Operationally th is  may be 
defined as occurring when two c riteria  are met:
1. The probability o f a correct response lie s  within the 95% 
confidence lim its  about the chance expectancy of 0.5.
2. The probability o f a h it and/or a fa lse  alarm lie s  outside the 
95% confidence lim its about the chance expectancy of 0.5.
In the experlMnt reported below (Experlaent 9) subjective detection 
threshold was assessed according to the c rite r ia  specified above.
The stimuli chosen for Experiment S were used again for Experiment 9 
so that a direct comparison could than be made of semantic and 
emotional priming effects below objective (Experiment S) and below 
subjective (Experiment 9) detection threshold.
Participants
Nine undergraduate students took part In the experiment for which 
they were paid £2.00. They had a mean age of 20.0 years ($0 1.2S) 
and 6 were women. None of them had previously taken part in 
subliminal research.
Apparatus
The apparatus was Identical to that used for Experiments 1 - 3. 
Tachlstoscopic luminance levels were at the settings previously used 
and the experiment was conducted under exactly the same conditions as 
In  Experiment S.
Stimuli
A ll prime-target word pairs, practice stimuli, mask, and test stimuli 
fo r the assessment of detection threshold were the same as In 
Experiment $ (Chapter 8).
Procedure
The procedure was Identical to that of Experiment 5 with the 
follow ing exceptions. F irst, as In Experiment S, during detection
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thr<sho1d isscssien t p irtlc lpants were asked to Indicate 'y e s ' when 
they thought that they could detect a stlaulus and 'n o ' when they 
could not detect a stimulus. But unlike In Experiment 5 they were 
not encouraged to give approximately S 'ye s’ and S 'n o ' responses per 
block of 10 t r ia ls ,  although as before they were told that an equal 
number of stimuli and blank cards would be presented In each block of 
t r ia ls .  During threshold assessment some participants commented that 
they were giving a disproportionate number of 'n o ' responses and must 
therefore be making many Incorrect decisions. In response to this 
comment the Experimenter reaffirmed that the participants task was to 
report which stimulus they thought had been presented even I f  this 
meant giving the same response on every tr ia l.
A second difference between Experiment 5 and the current 
experiment was that objective detection thresholds were assessed In 
Experiment 5 and subjective detection thresholds were assessed In 
Experiment 9. Subjective detection threshold (OT) was assumed to 
have been assessed when, averaged across 4 sets of 10 t r ia ls ,  the 
probability of making a correct response P(C) fe ll within the 95% 
confidence lim its about the chance expectancy of O.S and the 
probability of a h it  and/or a fa lse  alarm fe ll outside the 95% 
confidence lim its of the chance expectancy of 0.5. Participants who 
showed non*d1scr1m1nat1ve responding when P(C) did not d iffer 
sign ifican tly  from chance were not asked to take part In the priming 
experiment.
The resu lts given below for threshold assessment are only those for 
the participants who subsequently took part In the priming
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experlnent.
At detection threshold (DT) «11 participants had a probability 
of making a correct response P(C) within the 95% confidence lim its 
about the chance expectancy of O.S. The mean value of P(C) was 0.54 
(SO 0.052). Eight participants had a probability of a h it  which was 
below the lower boundary of the 95% confidence lim its about the 
chance expectancy of O.S (l.e . P(H) < 0.3) and a ll participants’ 
probability for fa lse  alarm also fe ll below th is lower boundary of 
0.3. The mean p robability for a h it  and a false alarm was 0.16 (SO 
0.123) and 0.06 ($D 0.094) respectively. Nean d’ at DT was 0.230 (SD 
0.420) but th is was based on only 5 observations because In 4 cases 
response distributions were so extreeie [P(H) and/or P(FA) • 0] that 
d’ could not be calculated. Mean DT was 26.11 msec (SD 7.74).
As In previous studies only responses to real words were 
analysed. The percentage of Incorrect responses In the SR, ER and UR 
conditions was 3.9%, 1.7% and 3.3% respectively. Outliers were dealt 
with as In previous experiments and comprised 5.0%, 4.4% and 3.9% of 
the responses In the SR, ER and UR conditions.
On average, lexical decision time was 706 msec (SO 131.57) In 
the SR condition; 717 msec (SD 152.73) 1n the ER condition and 759 
msec (SO 125.10) In the UR condition. Thus there was a 53 msec mean 
fac ilita tion  effect due to semantic relatedness between prime and 
target and a 42 msec mean fa c ilita tio n  effect due to emotional 
relatedness. The average percentage semantic and emotional 
fac ilita tion  effect was 6.18% (SO 4.88) and 7.15% (SD 4.80) 
respectively. Lexica! decision times were analysed using a one way 
repeated measures ANOVA and a summary of the results appear In Table 
11.1.
T ib í*  11.1 SuMMry U b it  fro« ont w«y ANOVA of U x ic i l  
d K is lon  t1«ts 1n Exptrlmnt 9.
Source of 
Variation df MS F Sig.
Condition (SR/ER/UR) 2 6956.59 9.5529 P -  0.0018
Subjects 8 61865.45
Residual 16 728.22
As can be seen f r M  Table 11.1 experimental condition (SR/ER/UR) had 
a sign ificant effect on lexical decision time well beyond the 1% 
level of confidence. Tukey tests revealed that th is  was due to 
lexical decisions being made sign if ican tly  more slowly in the UR 
condition than In either the SR (P < 0.01) or ER (P < 0.05) 
conditions, while lexical decision times in the SR and ER conditions 
did not d iffe r  sign ifican tly  (P > 0.05).
As noted above four participants had a response d istribution  at 
DT in which the probability of a h it  and/or the probability o f a 
false alarm was equal to zero. Thus in some cases d’ - the measure 
of detection performance used in previous experiments • could not be 
calculated. Cheesman and Nerikle (1984) found a sign ificant 
correlation between percentage priming effect and identification 
performance at threshold when identification  performance was defined 
as the percentage of correct responses in a four-choice recognition 
task. Following Cheesman and Nerikle ’s (1964) procedure detection 
performance was defined in the current experiment as the percentage 
of correct responses in the two choice discrimination task. The 
product moment correlation between percentage correct responses and 
percentage semantic and emotional priming effect was -0.280 and 0.095 
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respectively. Neither co rrU tlon  mis sign ificant at the 5% level of 
confidence.
A ll participants were very carefully questioned at the end of 
the session to determine whether they had seen any stimuli prior to 
the mask on priming t r ia ls .  A ll students reported In the negative 
and none thought that the assessment procedure was related In any way 
to the priming experiment.
The resu lts of Experiments 5 and 9 compared.
For comparison purposes the mean lexical decision time for the 
semantically related (SR), emotionally related (ER) and unrelated 
(UR) conditions of Experiments S and 9 are shown In Table 11.2. 
Because the high and low Neuroticism groups of Experiment 5 were 
found not to d iffe r s ign if ica n tly  on any dependent measure the 
resu lts for the two groups were combined.
Mean lexical decision times In the SR, ER and UR conditions of 
Experiments 5 and 9 were analysed using a two way analysis of 
variance with replication on one factor (condition). The results of 
th is  analysis are shown In Table 11.3.
Tabit 11.2 M«an le x ica l decision t iM  In the SR, ER and UR 
conditions of Experliwnts 5 and 9.
CONDITION
SR ER UR SR. ER and . 
UR combined*
























Standard deviations are shown In parentheses.
Means for the combined groups do not ta lly  exactly with means for 
the groups combined because of errors In rounding up.
Suanary table from a two way ANOVA of lexical 
decision times In Experiments 5 and 9.
Source of 
variation df MS F Stg.
Experiment (E) 1 216903.1 6.39 P < 0.05
Error: E x S 27 33940.3
Condition (C) 2 10893.1 14.00 P < 0.01
E X C 2 1756.6 2.26 P > 0.05
Error: E x C x S 54 778.2
FrcM Table 11.3 It  can be seen that there was a s ig n if ic a n t  Main 
effect for CxperlMent (S & 9) and for Condition (SR, ER & UR) but a 
non-significant Interaction effect. It  can be seen fro «  Table 11.2 
that lexica l decisions were Made sign ificantly  faster In  Experltent 5 
than In Experltent 9. Tukey tests revealed that when the results of 
the two experinents were coablned lexica! decisions were Made 
s ign if ican tly  nore slowly In the UR condition than In  e ither the SR 
or CR conditions (P < 0.01) while average lexical dec is ion  tiMe In 
the SR and UR condition did not d iffe r sign ifican tly  (P > 0.05).
For conparlson purposes the percentage seeantlc and eM otlona ! 
priMing effects In Experleents 5 and 9 are shown In Table 11.4.
These priMing effects were analysed using a two way (Experleent x 
PriMing effect) analysis of variance with repeated Measures on one 
factor and a sunnary of the results Is  shown In Table 11.5.
Table 11.4 Percentage seeantlc and eiotlonal p r li ln g  













Standard deviations are shown In parentheses.
Tab1t l l . S  SuMury tab it froa a two way ANOVA of porcantaga 
priaing affacts In Exparlaants 5 and 9.
Source of 
variance df HS F Sts.
Experiment (E) 1 114.29 1.517 P > 0.05
Error: E x S 27 75.36
Priming effect (P) 1 1.38 0.139 P > 0.05
E X  P 1 20.99 2.118 P > 0.05
Error: E x P x S 27 9.91
As can be seen froa Table 11.5 there was no significance overall 
difference In priaing between Experiments 5 and 9. When the results 
of Experlaents 5 and 9 were coablned there was no sign ificant 
difference between the emotional and semantic priming effect and the 
Interaction effect (Experiment x Priming effect) was not significant 
at the 5% level of confidence.
H e rlk le 's  (1962) claim that non-discrlmlnative chance level 
responding cannot be adequately assessed by ensuring only that the 
probability of making a correct response at threshold does not d iffer 
s ign if ican tly  from that expected by chance i s  supported by the 
resu lts of detection threshold assessment In  Experiment 9. A11 9 
participants In th is  experiment had an overa ll probability for making 
a correct response at chance level but nevertheless were responding 
discrim lnatively In that the ir probability of a h it and/or a false 
alarm lay outside the boundaries of chance expectation.
As in  previous experiments participants were fam iliarised with
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th« threshold essessiiient procedure by suprellMlnel presentitlon of 
the stimuli end stimulus duration was not reduced until each 
participant detected blank cards and word stimuli with 100% accuracy 
In one block o f 10 tr ia ls .  Thus In i t ia l l y  ’y * * ’ (stimulus present) 
and ’no’ (stimulus absent) responses were made with equal frequency. 
However, as prime duration was reduced participants began to use the 
•yes’ response less frequently. Many participants spontaneously 
conmented that I f  It  really was the case that an equal number of each 
type of stim uli was presented, and some students were quite sceptical 
of th is, then they must be fa llin g  to detect the word stimuli on many 
occasions when they were presented. For a ll participants the 
probability o f making a correct response reached chance level when 
there was a considerable over-representation of ’no’ responses and 
thus high accuracy for detecting blank cards and low accuracy for 
detecting word stimuli. Indeed, at detection threshold blank cards 
were correctly Identified on average 92% of the time while on average 
stimuli were detected on only 16% of the occasions on which they were 
presented.
Although Cheesman and Herikle’s (1964) method for assessing 
subjective threshold was not adopted In Experiment 9 subjective 
threshold appears to have been assessed In  accordance with their 
c rite ria . However, Cheesman and Herlkle (1984) found a sign ificant 
correlation between percentage priming effects and performance at 
detection threshold in a Stroop colour naming task when the primes 
(colour names) were presented at subjective threshold. But the 
correlation between percentage correct detection t r ia ls  at threshold 
and percentage semantic and emotional priming effects were 
non-significant in Experiment 9. This discrepancy in findings may 
have arisen because primes were presented below subjective detKtIon  
threshold In Experiment 9 but at subjective Identification threshold
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In the experiment by Cheesmen and Herlkle and the la tte r  Is  like ly  to 
be higher than the former. It  may also be the case that had 
participants been asked to estimate the accuracy of the ir responses 
during threshold assessment they may have Indicated that they thought 
they «rere responding at chance level before their probability of 
making a correct response actually fe ll within the boundaries of 
chance expectation. Thus subjective threshold may have been assessed 
more stringently In Experiment 9 than In Cheesman and Herlk le 's 
(1984) experiment and th is may account for the fact that In 
Experiment 9 a non*s1gn1f1cant correlation between detection 
performance and semantic and emotional priming was found.
The resu lts of Experiment 9 show that emotional stimuli can be 
primed by semantically and emotionally related primes presented below 
subjective detection threshold. Thus further support was found for 
the concept o f priming through a coaaon emotional evaluation of prime 
and target and for priming of emotional target stim uli below 
detection threshold.
By considering the results of Experiments S and 9 together a 
comparison can be made of priming effects below objective and 
subjective deteclon threshold. As subjective threshold I s  associated 
with higher stimulus energy levels than objective threshold (Cheesman 
t  Merlkle 1964) the finding that subjective detection threshold, 
assessed In Experiment 9. was on average 8 msec lower than objective 
detection threshold, assessed In Experiment S, was a l i t t le  
surprising. However, there are large Individual differences In 
visual threshold (see Narcel 1983a, Experiment 1) and different 
participants took part In each of these studies.
From Tables 11.2 and 11.3 I t  can be seen that lexica l decisions 
were made sign ificantly  faster when primes were presented below 
objective threshold than when they were presented below subjective
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threshold. To the author's knowledge no previous study has 
Investigated lexical decision times below subjective and objective 
detection threshold In a semantic priming experiment although faster 
lexical decisions have been associated with subliminal presentation 
in studies comparing priming above and below threshold (Fowler et al. 
1961; Balota 1983). Having collapsed resu lts across short and long 
SOAs Balota (1963) found that lexical decisions were made on average 
56 nsec faster In the threshold condition than In  the suprathreshold 
condition, a difference which was sign ificant at the 1% level of 
confidence. 6alota claims that a faster response time would be 
expected In the threshold condition because reading the primes 
requires mental capacity and therefore le ss capacity Is  available for 
responding to the target In comparison to the subliminal condition In 
which the primes are processed automatically. But, It  Is  d iff icu lt  
to extend th is  argument to account for the sign ificant difference In 
response time between presentation below objective and subjective 
detection threshold In Experiments 5 and 8. Moreover, Marcel’s 
(1983a, Experiment 4) results d iffe r  from those of Balota (1983) In 
that he found that lexical decisions were made more quickly when the 
primes were pattern masked (subliminal condition) than when they were 
unmasked (supraliminal condition).
It  was hypothesised above that semantic and emotional priming of 
emotional target stimuli would be greater In magnitude when the 
primes were presented below the le ss stringent subjective detection 
threshold than when they were presented below objective detection 
threshold. Tables 11.4 and 11.5 show that while there was a trend In 
th is direction the difference between percentage semantic and 
emotional priming effects below subjective and objective detection 
threshold was not s ta tist ic a lly  sign ificant. However, between 
Experiments 5 and 9 there was on average a 2I9X Increase In the
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OVEULL DISCUSSION OF SEMANTIC AND EMOTIONAL ra iN IN I NITH EMOTIONAL
TBBETS--------------------------
The experiments reported In Pert I I I  were designed to Investigate 
subliminal priming of emotional targets. The conclusions drawn from 
th is  work are presented below under three subheadings: Target 
repetition; Semantic and emotional priming below objective detection 
threshold and Priming effects below objective and subjective 
detection threshold compared.
Target repetition
Frequency o f  occurrence has a significant effect on lexical decision 
time (Rubenstein et a1. 1970; Scarborough et a1. 1977; Gardner et 
a1. 1987) and I t  Is  therefore very Important that frequency I s  
matched across conditions In a semantic priming experiment. In  some 
experiments th is  has been achieved by creating two sets of 
semantically related (SR) word pairs. One set I s  then ’scrambled* to 
form the unrelated (UR) prime-target word pairs for half the 
participants and the other set ’scrambled’ to form word pairs In the 
unrelated condition for those participants remaining. This procedure 
ensures that the differential effect of target frequency In the SR 
and UR conditions I s  cancelled out while complicated matching 
procedures are avoided. In the majority of semantic priming 
experiments however, frequency effects are controlled by matching 
targets for frequency of occurrence according to some published 
norms. Norms which have been used for this purpose Include the 
Kucera and Francis (1967) and Thorndike and Lorge (1944) word counts. 
The disadvantage of this method of frequency control I s  that the 
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noms «re often bised on word counts of lltere tu re  In a country other 
than that In which the experiment I s  to be conducted and the noms 
are often out dated.
A third method for controlling target frequency Is  to repeat the 
same target stimuli in each experimental condition and I t  was this 
method that was chosen for Experiment 6. That Is,  In Experiment 6 
one set of real word targets were chosen and shown three times: once 
preceded by semantically related primes; once preceded by emotionally 
related primes and once preceded by unrelated primes . A fu lly  
crossed experimental design was then used to ensure that presentation 
order would not confound the resu lts. Unfortunately the semantic and 
emotional priming effects which had occurred In  a previous experiment 
failed to emerge In Experiment 6. However, there was a sign ificant 
effect of target repetition with lexical decisions having been made 
relatively slowly when the targets were f i r s t  shown, more quickly 
when they were shown for the second time and fastest of a ll when they 
appeared for the third occasion. In previous studies repetition 
effects have been found to occur more strongly and to last longer 
than semantic priming effects (Dannenbring I  Briand 1982; Mayer et 
a i. 1975; Forbach et al. 1974; Scarborough et al. 1977; Ra tc liff 
et al. 1985). I t  was therefore hypothesised that the semantic and 
emotional priming effect which fa iled  to occur In Experiment 6 had 
been masked by the stronger effects of target repetition. This 
hypothesis was supported by the findings of Experiment 7 which was a 
supraliminal replication of Experiment 6. I t  was argued that while 
the existence of subliminal semantic and emotional priming effects 1s 
s t i l l  contentious, supraliminal semantic priming Is  a well documented 
phenomenon. Thus I f  the resu lts of Experiment 6 were replicated they 
would be consistent with, and thus offer some suppôt for, the 
hypothesis that semantic and emotional priming effects failed to
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occur because of target repetition. In fact the results of 
Experiment 7 were very comparable to those of Experiment 6. 
S ignificant semantic and emotional priming effects failed to occur 
while lexical decisions were made faster with each presentation of 
the target stimuli and the effect of repetition was s ign ifican t at 
the 7% level of confidence.
Taking the results of Experiments 6 and 7 together one I s  led to 
the conclusion that subliminal and supraliminal semantic and 
emotional priming effects are l ik e ly  to be masked I f  an experimental 
design Is  chosen In which priming and repetition effects are 
confounded. Frequency effects cannot of course be Ignored but In 
semantic priming experiments they should be controlled without 
adopting an experimental design which Involves target repetition.
Semantic and emotional priming below objective detection threshold
Semantic and emotional priming of emotional target stimuli was 
Investigated below objective detection threshold In Experiments S and 
8. In Experiment 5 there was a sign if ican t emotional priming effect 
while the semantic priming effect was sign ificant at the 7% level of 
confidence. However, In Experiment 6 the semantic priming effect was 
highly sign ificant while the emotional priming effect fa iled  to reach 
sta tist ica l significance at a ll.  One way In which the two 
experiments differed was the method by which stimuli were chosen. In 
Experiment 5 the experimenter and her supervisor chose ’emotional* 
and ’neutral’ words on the basis o f  the ir personal evaluations and 
they also decided whether word p a irs  were semantically related or 
unrelated. Prior to Experiment 6 two different word rating exercises 
were conducted. In one exercise students rated the quality and 
strength of emotion they associated with a large number of words and
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In thn second exercise they rated degree of relatedness between 
potential prime-target word pairs. Thus In  Experiment 8 emotional 
and neutral stimuli had been rated ’emotional’ and ’neutral’ 
respectively: semantically related word pairs were considered lik e ly  
to ’go together’ and semantically unrelated word pairs had been rated 
’unrelated’ . A fa ir ly  large number of people took part In the rating 
exercises and a ll ratings were made by members of the student 
population from which the subsequent experimental sample was drawn, 
although none of those who took part In the rating exercise 
subsequently took part In the experiment.
In some experiments the magnitude of semantic priming effect has 
been associated with degree of relatedness between the prime and 
target stim uli (e.g. F isch ler I Goodman 1978; McCauley et al.
1976). One might speculate that the Increase In percentage semantic 
priming effect from Experiment S to 8 occured because In Experiment 8 
the prime-target word pa irs In the semantically related condition 
were more strongly related. An ex post facto analysis of semantic 
relatedness between prime-target word pairs In Experiments 6 and 8 
however showed that they did not d iffe r sign ifican tly  In th is 
respect, but of course the control (unrelated) condition was 
different In  each experiment and as the difference In degree of 
relatedness between the semantically related and unrelated word pairs 
was not computed It  I s  not possible to draw any firm conclusions 
about strength of relationship and the strength of semantic priming 
effect In Experiments 5 and 8.
From the results of Experiments $ and 8 It  seems not 
unreasonable to conclude that semantic priming of emotional target 
stimuli can occur below objective detection threshold. However, the 
magnitude and therefore sta tist ic a l significance of the effect 
probably depends upon choice of stimuli and In particular on the
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degree o f reUtedness between the senentlcelly releted end control 
conditions.
The results of Experinents S end 8 suggest thet one cen be less 
certein ebout the existence of the emotlonel priaing effect. While 
there wes e lerge end ste t lst ic e lly  sign ificent enotlonel priaing 
effect In  Experlaent 5, the effect wes $ael1 end non-s1gn1f1cent In 
Experlaent 8. One cen be acre confident thet the priae-terget peirs 
were seaenticelly unreleted In the eaotlonelly releted condition of 
Experlaent 8 then In the eaotlonelly releted condition of Experlaent 
5. However, I t  seeas quite unreesoneble to essuae thet the enutlone! 
priaing effect In Experlaent S wes entire ly due to e seaentic 
reletlonship between priae-terget word peirs which hed gone 
unrecognized when the st iau ll were chosen. A aore lik e ly  explenetlon 
of the unre lleb lllty  of the eaotlone! priaing effect wes suggested In 
the d iscussion of Experlaent 8. It  wes ergued there thet the 
eaotlonel priaing effect I s  probebly e verlent of the conventlonel 
seaentic priaing effect end thet I f  th is I s  the cese, I t  I s  probebly 
e week effect which aey et tiaes be d iff icu lt  to deaonstrete. When 
aore I s  known ebout eaotlonel priaing those verlebles which effect 
the strength with which It  x c u r s  cen probebly be aenipuleted to 
deaonstrete thet it  cen occur aore rellebly.
Priaing below sub jKtIve  end objective detection threshold coapered
In Chepter 10 It  wes ergued thet the epperent u nre lleb lllty  of 
priaing effects In Experlaents 5 end 8 aey heve erlsen beceuse priaes 
were presented et such e low level of stlaulus energy. Not only wes 
objective detection threshold essessed conservetively with st iau ll 
whose length end frequency wes equel to, or greeter then, the longest 
end aost frequent occurring priae but priaes were then presented et
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90% of th is value. It  was hypothesised that priming effects may 
occur more strongly and re liab ly  I f  a le ss stringent measure of 
detection threshold were assessed.
When the effects of priming below subjective (Experiment 9) and 
objective (Experiment 5) detection thresholds were compared priming 
was Indeed found to occur more strongly below subjective detection 
threshold but the difference In magnitude of effect did not reach 
sta tist ica l significance. Horeover, lexical decisions were generally 
made sign ificantly  more slowly In Experiment 9 than in Experiment 5 
regardless of type of prime. Thus the Increase In magnitude of 
priming effect may have occurred as a consequence of th is  rather than 
as a result of higher energy associated with the prime. This view Is  
supported by the work of F isch ler and Goodman (1978) who found that 
semantic priming effects were large and s ign if ican t when lexical 
decision times were generally slow, and small and non-significant 
when lexical decision times were re latively fast.
In Experiment 9 primes were presented below subjective detection 
threshold. In Cheesman and Herlkle’s (1984) research subjective 
threshold was assessed by asking participants to guess the accuracy 
of their responses after a set of t r ia ls  had been completed (Cheesman 
I  Merlkle 1984, Experiment 2), but In Experiment 9 subjective 
threshold was assessed more objectively. I t  I s  possible that the 
method of assessing subjective threshold resulted In a particularly 
stringent measure and th is  view I s  supported by the non-significant 
correlation between detection performance and percentage semantic 
priming effect.
A final coMMnt
In chiptar 7 I t  was suggested that I f  Internal emotional concepts 
could be activated through a semantic priming effect then th is  might 
be the mechanism by which spontaneous panic attacks arise. I t  was 
noted that such an explanation re lie s on two assumptions. F irst ly ,  
that Internal emotional stimuli can be semantically activated and 
secondly that once activated (without awareness) emotional stimuli 
can give r is e  to an emotional response. Support for the f i r s t  of 
these assumptions comes from the experiments reported above. It  Is  
to the question 'Can non-conscious emotional stimuli give r ise  to 
emotional responses?' that we turn in Part IV.

CHAPTER 13
THE S W lllllH A L  ACTIW TIO H  OP A W I E H :  A KEVIEM  O f L I T E m U l t
The orig ins of spontaneous panic attacks In patients diagnosed as 
suffering anxiety states are far fro» clear. Typ ically such attacks 
do not occur at particular tines, In particular places or In the 
course of particular activ ities. Thus there are no apparent 
envlronnenta! events which could plausibly be considered as 
précipitants. When questioned patients often report thoughts of 
personal danger during a panic attack and such thoughts are 
frequently reactions to sonatic synptons (Hibbert 1984). For 
exanple, an Individual nay think a heart attack I s  about to occur 
follow ing the onset of palpitations. But patients rarely report 
s ign ifican t mental content Immediately prior to the onset of the 
sonatic synptons and so awareness of threatening thoughts, Impulses, 
Images or memories cannot be held responsible fo r the onset of the 
panic attack. However, i t  could be argued that spontaneous attacks 
a rise  following the activation of non>consc1ous stimuli associated 
with threat and such a view Is ,  o f course, a cornerstone of 
psychoanalytic theories. In previous chapters (especially those In 
Part I I I )  the means by which these Interna! threatening stimuli could 
be activated was investigated and a semantic priming mechanism 
postulated. Part IV I s  concerned with the question 'Can 
non-conscious threatening stimuli give rise  to anxiety related 
responses?* Evidence that they can would offer further support for, 
and thus strengthen, the hypothesis that spontaneous panic attacks 
a rise  following the non-conscious perception of Interna! threatening 
stim uli. Research Into th is hypothesis has been laboratory based and 
has sought to determine whether anxiety can be generated (usually in
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non-c11n1c«1 populations) as a rt su U  of the sub llilna l prostntatlon 
of emotionally threatening stimuli.
One of the f ir s t  studies to Investigate emotional responses to 
stimuli tach1st1scop1ca11y presented below recognition threshold was 
carried out by McGInnIes (1949). NcGInnIes found that 
pre-recognition guesses as to the Identity of taboo words were 
accompanied by a s ign ificantly  larger galvanic skin response (GSR) 
than were guesses to neutral stimuli. A few years later Dixon (19S8) 
found that a sign ificantly  greater GSR response was evoked by taboo 
words In comparison to neutral words when the stimuli were presented 
below awareness threshold. D ixon's research was extended by 
Worthington (1961) who discovered that an electrodermal response 
conditioned to particular verbal stimuli generalised to semantically 
related words presented below recognition threshold. This finding 
has been replicated In the fie ld  of selective attention research. 
Corteen and Wood (1972) for example, conditioned a GSR to three c ity 
names and subsequently found s ign if ican tly  greater electrodermal 
a ct iv ity  In response to other c ity  names than to unrelated nouns 
presented to the non-attended ear In a d ichotic listening paradigm, 
even though none of these stimuli had been presented In the shock 
association procedure. Corteen and Wood’s (1972) study has been 
c rit ic ise d  on the grounds that participants could have momentarily 
switched their attention from the passage of prose they were 
shodowing and then forgotten that th is  occurred. However, the 
resu lts were replicated by Corteen and Dunn (1974) In a study In 
which participants were asked to stop shodowing Immediately they 
heard a c ity  name and press a buzzer. As th is occurred only once out 
of the posible 114 opportunities I t  seems unlikely that the results 
of the original study by Corteen and Wood were artefactual.
Forster and Govler (1978) extended Corteen and Wood and Corteen
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and Dunn's findings by showing that once an e1 ectrodemal response 
had been conditioned to particular words a GSR was Induced with much 
greater than chance probability to synonyms presented In an 
unattended message. Horeover, while participants also showed a GSR 
to words which sounded lik e  the conditioned stimulus (CS) they were 
sign ifican tly  more lik e ly  to do so when the CS was embedded In a 
context which was appropriate rather Inappropriate. The studies 
cited above were a ll concerned with a psychophyslological component 
of anxiety (GSR) and collective ly  they lead to two conclusions.
F ir s t  that stimuli which are not consciously perceived can 
nevertheless be semantically analysed and second, that non-consclous 
stimuli are evaluated and can give rise  to psychophyslological 
changes consistent with an anxiety response.
The Influence of subliminal emotional stimuli on the generation 
of psychological aspects of anxiety, Including aspects having somatic 
referents, has been Investigated In two experiments by Tyrer, Lewis 
and Lee (1978). In the ir f ir s t  experiment 20 anxiety associated 
words were presented subllm lnally to a group of nurses and the same 
words presented suprallm lnally to a second group matched with the 
f i r s t  on a measure of tra it  anxiety. Seven dependent variables, a ll 
representing psychological aspects of anxiety, were assessed before 
and after the stimuli were presented. The dependent measures were 
a ll se lf ratings and Included two measures of state anxiety, one from 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Splelberger et al. 1970; STAI), 
the other from the Bond and Lader (1974) factor score measure. 
Analogue scales were also used to obtain five  further se lf  ratings of 
muscular tension, sweating, shaking, d iff ic u lty  breathing and 
palpitations. Results appeared to show sign ificant Increases In the 
two measures of state anxiety for both subliminal and supraliminal 
groups although no other dependent measures changed sign ificantly.
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In Tyrer et a l . ’s second experiment a speeded up film of a drive 
through a busy c ity  Mas shown to one group of volunteers who 
subsequently viewed suprallm lnally a film  of a swan floating on a 
lake. A second group matched to the f ir s t  In terms of tra it  anxiety 
f ir s t  viewed the ’floating swan* film  subllmlnally and subsequently 
viewed the ’speeding car* film suprallm lnally. The ’speeding car* 
film  was considered to have anxiety Inducing qua litie s (I.e . to be 
’emotional’ ) while the ’floating swan* film was thought to be 
’neutral*. Thus differential e ffects of emotional and neutral, 
subliminal and supraliminal stimulation could be Investigated. Six 
of the seven anxiety measures used In the tachlstoscopic study were 
taken before and after each film  was viewed. Results appeared to 
show that the factor score measure of anxiety Increased following 
subliminal presentation of the ’emotional’ film and decreased 
following subliminal presentation of the ’neutral* film. No 
sign ificant changes were found fo r  the remaining five  dependent 
variables with subliminal presentation. Comparison of pre-post 
change scores for supraliminal presentation of the emotional and 
neutral films showed sign ificant differences on a ll six  dependent 
measures, though ratings of sweating decreased s lig h t ly  for the 
emotional film.
At f ir s t  glance the results o f  the two experiments by Tyrer et 
a l. (1978) appear to offer Impressive support for the hypothesis 
that non-consclous stimuli can g ive  rise  to mental components of 
anxiety. However, on closer Inspection 1t can be seen that both 
studies were so seriously flawed that one cannot have confidence In 
conclusions drawn from them.
The c red ib ility  of the film  Investigation suffers from the fact 
that I t  was assumed rather than demonstrated that the emotional film  
produced anxiety. The finding that Increases occurred In  a ll but one
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o f the dependent neisures when the emotional film  was viewed 
suprallM lnally does not necessarily support th is  assumption. I t  Is  
equally, I f  not more, plausible to consider th is  film produced 
feelings of ' t h r i l l ’ such as nay be obtained from a fairground ride. 
The experience o f t h r i l l  would be expected to produce Increases In 
perceived muscle tension, palpitations etc. and these may have been 
misinterpreted as anxiety following supraliminal viewing of the 
emotional film. Such a misinterpretation seems especially l ik e ly  
since participants were apparently given no explanation of the 
purpose of the experiment.
A further d iff icu lty  with the film  study Is  that some 
participants reported seeing 'f l ic k e r in g ' during subliminal 
presentation. Tyrer et ai. (1978) do not say I f  th is was confined 
to the emotional film  though th is  seems very like ly  as a speeded up 
view of streets from a moving car I s  like ly  to Involve large and 
rapid luminance changes compared to a view of a swan on a lake. As 
participants were unaware of the purpose of the experiment the sight 
o f 'f l ic k e r in g ' may well have caused them to wonder what was going on 
and what was l ik e ly  to happen, thus generating genuine anxiety quite 
artefactually.
The tachlstoscopic study was seriously flawed In three major 
ways. F irst  there was a most Implausible 'cover sto ry '.
Participants were told the Investigation was concerned with "te sting  
eye movements so that there was no pre-existing expectation that 
anxiety levels might be altered during the experiment" (Tyrer et al. 
1978, p.90). I t  scarcely seems lik e ly  that participants given th is 
'explanation ' and subsequently asked to make seven ratings of aspects 
o f anxiety both before and after the experiment would believe the 
stated purpose. But I f  they did not, then they may well have 
wondered what the true purpose was, and their uncertainty may
140
«rtef«ctually have generated the apparent change In state anxiety. A 
second and more serious procedural flaw was the complete fa ilure  to 
employ an adequate control condition In the experiment. Participants 
In the subliminal condition were compared with those in the 
supraliminal. To draw any defensible conclusion about subliminal 
activation of anxiety, a control condition should have been Included 
In which emotionally neutral words, or blank cards, or both, were 
presented. It  I s  plausible to suppose that the Increase In anxiety 
In the supraliminal group resulted from a genuine Increase In anxiety 
but that the Increase In the subliminal group stemmed f rM  
uncertainty and apprehension about the true nature of the experiment.
Finally, the tachlstoscopic study was deficient In I t 's  
sta tist ica l analyses. Measures were taken of a set of seven 
dependent variables, but no multivariate comparison on th is set was 
made. Instead seven separate 2 x 2  ANOVA’s were carried out In which 
21 'F '  ratios were computed, only two of which were significant. It  
seems very like ly  that had a preliminary MANOVA been used I t  would 
have Indicated no sign ificant overall multivariate difference.
Taken together the methodological weaknesses In both studies 
reported by Tyrer et a1. (1978) were so severe that the results do 
not offer clear support for the hypothesis that psychological 
components of anxiety may be caused by non-consclous emotional 
stimuli.
Experiment 10, which Is  reported In the next chapter, was 
designed to replicate and extend Tyrer et a l . ’s study while avoiding 
the methodological flaws associated with the ir work.
PSYCH0L061CAL AND PSYCHOPHYSIOLMICAL RESPONSES TO NILO SUILIHINAL
inmrEXFEtiHBff lo-----------------------
Experiment 10 was designed to Investigate the Influence of subliminal 
emotional and neutral stimuli on psychic, somatic and 
psychophys1o1og1cal aspects of anxiety. The study was broadly 
sim ilar to that of Tyrer, Lewis and Lee (1978) discussed In the 
previous chapter. One group of participants was shown ’emotional’ 
words sublim lnally while a second group, matched to the f ir s t  on 
tra it  anxiety, was sublim lnally presented with ’neutral’ stimuli. 
Psychic, somatic and psychophyslological aspects of anxiety were 
measured before and after stimulation and the differences between 
groups and across time was Investigated. Stimuli were rendered 
subliminal by means of the backward pattern masking technique used In 
Experiments 1 * 3.
Participants
Twenty-eight undergraduate students (16 women, 12 men) aged 18-24 
took part In the experiment. Each was paid £2.00 for participating. 
Two groups were established matched In terms of score on the tra it  
version of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) Form X 
(Splelberger et a1. 1970). During the experiment one group (E) was 
presented with emotional words and the other group (N) with neutral 
words. The mean t ra it  anxiety scores for the E and N groups were 
39.8 (SD 9.16) and 40.1 (SO 9.23) respectively. Both groups 
contained eight women and s ix  men and the mean age was 19.7 years 
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(SO 1.39) for the E group and 19.4 years (SO 1.04) for the N. The 
groups did not d iffe r  sign ificantly In tra it  anxiety (t  -  0.07, df 
26, P > 0.1) or age (t  -  0.74, df 26, P > 0.1).
Apparatus and stimuli
Heart rate (HR) and respiration rate (RR) were measured using a Grass 
78 series polygraph. HR was recorded using three plate electrode 
placements (le ft and right wrist and le ft  ankle) and the extrapolated 
beats per minute HR was computed and printed using the integrated 
Grass tachograph. RR was recorded using a temperature sensor 
Incorporated In a nose c lip  Inserted In  one nostril. Stimuli were 
presented by means of the Electronic Developments 3-f1e1d 
tachlstoscope used In Experiments 1 - 3. The stimuli were presented 
at a luminance of 2.35 1g cd/m  ^ and the mask at a luminance of 1.90 
Ig  cd/m .^
Twenty emotionally unpleasant (E) and 20 emotionally neutral (N) 
words Individually matched for length and frequency of occurrence 
using the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms served as verbal stimuli. 
The 40 words were selected from a total of 146 words rated for 
emotional pleasantness/unpleasantness In a p ilot experiment. In the 
p ilo t  study 124 undergraduates rated words considered to be 
associated with threat and frequency matched words believed to be 
emotionally neutral. Participants were asked to rate the quality and 
strength of emotion they associated with each word on a 7-po1nt scale 
(7: Very strong unpleasant emotion, 6: Fa irly  strong unpleasant 
emotion, S: N lld unpleasant emotion, 4: No emotion, 3: H lld  pleasant 
emotion, 2: Fa irly  strong pleasant emotion, 1: Very strong pleasant 
emotion). The questionnaire used In the rating study has already 
been described as I t  was also used In another rating exercise (see 
Appendix E). However, when used previously the numbers were assigned
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for scoring In a different order (I.e . 7 ■  very strong pleasant 
emotion and 1 -  very strong unpleasant emotion).
A11 but two of the I words used In the experiment had median 
emotionality ratings of 6 or 7. The two exceptions had ratings of 5. 
A ll but two of the N words had median ratings of 4 (i.e . no 
emotional association), the two exceptions having ratings of 3. The 
E and N stimuli (which are shown In Appendix J) varied In length from 
two to nine letters and In frequency of occurrence from 3 to 89 In 
the Kucera and Francis norms. Four stimuli were abbreviations rather 
than proper words. Two of these were emotional (TB, VD) and two were 
neutral (AC, BC). The emotional abbreviations were used because they 
had been used In the study by Tyrer et a l. (1978) and had also 
emerged as strongly emotional In the p ilo t  rating study. The neutral 
abbreviations were rated as neutral In the p ilot Investigation.
In addition to the verbal stimuli a set of five numerical 
stimuli was constructed. These consisted o f the numerals 3, 5, 6, 7 
and 8 printed on tachlstoscope cards. A ll stimuli were printed on 
transparent tape using the KROY 80 le tte ring  system (wheel size 10). 
The printed stimuli were then fixed In the centre of white cards 101 
X 152 mm In size. The stimuli were 2.5 mm In height and subtended 
horizontal visual angles In the range 0.90° to 3.21°’ The pattern 
mask used In a ll previous experiments except 4 and 7 was used again 
In th is  experiment.
Overview of Procedure
Participants were told that two experiments were to be carried out. 
The f i r s t  (which actually consisted of detection threshold 
assessment) was said to be one of a se rie s of studies concerned with 
Individual differences In visual acuity fo r different types of 
stim uli. Following threshold estimation participants were told the
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second experiment was concerned with the relationship between visual 
acuity and emotion. It  was explained that a series of t r ia ls  would 
be given and that on some occasions a stimulus would be shown 
brie fly. Participants were told that they were to look very 
carefully as they would be asked to report what they had seen at the 
end of the experiment. To give credence to th is  ’story’ the five 
numerical stimuli were mixed In with both the E and N verbal stimuli 
and were presented at 10 times the exposure duration of the verbal 
stim uli, thus giving something to be seen and reported.
The binocular backward pattern masking procedure Investigated In 
Experiments 1 • 3, and reported In Chapter 4, was used to render 
stimuli subliminal in the current experiment. Eight emotionally 
neutral nine letter words were used for the assessment of detection 
thresholds. These were chosen to have frequencies equal to, or 
marginally greater than, the most frequently occurring E and N words 
used In the experiment. The use of neutral test words equal in 
length and frequency to the E and N stimuli was considered lik e ly  to 
yie ld  conservative estimates of detection threshold. The stimuli 
used for assessment of detection threshold are shown In Appendix J. 
Detection thresholds were assessed using a forced choice procedure In 
which participants attempted to discriminate between blank and 
stimulus cards. A fu ll description of the procedure I s  given In 
Chapter 4. Detection threshold was assumed to have been reached when 
the probability of a correct response was within the 95% confidence 
lim its of the chance expectancy 0.5 (0.35 - 0.65) and participants 
were responding non-d1scr1m1nat1vely. Non-d1$cr1i1nat1ve responding 
was defined as occurring when ch1 square Indicated that the response 
d istribution  for h its, false alarms, misses and correct negatives did 
not d iffe r  from that expected by chance. In Chapter 3 It  was argued 
that at objective threshold non-dlscrimlnative responding should be
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dewonstrated by showing that tha probability of a correct rtsponso, a 
h it and a fa lse  eUne  a11 fe ll within the 95% confidence H i l t s  of 
the chance expectancy of 0.5. However, these c rite ria  for assessing 
objective threshold were proposed after the coaipletion of the current 
experinent. To see whether participants* response distributions 
conformed to the c r ite r ia  proposed in Chapter 3 ex post facto 
analyses were carried  out and these are reported below.
Dependent variab les assessed
After detection threshold had been assessed the ’cover story’ for the 
’second experiment* was given to participants who were then wired fo r 
recording of heart and respiration rate. Following a period of 
approximately 10 minutes during which the polygraph was calibrated, 
participants made ratings of state anxiety on the STAI. Ratings o f a 
variety of fee lin gs were also made on the 16 analogue scales 
developed by Bond and Lader (1974). Only two of these (Calm-Excited 
and Tense-Relaxed) were used in the analysis of data, the remainder 
were given to obscure the fact that the experimenter was chiefly 
interested in anxiety. The Calm-Excited and Tense-Relaxed scales 
were shown by Bond and Lader (1974) to define a factor in their 
factor analysis o f analogue scale ratings. In comparison with a 
placebo condition scores on this factor decreased following 
administration o f an anxiolytic drug (Flurazepam) and I t  therefore 
seems reasonable to consider the factor offers a valid  measure of 
state anxiety. The procedure described by Bond and Lader (1974) was 
used to compute a ’ factor score’ measure of state anxiety from 
ratings on the Calm-Excited and Tense-Relaxed scales. Finally, 
participants made ratings on the five  analogue scales used by Tyrer 
et a l. (1976) to measure aspects of (perceived) somatic anxiety. 
These scales, l ik e  the Bond and Lader measures, required participants
146
to draw a vertical pencil line through a 100 nm horizontal line to 
Indicate strength of feeling. The five  somatic anxiety scales 
measured perceived sweating, shaking, palpitations, d if f ic u lt y  in 
breathing and muscular tension. Each was verbally labe lled  'not at 
a i r  at one end and 'very severely' at the other.
Presentation of stimuli
When a ll ratings had been made the main part of the Investigation 
began with a 30 second resting baseline recording of the 
psychophyslologlca! variables. Following th is the word stimuli were 
presented lOK below each participant’s detection threshold, each 
stimulus being Immediately followed by the pattern mask for a period 
of 500 msec. Following the mask a dark fie ld  was viewed prior to the 
next stimulus. An Inter-stimulus Interval of approximately 6 seconds 
was used and 1 sec before the onset of each stimulus an audible 
warning sounded. The five  numerical stimuli were presented (at ten 
times the duration of the verbal stim uli) In the fo llow ing serial 
positions for each group; 5th, 8th, 14th, 18th, and 23rd. Packs of 
stimulus cards (E or N) were made up prior to each experimental 
session. The experimenter’s supervisor assigned partic ipants to the 
E or N groups according to their score on the STAI measure of trait 
anxiety which was assessed at the very beginning of the session. He 
then gave the appropriate pack of cards (E or N) to the experimenter 
for presentation. Thus the experimenter was able to present stimuli 
blind with respect to experimental group although of course she knew 
where the numerical stimuli appeared so that she could adjust 
stimulus duration appropriately. Following the la st  ( I.e .  25th) 
stimulus psychophyslological recording was continued fo r  IS  seconds 
with the participant at rest. Immediately th is recording finished 
the analogue rating scales and the STAI measure of sta te  anxiety were
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readfflinistered. Stimuli and mask in the main part o f the study were 
presented in the same manner and under the same levels of 
illumination as in the threshold determination procedure.
When a ll post-stimulation ratings had been completed 
participants were asked what they had seen during stimulation. A ll 
but one remembered seeing numbers, Indeed most remembered the actual 
numbers seen. None reported seeing anything else. Probe questions 
asking i f  colours, shapes, letters, or words had been seen were a ll 
answered in the negative.
Thresholds and detection performance
The mean probability of a correct response P(C), a h it  P(H) and a 
fa lse  alarm P(FA) at detection threshold (OT) are given in Table 14.1 
together with the mean value of d’ and mean OT. As can be seen the 
groups viewing emotional (E) and neutral (N) words did not d iffe r 
s ign if ican tly  on any of these measures and the average values for 
P{C), P(H) and P(FA) a ll fe ll within the 95% confidence lim its about 
the chance expectency of 0.5. However, inspection of the individual 
response d istributions revealed that 3 participants in the N group 
and 1 participant in the E group were responding d iscrim inatively as 
defined by the objective c riteria  proposed in Chapter 3. Three 
participants in the N group and one in  the E group had a probability 
of a h it less than the value defined by the lower boundary of the 95% 
confidence lim its about the chance expectency of 0.5 (i.e . P < 0.3). 
One of these participants (in the N group) also had a probability of 
a fa lse  alarm less than 0.3.
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Tab1t 14.1 Naan d tU ctlon  thrashold (DT) and value of d '«  P(C), 
P(h1t) and P(F/A) in Experluent 10. *




























0.024 P > 0.05
*  Standard deviations are shown In parentheses.
Psychological data
When a11 28 participants had completed the experiment analogue rating 
scale responses were measured to the nearest half millimetre by the 
experimenter who was blind with respect to group (E or N) and time of 
recording (Pre or Post). The Bond and Lader factor score measure of 
state anxiety was a lso  computed blind as was the STAI measure of 
state anxiety. Inspection of the score d istributions on the seven 
psychological measures (perceived sweating, shaking, palpitations, 
d if f ic u lt y  breathing, muscular tension, STAI anxiety, anxiety factor 
score) suggested a degree of positive skewing and so scores were 
normalised using a logarithmic transformation. The Pre and Post 
stimulation means for normalised scores In the E and N groups are 
shown In Table 14.2. The raw scores are shown In Appendix K.
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T*b 1<  14 .2  N o rn iH s c d  ni«an p r«- and p o s t-tt la w la tle n  scorts fo r  I  and
N Croups.
E GROUP N GROUP
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Psychophysloloqical data
Kean heart rate (HR) and respiration rate (RR) during the la st 15 
seconds of resting baseline prior to the onset of stimulation were 
compared with mean HR and RR during the 15 seconds of rest after 
stimulation. Kean HR in each period was computed from the heart rate 
in beats per minute automatically extrapolated from beat to beat 
interva ls. Respiration rate was calculated as the number of 
resp iratory cycles occurring in the 15 second epochs. Kean Pre and 
Post stimulation values of HR and RR for the E and N groups are shown 
in Table 14.2 for normalised scores. Tne raw scores are shown in 
Appendix K.
Artilysls of Results
A 3-way HANOVA for repeated measures with subjects nested within 
experimental group (E/N) and crossed with time (Pre/Post stimulation) 
was carried out on normalised scores In the set of nine dependent 
variables. Results from MANOVA showed no significant main effect for 
experimental group (G), F ■  1.600; df 9,16; P > 0.189. However, a 
significant main effect for Time (T), F -  8.489; df 9,18; P -  0.00007 
and a sign ificant Interaction (G x T). F -  2.885; df 9,18; P -  0.028 
was found. Subsequent 2 x 2  ANOVAs showed a significant main effect 
for time on four psychological variab les; shaking (P ■  0.0004), 
palpitations (P • 0.002), d if f ic u lt y  breathing (P -  0.0006) and 
muscular tension (P ■  0.003). Both psychophyslological variables 
also showed a significant main effect fo r Time; HR (P -  0.038), RR (P 
• 0.0021). Examination of the means In  Table 14.2 shows that values 
of a ll these s ix  variables Increased following stimulation and that 
this occurred In both E and N groups. Sweating, STAI and the factor 
score measure of anxiety did n ^  show sign ificant changes over time 
at the 5% level.
The univariate ANOVAs showed sign if ican t  Group x Time 
Interactions for four psychological variables; sweating (P ■  0.048), 
shaking (P -  0.043), muscular tension (P • 0.025) and the anxiety 
factor score (P • 0.026). Neither of the psychophyslological 
variables showed a significant Interaction effect (HR; P • 0.877, RR; 
P -  0.141). Table 14.2 shows that for sweating the E group mean 
Increased and the N group decreased follow ing stimulation. The same 
was true for the anxiety factor score. For both shaking and muscular 
tension the mean scores In both groups Increased following 
stimulation, though the Increase fo r the E group was much greater 
than that for the N. Five dependent variables showed no significant 
Group X Time Interaction at the 5X leve l; palpitations, d iff icu lty
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breathing, STAI anxiety, HR and RR. It  Is  Interesting to note the 
univariate ANOVAs revealed that only one variable, the STAI measure 
of state anxiety, showed neither a significant main effect for time 
nor a sign ificant Interaction effect.
It  seems reasonable to conclude that the significant Increase In  
ratings of palpitations which occurred In both groups following 
stimulation resulted from conscious experience of the actual Increase 
In heart rate which Is  evident In the data. Thus changes In rating 
of palpitations would be expected to correlate positively and 
sign ifican tly  with the psychophyslologically measured change In heart 
rate. To examine th is  point data from the E and N groups were 
pooled, an operation legitim ized by the lack of a significant 
difference between groups In  both the HANOVA and subsequent 
univariate ANOVAs. As the correlation of Interest was one between 
Pre and Post stimulation change scores. I t  was considered appropriate 
to correlate the component of post stimulation palpitation scores 
orthogonal to the pre-stimulation score with the corresponding 
orthogonal component for HR. This procedure gives a better 
indication of the correlation between ’true’ change scores than Is  
given by using raw Post minus Pre scores. The correlation was 
computed as 0.428 (P < 0.05 for a two-ta1led test).
The ’d iff ic u lty  In breathing’ measure I s  not clear enough In 
nature to permit an unequivocal prediction of It s  relationship with 
RR. It  might be argued that d iff icu lty  In breathing could be related 
either to an Increase or a decrease In actual respiration rate 
depending on the nature o f the d ifficu lty. However, out of Interest 
the correlation between d if f ic u lt y  In breathing and RR was computed 
using the orthogonal component procedure and found to be 0.22S (P > 
0.05 for a two-tailed test).
Threshold values for the E and N groups were closely comparable and 
the analysis of detection performance at threshold showed no 
sign ificant differences between the groups. The mean value for the 
probability of a correct response did not d iffe r s ig n if ic a n t ly  from 
the chance expectancy of 0.5 at threshold, though four of the 28 
participants failed to show non-d1scr1m1nat1ve responding In  terms of 
the c rite r ia  proposed In Chapter 3. However, as the mean value of d’ 
very c lose ly approximated zero In each group the data fo r the four 
aberrant cases were Included In the analysis and It  seems reasonable 
to conclude that thresholds were adequately assessed and that the 
verbal stimuli presented In the main part of the experiment were 
generally presented below objective detection threshold. Further 
assurance that stimuli were unavailable to awareness comes from the 
fa ilure  of participants to report any of the verbal st im u li, though 
numerical stimuli were reported as expected.
The fa ilure  In the univariate ANOVAs to find a sign if ican t  main 
effect for Time (Pre/Post stimulation) together with the sign ificant 
Group X Time interaction for sweating and the factor score measure of 
anxiety are the most Interesting results. It  Is  clear from Table 
14.2 that subliminal exposure to emotionally unpleasant words having 
connotations of threat produced Increases In subjective feelings of 
sweating and anxiety (on the factor score measure). By contrast 
sim ilar exposure to emotionally neutral words produced decreases In 
feelings of sweating and anxiety. The sign ificant d iffe ren tia l 
change on these variables In relation to type of stimulation Is  
entire ly consistent with the lack of sign ificant change reflected In 
the ANOVA main effect for Time. That Is ,  an Increase In  the
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emotional word group following stimulation and a decrease In the 
neutral word group would be expected to cancel one another out 
leaving no sign ificant change over time for the groups considered 
together.
The resu lts for sweating and the anxiety factor score measure 
cannot plausibly be explained as an artefact of the stimuli used as 
these were matched across the emotional and neutral groups for length 
and frequency. Also, the emotional and neutral words were 
respectively shown to have emotionally unpleasant and emotionally 
neutral qua lities. Neither can the results be attributed to a 
partial cueing effect resulting from an Inadequate threshold 
determination procedure.
The sign ificant main effect for Time and the sign ificant Group x 
Time Interaction for muscular tension and shaking In the univariate 
ANOVAs presents an Interesting finding. Table 14.2 shows mean 
Increases In both variables following stimulation, and although this 
occurred In both the emotional and neutral groups the emotional group 
showed much greater Increases (44% and 107% as against 6% and 23% In 
the neutral group). The Increase for both groups Indicates the 
presence of an experimental artefact. This might have been a 'demand 
characteristic’ In the sense that participants In both groups might 
have believed they were expected to rate themselves as experiencing 
more somatic features of anxiety following stimulation. However, 
th is  explanation seems unlikely. No such demand characteristic Is  
evident In the case of sweating and the factor score and I t  Is  
d iff ic u lt  to believe that a demand characteristic would be so 
selective In I t s  effects. Probably a more plausible explanation may 
be found In considering the nature of the participants* task, 
looking into a tachlstoscope and viewing a series of supraliminal 
stimuli (the recurring mask and the five numerals) as well as a
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se rie s of sub11in1n«1 stimuli requires concentritlon and maintenance 
of a s t i l l  posture, albeit for a short time of about 150 seconds.
The need to remain s t i l l  could well have been a situational 
characteristic which contributed to Increases In perceived muscle 
tension and shaking In both groups. However, the d iffe rentia lly  
greater Increase In shaking and tension In the emotional group, as 
evidenced by the sign ificant Interaction term, I s  d if f ic u lt  to 
explain except In terms of the emotional stimuli making some genuine 
contribution to Increased feelings of shaking and tension which was 
not made, or not made so strongly, by the neutral stimuli. It  seems, 
therefore, that the results for shaking and tension were In part an 
artefact of the need to maintain a s t i l l  posture and In part the 
resu lt of a genuine disturbance of mood produced by the emotional 
stim uli. Thus there Is  additional. I f  s l ig h t ly  more equivocal, 
evidence from the shaking and tension results that non-consclous 
emotional stimuli can evoke psychological responses consistent with 
elevated anxiety, particularly those associated with muscular 
activ ity .
The sign ificant main effect for time in the case of palpitations 
and d iff icu lty  In breathing, together with the lack of a significant 
interaction term, suggest the Increases in these variables was purely 
artefactua!. However, the perceived Increases appear to be genuine 
and not the result o f error In measurement because there were 
sign ificant Increases In actual heart and respiration rate following 
stimulation, and the Increase In palpitations was sign ificantly  
correlated with the Increase In actual heart rate. The nature of the 
artefact I s  not clear but I t  seems lik e ly  that participants tended to 
hold their breath to some extent while viewing stimuli as an aid to 
concentration and postural st illn e ss .  Such a tendency would very 
probably leave a legacy of Increased heart and respiration rate when
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r iU x a t lo n  occurred i t  the end of the t isk .
The two psychophyslological variables, heart and respiration 
rate showed increases follow ing stleulatlon In both groups but like  
the ir psychological counterparts, palpitations and d iff icu lty  
breathing, the Increases are probably best Interpreted as resulting 
artefactually fro« participants holding the ir breath as an aid to 
concentration and postural st illne ss. However, an alternative 
explanation «ight be that participants In both groups becaae 
concerned about consciously seeing re lative ly  few st1«u11 and th is 
concern was reflected In increased heart and respiration rates.
The fa ilure  of the STAI «easure of state anxiety to show a 
s ig n if ica n t  differential effect In the two groups Is ,  at f i r s t  sight, 
puzzling. The Increase In  the eaotlonal group following st1«ulat1on 
and the decrease In the neutral group are of course In the expected 
d ire ction s, but the Increases were too snail to produce a sign ificant 
Interaction  tern. This resu lt nay Indicate that the STAI was too 
in sen sitive  a Measure fo r the experinental Manipulation carried out. 
8y contrast the Bond and Lader (1974) analogue scales fro« which the 
factor score Measure of anxiety was derived, and Indeed the analogue 
scales o f  sonatlc anxiety taken fron Tyrer et al. (1978), see« 
adequately sensitive fo r atte«pts to activate anxiety with the brief. 
Mild and subllninal st in u ll used In th is  experlnent.
The present resu lts confine the finding by Tyrer et a l. (1978) 
that fe e lin gs of anxiety as Measured by the Bond and Lader (1974) 
factor score can be Induced by M ild ly stre ssfu l subllMlnal stiM ull. 
But the resu lts fa ll to support Tyrer et a l . 's  finding In respect of 
the STAI Measure of anxiety. In addition the resu lts Indicate that 
soMe aspects of anxiety having so«at1c referents, perceived sweating, 
shaking and Muscular tension, can be activated by e«ot1onally 
threatening subllMlnal st1«ul1. Other aspects of anxiety with
1S6
soM tlc  referents. p ilp lU tlo n s end d if f ic u lt y  In breathing, do not 
appear to be activated by th is type o f stlw jlus. Because no atteupt 
was Mde to assess changes In mood sta te s other than anxiety one 
cannot be certain that the changes In  perceived sweating, shaking and 
muscular tension which have been ascribed to anxiety were In  fact 
specific to anxious mood. The emotional stimuli, though selected to 
present m11d stress capable of Inducing anxiety, could a lso  be 
considered gloomy or d isp ir it in g  In nature and could have acted like 
the statements In a Velten type of mood Induction procedure (VeUen 
1968) to bring about, at least In part, a depressed or dysphoric 
mood. But the differential change In  the well validated factor score 
measure c learly Indicates that anxiety Increased In the group viewing 
emotional words and decreased In the neutral word group.

CHAPTER 15
TOWARDS AN UNDER5TAHD1N6 OF PANIC AHACKS
In th is  final chapter findings from the research w ill be drawn 
together In the form of a ’model’ which, It  w111 be argued, may go 
some way towards explaining the c lin ica l problem outlined In Chapter 
1. The problem was: How are anxiety (panic) attacks generated 
without apparent précipitants? It  i s  not claimed that the mode! Is  
complete or that a ll features of It  have been supported by the 
present research. Nor Is  It  claimed that the mode! has been tested 
and shown to be adequate; that would obviously require additional 
c lin ica l research. Rather the model 1$ put forward as a set of 
hypotheses, some of which have been shown by the research reported In 
the thesis to be plausible.
A COGNITIVE HODEL OF PANIC
Figure 15.1 shows a schematic view of processes which may account for 
the generation of spontaneous and apparently unprecipitated attacks 
of anxiety. This view assumes that emotionally neutral concepts are 
stored In semantic memory. One such concept Is  depicted as In 
Figure 15.1. It  I s  also assumed that any given concept I s  a member
of a set of other sim ilar concepts [N2 ....... N^] which together form
an associative network of the sort postulated by Collin s and Loftus 
(1975). Emotional concepts, that Is,  concepts which are associated 
with particular emotions, are envisaged as stored In a sim ilar manner 
within semantic memory. Following Posner and Snyder (1975) I t  may be 
assumed that the emotional Information I s  stored as an associate to 
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assuMptlon I s  not viewed as necessary to the model and for ease of 
exposition the emotional and semantic features of emotional concepts 
w ill not be separated In Figure IS . l.  In the figure depicts an
emotional concept which I s  a member of a set (E^ ...... E^] of such
concepts which collective ly forms an associative network. It  Is  
assumed that a11 members of the set are relevant to the emotion of 
anxiety. Unlike Bower’s (1981) associative network theory the 
present model does not assume that emotions themselves are stored as 
part o f the associative network. In the author’s view th is  Is  an 
unecessary, and probably untenable, assumption. Rather emotion Is  
viewed as being created by the activation of emotional concepts and 
the ir associated emotional Information. Such a view would explain 
the mood dependent recall effects found by Bower, Nonteiro and 
G llllgan  (1978) equally well as the Bower (1981) network theory 
without the Implausible need to conceive of emotion as a form of 
Information which M.y be stored.
The terms n  ^ and e  ^ In  Figure IS . l  represent environmental 
stim uli; n  ^ I s  an emotionally neutral stimulus and e^ I s  an 
emotionally aversive (threatening) stimulus. Each stimulus 
represents a possible Input to semantic memory. On the output side 
of the model 1$ a set of anxiety responses Including general 
subjective feelings of anxiety (dread) and more specific  
psychological components having somatic referents (feelings of 
Increased muscular tension and shaking, feelings of sweating, 
palpitations etc). Physiological responses are also postulated to 
occur (increased heart and respiration rate, sweating etc).
CoqnUive p roctssts «nd tht gtntrttlon  of anxiety.
According to  the model of Figure IS . l  the simplest explenatlon of how 
an anxiety attack may develop can be seen In considering links d and 
f. I f  ej I s  either clearly present In the environment, but 
unattended consciously, or present so fleeting ly, or In a context 
such that I t  has a very low signal to noise ratio  and cannot be 
perceived consciously, It  may nonetheless be registered and activate 
It s  representation E| In semantic memory ( lin k  d). The activation of 
Ej w ill then drive at least some psychological components of an 
anxiety response (link f). Clear evidence for the operation of the 
conjoint d and f  links was found In Chapter 14 though the anxiety 
responses driven  by sublim inally perceived stimuli were confined to 
the general feeling of anxiety and anxiety features having some 
somatic referents (I.e. feelings of sweating, tension and shaking). 
Anxiety generated by a non-consciously perceived emotionally aversive 
stimulus such as e  ^ may be strengthened through an ’emotional priming 
effect’ . That Is,  e, may activate It s  memory representation E, which
primes another aversive stimulus representation which generates an 
anxiety response additional to that generated by Ej This sequence of 
events Invo lve s the Joint operation of lin ks d, e and g. The joint 
operation o f  d and e was supported by the ’emotional priming effect’ 
found In Chapters 8 and 11, though the fa ilure  to replicate the 
effect below objective threshold In Chapter 10 lessens the confidence 
one can have in the Joint operation of lin ks d and e.
A s l ig h t ly  more circuitous, and it  must be admitted, less well 
evidenced, route to an anxiety attack may be postulated in the 
conjoint operation of lin ks a, c and f. Here I t  Is  envisaged that a
registered and activates I t s  representation in semantic memory 
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(link  I ) .  It  Is  further envisaged that In  turn activates, v ia  
priming lin k  c, the memory representation o f an emotionally aversive 
(threatening) stimulus Ej which In this case I s  not present In the 
external environment. The activation of Ej I s  hypothesised to resu lt 
In anxiety responses ( link  f). It  was found in Chapters 8, 10 and I I  
that neutral stimuli can prime (activate) emotionally aversive 
stimuli and so there Is  d ea r evidence for the Joint operation of 
lin ks a and c. The Joint operation of l in k s  a, c and f  has not been 
demonstrated as th is was not Investigated In  the research. However, 
It  was found In Chapter 14 that when the memory representation of an 
aversive stimulus such as E| was activated by an external stimulus e  ^
an anxiety response occurred. It  therefore seems plausible to 
hypothesise that however Ej 1s activated ( I.e .  whether by an 
emotional stimulus such as e  ^ or by a neutral stimulus such as n^)
It s  activation w ill result In an anxiety response. Of course the 
activation of E| by a neutral stimulus n  ^ I s  indirect In the sense
less strongly activated by n  ^ than by e  ^ and hence the anxiety 
response may be weaker. In th is account the emotionally aversive 
stimulus activated In memory Is  not present In  the external 
environment but I t  may be thought of as the memory of repressed 
events associated with pain, gu ilt, shame o r fear. Alternatively, It  
may be the memory representation of a stimulus associated with 
repressed conflicts or frustrations and Silverman (1985) has shown 
that such stimuli can be non-consclously activated.
A third, much more speculative route to anxiety attacks may be 
hypothesised from Figure 15.1. A weak neutral stimulus n  ^ may 
activate, through a semantic priming effect, the memory 
representation of another neutral stimulus which In turn activates 
the representation of an aversive stimulus through a second
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priMing lin k ; then drives an anxiety response. This Involves 
lin k s a, b, k and g, and of these only links a and b have been 
deiaonstrated In the present research (Chapter 4 and 5). However, as 
C o llin s and Loftus (1975) consider that activation of a single 
concept In semantic memory produces an automatic spread of activation 
through the memory network, and as the automatic spread of activation 
for short duration prime stimuli has been supported by work on 
supraliminal priming (Neely 1977), I t  seems not unreasonable to 
postulate the ’second order* priming lin k  k In Figure 15.1. But as 
there I s  l i t t le  d irect evidence to support th is  third view of how 
anxiety attacks may arise  the view w111 not be emphasised. However, 
I t  does offer an Interesting set of hypotheses for future 
Investigation. Two hypotheses seem crucial. The f ir s t  predicts that 
a neutral subliminal stimulus n  ^ w ill activate the memory 
representation of an emotional stimulus to which I t  Is  
semantically unrelated through the Intermediate activation In memory 
of a neutral stimulus N2 which Is  semantically related to both n  ^ and 
£2- In such a case N2 would be a target for the prime n  ^ and would 
also act as a ’ghost* prime (I.e . one not actually present In the 
environment) for the target E2. The hypothesis that ’ghost* priming 
could occur Is  Im plicit In Collins and Loftus (1975) view of semantic 
memory and can e a s ily  be tested In a lexical decision task. The 
second hypothesis would test the operation of conjoint links a, b, k 
and g by observing whether appropriately chosen neutral stimuli could 
generate anxiety responses.
COHPARISON OF THE PRESENT HOOEL WITH OTHER CURRENT VIEWS OF PANIC
Recently Clark (1986) argued that panic attacks which appear to come 
’out of the blue’ In fact stem from a misinterpretation of bodily
disturbances caused by a different emotional state or by exercise, 
partial anoxyatlon through standing up too quickly, or a mild 
stimulant such as coffee. The Innocuous bodily disturbances, It  Is 
argued, are Interpreted In catastrophic ways. For example, the 
person may Interpret slight breathlessness and palpitations as an 
Indication that a heart attack or some other serious Illn e ss  Is  
Imminent. Hibbert (1984) likewise argued, that a fu ll panic attack 
resu lts from Inappropriate cognitions applied to somatic 
disturbances. Although these two views have much to coeinend them 
neither sa tis fac to rily  explains spontaneous panic attacks. To see 
why th is  I s  so a b rie f case history w ill be presented of an anxiety 
state patient treated by the author.
The case of N iss P.
H iss P gave the Impression of a fa ir ly  Immature 21 year old. She 
lived  In modest circumstances with her mother and younger brother 
aged 17, her father having died of a frontal lobe tumour when she was 
18. A qualified hairdresser N iss P had given up her Job 18 months 
p rio r to her appearence In the c lin ic  after experiencing a number of 
panic attacks at work. From her spontaneous report, and from a diary 
the author asked her to keep. I t  was clear that there was no pattern 
to the occurrence of the panic attacks which had f ir s t  started 2 
years before. The panic attacks started, as Is  usual, with the 
perception of somatic symptoms: sweating, shaking and tachycardia 
followed by feelings of anxiety, loss of control and panic. The 
attacks might occur Indoors or out, during conversation, while 
watching television, during a meal or while taking a walk either 
alone or In company. They did not appear to be associated with mood 
so far as could be ascertained, and did not appear to have external
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preclp ltints or to be associated with particular thoughts or 
memories. During the few months before h is death H iss P’s father had 
been unaccustomedly aggressive and shown other personality changes. 
This was a period of considerable stra in  for H iss P who became 
Involved with a group of teenagers who took (re lative ly) hard drugs. 
Against her better Judgement she once tried a drug cocktail, had a 
very upsetting experience and never took drugs again. Later, after 
her father’s death she learned that one of the drug taking group had 
suffered brain damage. She did not admit to believing she was brain 
damaged herself though friends whose opinion she valued told her she 
might be. H iss P did not associate the panic attacks with thoughts 
about taking drugs or with recall of her bad experience of drug 
taking.
It  I s  clear from the case of Hiss P that the panic attacks 
started with perceived autonomic symptoms and progressed to 
subjective feelings of anxiety and panic. What Is  not clear In the 
case of Hiss P, or In the explanatory accounts of panic attacks 
offered by Hibbert (1984) and Clark (1986), I s  how the perceived 
somatic disturbances came about. Hibbert and Clark’s accounts make 
excellent sense given the occurence of the perceived somatic 
symptoms. But H iss P, like  so many anxiety state patients who 
experience panic attacks, could not associate the onset of the 
somatic symptoms with any of the causes suggested by Clark (1986) and 
careful recording by means of the diary and extensive questioning by 
the author failed to e lic it  awareness of précipitants Including 
conscious cognitions.
The model presented In Figure 15.1 can account for at least some 
of the feelings of bodily disturbance particularly feelings of 
sweating, tension and shaking. It  can also account for the 
subjective component of anxiety either In terms of direct
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non-consclous perception of extern«! everslve stimuli or, perhtps 
more plausibly, In  terms of non-consclous reg istration  of neutral 
stimuli which activate memory representations of Internal threatening 
stimuli through a semantic priming effect.
The intention here Is  not to argue that the views of Hibbert and 
Clark are incorrect, but rather that they are incomplete. It  makes 
excellent c lin ic a l sense to suppose that It  Is  probably the In it ia l 
stages of a panic attack which are e lic ited  by subliminal perception 
and/or priming effects and that the later development of the attack 
I s  largely Influenced by Inappropriate thoughts, belie fs or causal 
attributions concerning the significance of the early somatic 
features. I t  1$ of course quite characteristic fo r patients who 
suffer panic attacks to believe that they cannot control the early 
symptoms and as the author has shown elsewhere (H ill & Kemp-Wheeler 
1986) certain types of attribution made to aversive events believed 
to be uncontrollable are associated with emotional upset.
In conclusion 1t merely remains to say that the research 
presented In th is  thesis has provided further evidence that stimuli 
may be perceived without awareness and that such stimuli may have 
dynamic effects In  changing the Ind iv id u a l 's  emotional state. The 
model of anxiety offered must be viewed as provisional pending 
confirmation of the lin ks not yet Investigated, though in the 
author's view I t  has potential for explaining the In it ia l stages of 
panic attacks which are not adequately explained by other 
contemporary accounts of anxiety. The lin ks and Implications of the 
model are c le a rly  Investigable and like  a ll models and theories It  
w ill survive or perish on the basis o f evidence gained from further 
empirical research.
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vsyii?i' FECrULES k.o y COFFEI 1.6 2 CiPSUIE li.06
COfiSTAm COmiSCT I4.06 UORT 2 .lt5 EIECTIOU 3.93
POLICE STiiPV 3.78 CRIPPLE 2.30 HiUilER 3.90
fffSHT* m n m i(.02 EUURI 2.37 DOSE li.OO
SSTOIIE SI^BP 5 . iii SUICIDE 1.61 L .29
JPOLU) ANEtAL k .56 7URBRAL 1.9 3 aCND 1*.75
KMIACS MSDICBJE 3.69 PANIC 2.60 I'KXK U.21
SHA7ID SPHERE 3.95 GANG 3.05 LOAD 3.9 1
TOSE GAHDS] i».78 UARH 2 . 62^ u m n k . S I
ittLOci: P U Y 5 U.82 nT.iT.1B 2.85 EEQJPOED 3.58
BAETUC c o m s L .17 EOECZIOH 2 .72 D lY m O It.21
HARSHJG TACi’ ll.liO CURSE 2.56 aipLY 24.10
M 7 U SUHDOVOI 1I.61 VIOI£ICS 2.23 DUTi' 3 . 7lt
T.TgH SIGÍI ii.OO 10GO2RS 1.79 CONGEAL 3 .7 1
FLIHD MEDIEVAL 1I.18 STRESS 2.28 LOOKS 4 .3 2
TASLS HORSES Í..32 ATTACK 2 . 1t1 BROADER 3 .9 7
WISPOCS ADVISOR 2|.06 VIARNING 3.22 BLOSSOn 5.12
QOOCEiS HORSES I1.II DEVIL 2.60 THTOiB 1|.29

sI I












. 1 ^  
9 A >>O -H a




SR C o n d it io n
E Prime Target £ £
I4. I6 SHIP WRECKED 2.U7 2.J16
3.95 SANITY MADNESS 2.5U 2.9U
3.63 BAIT TRAP 2.16 2.73
3.ao VERDICT GDII/TY 1.82 2.62
3.59 MEDicms DRUGS 2.81 2.31
3.70 ATCM BOMB 1.58 ^.^^2
3.73 DOCTOR ILINESS 2.25 1.97
U . u DONOR BLOOD 3.13 1.23
3.95 LONG CANCER 1.50 2.00
3.83 Toora ACHE 2.69 1.55
U.36 HTBAT/m SICKNESS 2.27 2.92
3.67 STOMACH ULCER 2.69 3.08
3.73 TRENCH WARPARB 2.13 3.OU
U.U1 SWIM DROWN 1.U3 3.29
U.17 HBAW DEAF 2.97 3.13
U.69 GRASS SHAKE 2.31 3.05
U.05 TRAIN CRASH 1.92 3.33
APKMDIX H c o n t* d
SR C o o d it io o
£ £ l i S l Tar/wt £ i
1.10 BAFB COWIN 1.62 5.53
1.93 PAIHS NlffllHABB 2.11 I1.39
2,76 CBISIS GEBIG 2.83 i.ltk
1.97 100177 COBPSE 2.00 5.15
2.69 GUN SUBTSBISO 1.03 3.79
2.66 SHOCK <?BTAT. 3.18 5.63
1.U8 KDBQER FASCISM 2.07 U.67
2.23 MIUCE suumr 2.37 3.82
3*08 FI£1 PRISON 2.33 5.83
2.U3 fflBBlIS GBISF 2.07 U.33
1.8U 1SBB0B s u ic u s 1.61 lt.06
z.liS HOBT POISC« 2.$0 lt.65
2.10 FUUIBB CHIKTNATf 2.68 5.63
2.30 CBIFPLB imSBAL 1.93 5.27
2.71 HEBT CSDEUTi 1.60 5.63
2.80 ? 1U TOHFDBE 1,1|6 5.75
2.23 TIOISNCB T^ TStaiSK 2.U5 5.63
192
APPEaiDIX H oont'd 
OR ConditioD
£ Prlae Target £ £
3.99 UHIT3 LxVBCnOH 2.72 5.90
U.oo BgAgttB SPDIEB 3.27 5.80
i*.07 mis SBSPilB 2.21 5.92
3.95 ROHEBR CRAMP 2.89 5.95
ii.03 iSr.L PAHIC 2.60 5.70
k *0Q VilCH i!n!ACK 2.U1 5.88
li.07 QATBS rTTJjffi 1.87 5.80
U.10 lOB GONHAN 2.2U 5.95
PBOSDCTS moo(2i 2.69 5.73
li.07 BBiCE BIDICUI£ 2.26 5.95
U.02 m m DISASTER 2.1U 5.88
U.oo TBEBIS CONFLICT 2.91 5.95
l*.05 i l U S RABIES 1.63 5.9I4
1|.02 PIPER PAffwiqnAKB 2.38 5.95
u.02 POCKET E7IL 1.96 5.95
3.95 IRDEX EPlDBilC 2.57 5.9I1
3.93 CI£BK KNIFE 3-12 I1.90
193
APPiaiDIX U c o n t* d
UP  ^ C nnditlQ n
£ Prime Target















i^ .OO OB7ICE wA?m
1|.0^ OOTPm ?ZLCW
APPEMDIX H o o n t »d






2.15 Hn r.T. BBASY
2.18 E3ia>17 VfEtnEHi







2.19 S T n c BLQFE
2.59 im o u s SUHN
2.11 CONDBiH ELPOCK
2.22 ACCUSED CHU










li.11 i n dCAL













ScD eriaw t 10. n »  iii.<u,iM a t i w  o f
fltt&t_l3_D<aity (E) l8  alBo elYwi
Condition
fiDotional £ Neutral £
CANCEB 7 JURSRY 1*
c o r n u 6 GLOVES l4
HA'PRim 6 H0TE[£ 3
TB 6 AC It
PAIN 6 PASS It
RAPE 7 fSKTP 3
TiTggigP 6 FEBCafT h
SUICQB 6 POCKETS It
AIDS 6 CEDI It
BOMB 6 SR8R It
BBITIST ? MTHBBAT. It
TOETOBB 7 COSNBCT It
nUBCTION 1 UTILITIES It
GDiur 6 OMHER It
CRtTRI. 6 CUBIC It
VI) 6 BC It
PLICDE 6 DRIVES u
MDTIIASE 7 Ifll'RiWIiSj It
ftWTOT 6 WRIST It
PAIKIBB 6 HEÌASDRE It
S tln u li used fo r  tb e  a oM sn en t o f
d e tect ion  threshold In  KtoerlnMit 10
o B J ic r n s
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